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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
Property and Welfare in Liberal Political Philosophy 
by 
Jennifer Louise Mayor 
In Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Robert Nozick argues that only a 
minimal, nightwatchman state is morally justified because a state 
with more extensive powers "violates persons' rights not to be 
forced to do certain things". He writes that his view implies 
that the state may not justly compel "some citizens to aid others". 
;It is the justification of compelling "some citizens to aid others" 
~lhat is the subject of this dissertation. 
In arguing for his position, Nozick invokes the name and prestige 
of two foremost liberal philosophers, Locke and Kant. It is shown 
that these two philosophers to whom Nozick turns for support do not 
support him at all, for they, like other philosophers in the liberal 
tradition such as Mill and Reid, argue that the property rights of 
the affluent be limited to provide for the needs and welfare of those 
unable to do so for themselves, that the state may justly compel some 
citizens to aid others. 
It is possible that, while Nozick is not, as he believes, a true 
disciple of Locke and Kant, or, indeed, in the mainstream liberal 
tradition on this important aspect of distributive justice, he has, 
nevertheless, produced a theory of property rights that can stand on 
its own merits, without appeal to Locke and Kant. It is argued that 
this is not so either, that Nozick fails to give convincing arguments 
for his strong property rights. 
The rejection of the idea that redistribution is a legitimate sphere 
of state action did not originate with Nozick in the twentieth 
century. The idea is clearly expressed in the writings of HUme in 
the eighteenth century. In order to show mora c~early the implausi-
bility of the minimal state case, Hume's argumen~s against redistri-
bution are investigated and shown to fail. 
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1. 
"A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he 
cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a 
just demand, and if society do not want his labour, has 
no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, 
in fact, has no business to be where he is. At Nature's 
mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells 
him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own orders".l 
T. Malthus, An Essay on the Principles of Population, 
Second Ed., 1803, p.531. Quoted in: A. Menger, The 
Right to the Whole Produce of Labour, First Ed., London, 
1899, p.4. 
vii 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia has stirred considerable 
controversy among philosophers not only because of its generally 
stimulating and provocative nature, but also because Nazick advocates 
a libertarian view of the state. He belieyes that only what he calls 
the "minimal, nightwatchman state"l, that is, a stat~ "limited to the 
narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement 
of contracts" is morally justified, and that "any more extensive state: 
will violate persons' rights not to be forced to do certain things". 
r "noteworthy implication" of this view, he informs us, is that "the 
state may not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting 
some citizens to aid others,,2. It is the justification of "getting 
some citizens (without their consent) to aid others" that is the sub-
ject of this dissertation. 
The view that. aid to the needy is a duty of justice, enforceable by the 
state, and that the property rights of the wealthy may be curtailed to 
satisfy such positive rights of the needy is fundamental .to modern 
welfare liberalism. Welfare liberals believe that the state is 
required to tax the wealthy to provide for the material needs of those 
who are unable to look after themselves. For Nozick, in contrast, need 
per ~ can never create a right to any part of the wealth (earned or 
unearned) of others. It may be the case that A and his family are 
able to live lives of luxury, eating caviar twice daily, while Z and 
his family have insufficient bread, but this, of itself, is not unjust. 
Nozick believes, contra the welfare liberals, that where A is in no way 
responsible for Z's plight, Z can have no claim on any part, however 
small, of A's wealth. 'The idea that there are rights to benefits, on 
the grounds of need, as the welfare liberals maintain, is a mistaken 
one. In taxing (without consent) its wealthier citizens in order to 
satisfy these supposed rights to benefits, the welfare state is 
violating the rights of the property-holders to dispose of their 
property as they choose. 
Nozick argues that, in advocating "enforced benevolence" and positive 
rights to aid, welfare liberals have abandoned those moral principles 
and rights that were the cornerstone of traditional liberalism, 
especially the liberalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
I 
Welfare liberals, he informs us, have "shifted" away from the moral 
principles and rights of the "classical liberals,,3. In particular, 
they have rejected those strong property rights that stem from the 
moral principle of "self-ownership". Nozick tries to resurrect what 
he takes to be the fundamental moral principles and rights of trad-
itional liberalism and embody them in his own theory of distributive 
justice. In so doing, he invokes the name and prestige of two fore-
most liberal philosophers, Locke and Kant, in support of his own 
"minimal-statist" and anti-welfare position. 
Now it appears that there are many philosophers who have doubts and 
reservations about the correctness of Nozick's uncompromising line, 
his firm stand against welfare rights and redistribution, but who 
remain as convinced as Nozick himself that the theory of distributive 
justice in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is, indeed, based upon those moral 
principles and rights espoused by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
liberal philosophers, especially Locke and Kant, and certain other, 
more recent, liberal philosophers. In other words, while Nozick 
believes that the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the 
purpose of getting some citizens to aid others, and his critics believe 
that the state is morally required to use its coercive powers to this 
end, both he and they are equally convinced that traditional liberalism, 
especially the liberalism of Locke and Kant, takes the Nozickian line 
in respect of its advocacy of strong property rights and a limited, 
nightwatchman, role for the state. Thus Paul writes: 
Anarchy, State and Utopia cannot be divorced from the 
tradition of which it is so obviously a part. Nozick is 
the twentieth century successor to the great classical 
liberals of the seventeenth century - Locke, Grotius and 
Pufendorf. 4 
He adds that Nozick is "the recent successor to Lockean liberalism,,5 
He "revives the claim long associated with Locke and Spencer that a 
'minimal state limited to the narrow functions of protection against 
force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts and so on is morally 
justified' ,,6 Similarly, Williams writes that Nozick is "with Locke" 
in his advocacy of the minimal, nightwatchman state, that is, the 
7 
"nightwatchman state of classical liberal theory" , and Wolff claims 
8 
that "Nozick elaborates a neo-Lockean theory of property" , advocates 
"the classic theory of rights 
Mill theory of the public and 
and border-crossings,,9, and the "Locke-
10 private" Finally, Scanlon tells us 
that Nozick has a "framework of rights derived from Locke"ll. 
2 
· 12 It can be seen that, like Nozick h1mself ,these critics and commen-
tators make reference to the "classical liberal" tradition. It appears 
to be their belief (and Nozick's) that philosophers such as Locke, 
Pufendorf, Grotius, Kant and Mill, among many others, are "classical 
liberals", and, as such, conSistently argue for a Nozickian-type 
principle of self-ownership, strong property rights, and a minimal, 
nightwatchman role for the state. They regard Nozick in the same way 
as Nozick regards himself - as one of the latest in this long tradition 
of "classical liberals" who have argued for a minimal-statist, anti-
welfare position. 
rt is my primary goal in this dissertation to show, by a detailed 
examination of their workS, that many of those philosophers who have 
been called "classical liberals" such as Locke, Pufendorf, Reid, Kant 
and Mill do not take the uncompromising, anti-redistributionist stand 
that Nozick takes. I shall show in particular that the two liberals, 
Locke and Kant, to whom Nozick turns for support, do not support him at 
all, for they, like Pufendorf, Reid and Mill, argue that the property 
rights of the affluent be limited to satisfy the needs and welfare of 
others, that the state may legitimately use its coercive apparatus for 
the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others. I shall show 
further that the justifications they offer for redistributing property 
are coherent in terms of the pre-suppositions and assumptions of their 
own theories. 
Thus, it is my contention that it is wrong to call philosophers like 
Locke, Pufendorf, Reid, Kant and Mill "classical liberals" for they do 
-not eschew all forms of state-enforced redistribution and aid as do the 
true "classical liberals" such as the modern libertarians and their 
philosophical ancestors, the nineteenth-century laissez-faire "economic 
individualist" school. I aim to show that many libertarian philo-
sophers such as Nozick and Hospers, and many commentators and critics 
of libertarian theory, such as Paul and Williams, have seriously mis-
interpreted these earlier liberal philosophers whom they have called 
"classical liberals", and that Nozick and Hospers have added to this 
mistake of interpretation by invoking their names in support of their 
own extreme positions. (Just as Nozick invokes the names of Locke and 
13 Kant in support of his position, so Hospers turns to Mill in support 
of his own, even more extreme pOSition, but, as I shall Show, the 
3 
rights and liberties found in the theories of Locke, Kant and Mill are 
very unlike those found in libertarian and classical liberal theory.) 
Although the focus throughout will be upon the right to aid, this topic 
will be discussed in the wider context of the property rights and 
principles that each philosopher considers ideally just. By this 
means, the contrast between the true classical liberals or libertarians 
and those who h~ve been wrongly categoriseq,as classical liberals will 
be more sharply delineated. 
Nozick claims that contemporary welfare liberals have "shifted" away 
from the moral principles and rights that were fundamental to the 
fheories of Locke and Kant. My aim is to show that the rights and 
principles of modern welfare liberalism are quite consistent with those 
that Locke, Kant (and other liberals) articulated, that the welfare 
state is founded upon a principle of distributive justice that these 
earlier liberals also acknowledged, namely that the right to have one's 
basic needs satisfied is a more fundamental right than that to dispose 
of all one's property as one chooses. Rather, the "shift" has been 
made by Nozick himself - a shift towards a principle of self-ownership 
so strong and a right of property so absolute that it becomes appro-
priate to ask whether the property rights of individuals may ever be 
compromised (Nozick says "violated") even to avert "catastrophic moral 
14 horror" . As I shall show, the question would not be at all 
appropriate in the context of the theories of property of Locke, 
Pufendorf, Reid, Kant and Mill, and Locke, the philosopher from whom 
Nozick's own rights are supposed to be derived, would have regarded the 
question itself with "moral horror". 
Now it is, of course,possible that while Nozick is incorrect in his 
belief that he is a true disciple of Locke and Kant, or, indeed, in the 
mainstream liberal tradition on this important aspect of distributive 
justice, that he has, nevertheless, produced a theory of property rights 
that can stand on its own merits, without appeal to these other philoso-
phers. In other words, it might be the case that Nozick's mistake is 
merely one of interpretation, rather than justification, and that, by 
substituting the terms "Nozickian moral principles" for "Kantian moral 
principles" and "Nozickian rights" for "Lockean rights", he might be 
able to show convincingly that redistribution for welfare is not a con-
cern of distributive justice and that the minimal state iS r indeed, 
4 
"inspiring as well as right,,15 
My second goal in this dissertation is to show that this is not so 
either and that he does not succeed in making a good case for his 
minimal state and Nozickian property rights. In order.to do this, I 
shall examine the grounds or justificatory basis of rights as he out-
lines them in b?th Anarchy, State and Utopia and in his recent work, 
Philosophical Explanations. I shall argue, in part~cular, that if 
property is required for a value-seeking life, and property rights are 
justified on account of this, then the case for some redistribution by: 
the more-than-minimal state is very strong. If what is of ultimate 
ralue is a value-seeking life, and property is necessary for such a 
'life, then it seems that all persons should have at least that minimum 
amount of property required for such a life, and'.that some redistribution 
will be necessary. In other words, it is reasonable to claim that 
whatever basis or fundamental value serves to justify or give point to 
a right to property should also serve to justify a right to welfare. 
This, I shall show, is the position taken by other liberals such as 
Locke, Kant, Reid and Mill in respect of their own justifications of 
rights to aid. 
The rejection of the idea that redistribution for aid is a legitimate 
sphere of state action did not originate with those like Nozick, 
Hospers and Rothbard in the twentieth century or even with the laissez-
faire liberal economic tradition in the mid-nineteenth century. The 
idea may clearly be seen in the writings of Hume in the eighteenth 
century. In order to show more clearly the implausibility of the 
minimal-statist, anti-welfare position, which is the second goal of this 
dissertation, I also investigate Hume's defence of his strong property 
rights and his arguments against redistribution, and show that the case 
he presents is no more convincing than Nozick's. 
Now, although Hume leans towards the conservative tradition, laying 
great emphasis on custom, tradition, and the security of society, he is, 
nevertheless, important from the viewpoint of this study in that he 
employs an argument in defence~ his strong property rights and anti-
welfare position which becomes familiar with later nineteenth-century 
laissez-faire liberals and twentieth-century libertarians. He claims 
that his system of property rights operates to the material advantage 
5 
of every member of society. Now his system of property rights makes 
possible the flourishing of what is often called the "laissez-faire" 
market economy - a market economy untouched by government or f·ree of 
government "interference". The implication of his view is that no 
redistribution, no welfare payments, and no modification of the free 
market is necessary because all individuals, including the poorest and 
the weakest, benefit from the operation of ~he "untouched" market 
economy. 
This particular defence of strong property rights and the minimal, 
nightwatchman state clearly articulated by Hume in the eighteenth 
Fentury is still vigorously maintained to this day and, thus, has 
more than historic interest. Hospers, for example, argues that 
"Everywhere the free market has been permitted to flourish, prosperity 
for the masses of the people has followed,,16 and "economic abundance 
can be assured only by the free market ... to the extent the free 
market is tampered with, the abundance people take for granted is 
jeOpardised,,17 Similarly, to Berlin's challenge that the 
"unrestrained" free market works to the advantage of "the strong, the 
brutal and the unscrupulous against the humane and the weak ... 
18 freedom for the wolves has meant death to the sheep" , Rothbard 
claims that "unrestrained economic individualism leads, on the con-
trary, to peaceful and harmonious exchange which benefits most 
precisely the 'weak' and the 'sheep'; it is the latter who could not 
survive in the statist rule of the jungle, who reap the largest share 
19 
of the benefits from the freely competitive economy" Hume has thus 
initiated what appears to be a powerful and important defence of such 
.. -
strong property rights, and the minimal, nightwatchman state. I shall 
show that such a system of property rights as Hume and others like 
Nozick, Hospers and Rothbard advocate, which make possible this 
"unrestrained economic individualism" is not to the advantage of all 
for the benefits do not necessarily "filter down" in such a way that 
the material needs of every person are satisfied. Thus, some re-
distribution by the more-than-minimal state is necessary. 
In addition to claiming advantages for his particular type of "market" 
property rights, Hume also employs two arguments against redistribution 
of property. These are: the argument from liberty (a typically 
liberal argument) and the argument from the security of society (a 
6 
typically conservative argument). Clearly, if it were the case that 
individuals' liberty would be infringed and their lives subject to 
coercive interference by government officials or the security ,of 
society threatened, by any state-enforced scheme of redistribution, 
these would constitute powerful reasons against the practice. The 
liberty argument is used by Hume specifically against redistribution 
for "perfect equality" rather than against the more moderate schemes 
, 
of redistribution for aid. But from his silence on the subject of 
state-enforced welfare, it seems that he might have believed that his 
argument was valid for redistribution at any level. I aim to show 
that this argument has little plausibility when applied to more moderate 
~chemes of redistribution for welfare. His argument from the security 
I 
of society seems to be intended to apply to all forms of redistribution, 
including that for welfare. I aim to show,against Hume, that the 
security of society actually requires some moderate redistribution. 
In the course of my arguments against Hume, I refer to points made by 
his liberal friend and contemporary, Francis Hutcheson. The. inclmsion 
of Hume's theory of property in this thesis broadens the discussion 
beyond the frontiers of liberalism, but.m showing that his conservative 
and liberal arguments fail, I aim to demonstrate more clearly the 
implausibility of the minimal-statist, anti-welfare case. 
It is not my aim in this study to discuss all the philosophers to whom 
I have referred in this introduction with the same degree of detail. 
I have devoted a full chapter each to the two anti-welfare philosophers, 
Hume and Nozick. Nozick is especially important because his view of 
redistribution for aid is in marked contrast to that of his supposed 
-philosophical predecessors, Locke and Kant, and because ',.his is the 
most cogent and sustained attack on the welfare position to be produced 
in recent years. Hume is important in that his strong property rights 
and anti-welfare position may be sharply contrasted with the more 
moderate positions of certain other eighteenth-century philosophers 
such as Reid, and also because some of the arguments that form part of 
his lucid defence of his own position have survived to this day. 
Of the pro-welfare philosophers to whom I have referred, I have sought 
to discuss and analyse more fully those whose theories of property are 
better known, or more controversial, or, in my opinion, more seriously 
misinterpreted. I have devoted a full chapter each to Locke and Mill 
7 
on the grounds of both misinterpretation and significance in liberal 
theory. Reid, Pufendorf and certain other philosophers such as 
Price are discussed mainly by way of contrast on specific pOints 
on the grounds that their theories of property are rarely, if ever, 
discussed in the philosophical literature. Kant is accorded inter-
mediate treatment - he is given a full section in the chapter on Nozick. 
Even though his, theory of property and wel~~re is little known and 
discussed, he makes his case for welfare so plain that the contrast 
wi th Nozick who invokes his name and support is all the more st.riking. 
Locke, Hume, Mill and Nozick are, therefore, discussed in .. indi vidual 
chapters. It can be seen that I have devoted one complete chapter to 
I 
a philosopher from each of the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, and that two of these, Locke and Mill, are pro-
welfare,. and two, Hume and Nozick, are anti-welfare. The chapters are 
arranged in a historical order, reflecting the historical character of 
the dissertation. 
* * * 
It can be seen that the question of rights is central to this study. 
Mention has already been made of the right to benefit or aid, and we 
have seen that Wolff, in criticizing Nozick's position, makes refer-
ence to the "classic theory of rights". It is appropriate at this 
stage to say something about the "classic theory of rights" (or the 
"negative theory of rights" as it is also sometimes called) and to 
demonstrate the way in which this theory of rights differs from what 
may be called the "welfare theory of rights". :rn so doing, I shall be 
able to introduce the classification of rights which I use throughout 
the following chapters. The classification I have adopted is that 
outlined by Joel Feinberg in Social Justice20 as it is very comprehen-
sive and permits a high-lighting of the key difference between the 
classical liberals and libertarians on the one hand and their welfare 
opponents on the other in respect of aid and redistribution. 
Feinberg distinguishes between in personam and in rem rights, between 
positive and negative rights, and between active and passive negative 
rights. In personam rights are rights held against particular, 
nameable individuals. Their distinguishing characteristic is that 
they enable the right-holder to demand that these particular and certain 
8 
individuals perform specific duties. In contrast, in the case of in 
rem rights, there are no determinate or nameable individuals. Such 
rights are assertable against the "whole world", that is, against all 
persons who are in a position to infringe or violate them. They 
enable the rightholder to demand that such persons perform specific 
duties. 
These specific duties may be either positive or negative. Positive 
rights (both in personam and in rem) are rights to positive performan-
ces (positive duties) on the part of others while negative rights (both 
in personam and in rem) are rights to others' omissions or forebearances 
l(negative duties). Thus, for every positive right I have, someone 
I 
else has a duty to do something; while for every negative right I have, 
someone else has a duty to refrain from doing something. Negative 
rights may be either active or passive. Active negative rights enable 
the rightholder to do something (should he choose to do so) and 
passive negative rights enable the right-holder not to be treated or 
done to in certain ways. All these rights, therefore, impose duties 
on the part of others. The rights of Feinberg's classification are 
distinguished according to the nature of the duties they impose upon 
others, or according to the person or persons upon whom they impose 
duties. 
The right to welfare or aid that we mentioned earlier in the 
introduction is a, posi t'ive in rem right: It is positive in 
that the specific duty with which it correlates is one that requires 
a positive performance on the part of these others against whom it is 
held (such as taxpaying) rather than a mere act of omission or fore-
bearance. It is this category of rights which is most significant 
from the viewpoint of this dissertation, and which, as Nozick points 
out, requires the regulatory or more-than-minimal state to be satisfied. 
Moreover, it is this category of rights which is absent from genuine 
classical liberal and libertarian theory. If philosophers such as 
Locke ,: 'Pufendorf, Reid, Kant and Mill are, indeed, classical liberals 
who argue for the "classic theory of rights" we should not expect to 
find such positive in rem rights in their theories of property and 
distributive justice. 
Positive in personam rights are held not against a group of persons, 
or "the whole world", but against specific, nameable individuals and 
9 
they are rights to positive actions from these individuals. !fA 
owes B £1, he has a duty to B to repay that amount, and B can insist 
that A discharge his duty, and can justly complain if A fails to do 
so. B's right holds against one assignable person, A. The distin-
guishing characteristic of positive in personam rights is that they 
are correlated with positive duties of determinate individuals. 
Contracts and agreements are covered by this category of rights. The 
category also includes the rights of the wrongfully injured to damages 
from their injurers. 
Such positive in personam rights are, of course, important in the 
~heories of all those philosophers to whom we have referred in the 
rintroduction for making contracts and agreements is an important 
feature of a free society. While for "pro-welfare" philosophers there 
are two kinds of positive rights in an acceptable theory of distributive 
justice - in personam and in rem rights - for "anti-welfare" philoso-
phers, in contrast, there can be only one type of positive right - the 
positive in personam right. Indeed, this kind of right is of great 
significance to libertarians and classical liberals for it is a 
"backbone" right of the market society. 
Negative rights are rights against others not to be interfered with; 
they are rights to other persons' omissions and forebearances. Thus, 
the homeowner's right to the peaceful occupancy of his home, a land-
owner's right to the exclusive enjoyment of his land and an individual's 
right to the possession and use of the money in his pocket all correlate 
with duties of non-interference on the part of others. Most negative 
rights are in rem rights in that they hold against·· "the whole world"; 
they correlate with duties of non-interference on the part of every 
other person, rather than specific, nameable individuals. 
These negative rights may be subdivided into active and passive rights; 
active rights are rights to act as one chooses provided in so doing 
one does not infringe the rights of others; passive rights are rights 
not to be done to in certain ways. The key passive rights are the 
rights to be let alone, to have one's privacy, to be left to enjoy 
one's property, to have one's reputation undamaged and to have one's 
body unharmed. Collectively these rights are often referred to as 
the "right to security". Among one's active rights are those to 
speak openly about the things one believes in, to move from place to 
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place without the permission of others, to associate with whom one 
chooses, to use one's property for one's own benefit and to dispose of 
it as one pleases. Collectively these rights are often referred to 
as the "right to liberty". 
It is these (active and passive) negative in rem rights that are fore-
most in peoples' minds when they think of the "liberal rights and 
liberties", and'this is correct for both pro-welfare and anti-welfare 
philosophers recognise these rights. Indeed a list~'of active and 
passive rights similar to those given in the last paragraph is out-
lined by the pro-welfare, Thomas Reid2l There is, however, an 
.important difference between classical liberals and their modern 
I 
i 
counterparts, the libertarians, on the one hand, and their welfare 
opponents on the other in respect of the active and passive component 
rights that make up the "right to property". For welfare liberals, 
the right to enjoy, use and dispose of one's property is limited by 
the positive in rem right to aid. There can be a right to enjoy, to 
use to one's benefit, and to dispose of, only that part of one's 
property that remains after taxation, or after the positiVJe.in rem 
right to welfare has been satisfied by other means such as by giving 
in to some authority a part of the food one has grown or the goods one 
has produced. In contrast, in the "classic theory of rights" espoused 
by classical liberals and libertarians, no such limit is placed on the 
right to property. The owner has full choice in respect of all his 
property. ThUS, he has the passive negative right to be left in the 
peaceful enjoyment of all his ~ropert~ and the active negative right 
to use it all to his benefit, and to dispose of it all as he chooses. 
This classic property right is often described as the absolute right 
to property in order to contrast it with the redistributionist's 
limited right to property. Although for classical liberals a 
property right is absolute in this sense, there is another sense in 
which it is not absolute. The property owner cannot use his property 
in a way that infringes the negative rights of others. .Thus, A 
cannot allow poisonous fumes to escape from his factory which are 
damaging to the health of other people in the area. The classic 
property right is thus the full or absolute power and discretion 
over one's own property, but within the limits of other persons' 
negative rights. The welfare liberal property right is the power 
and discretion over one's property but within the limits of others' 
11 
negative and positive in rem rights. I shall show, in the following 
chapters, that Locke, Pufendorf, Reid, Kant and Mill argue for the 
welfare liberals 'property right and not the classical liberals' 
property right as is generally believed. 
This completes our classification and summary of the various kinds 
of rights that ~ill be used throughout thi~ study. We are now ready 
to turn our attention to the first of our philosophers, John Locke. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LOCKE'S THEORY OF PROPERTY 
Introduction 
In an article called "The Right to Life", Hugo Bedau writes "It would 
be fascinating to study in detail the steady emergence of the con-
viction (and the supporting legislation) that society and its govern-
mental agencies have the duty to provide the minimal necessities of 
life as a matter of the individual's right". But "One thing is 
certain", he adds, "Natural rights theorists such as Locke contributed 
. 
hothing to the growth of this vie~'~. Bedau, thus, makes the claim 
that Locke acknowledges only a purely negative right to life. As a 
classical liberal who espouses the classic theory of rights, he sees 
the right to life as a negative in rem right - a right not to be 
killed, injured or interfered with by others, but not as a positive in 
rem right to be supplied, by the more fortunate members of society, 
with the goods one needs to stay alive. 
In similar vein, Rodney Peffer writes that although "Locke and other 
classical liberals were the first to stress the existence and sanctity 
of natural rights of human beings ... they construed them as permissions 
to act in certain ways and correlative obligations of others not to 
interfere. The underlying ideas were that persons ought to be free 
'to order their actions and dispose of their possessions as they see 
fit' and that 'all men must be restrained from invading one another's 
rights ,,,2 But "they refused to recognise rights ~o certain types of 
goods" or rights to be in a certain kind of "economic position". 
Peffer maintains, in other words, that Locke, like other classical 
liberals refused to recognise "welfare rights,,3 or positive in rem 
rights to aid. 
In this chapter, we shall see that these two commentators (together 
with many others) are incorrect in their claim that Locke recognises 
only negative in rem rights to life and property (the typically 
classical rights of non-interference) and no positive in rem rights to 
aid. Locke's account of the rights to life and property will be 
examined in detail, and it will be shown, in particular, that his 
justification of redistribution for aid is coherent in terms of the 
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assumptions or pre-suppositions of his theory, and that the rights to 
welfare and property have a common ground .or foundation. It will 
also be shown, contra C.B. Macpherson, that Locke's property ~ights 
and principles of distributive justice do not provide the rationale 
for the laissez-faire market economy and the unlimited accumulation 
of wealth associated with "poss~uve individualism". Thus Locke is 
not to be seen as a founding father of laissez-faire theory, classical 
liberal entrepreneurship and the minimal, nightwatchman state. 
l: tiatural Law and Natural Rights 
I 
Locke's theory, like other natural rights theories before his, is 
grounded in theology. According to Locke's theory, God has made the 
World and laid down certain laws to which men are subject. This 
Natural Law is "a declaration of God's will and a standard of right 
4 
and wrong" It not only specifies men's rights, but also their 
duties and obligations; it not only sets out what others may not do 
to him, but it also sets out what he must do to, and for, others. I 
shall begin this chapter on Locke's theory of property with a short 
account of his- ideas of Natural Law and Natural Rights. This is 
necessary because ~hese two parts of his theory are intimately linked 
so that an understanding of his theory of property requires some under-
standing of his theory of Natural Law and Natural Rights. Locke 
clearly specifies the centrality which God plays in granting (and 
limiting) property rights; for God, says Locke, "hath given the World 
to mankind in common,,5, and it is only because of this gift that men 
are able to obtain individual property. 
1.1 God and Natural Law 
In the Essays on the Law of Nature, Locke argues that the· order and 
regularity found in the World points to the existence of a maker or 
6 
creator of this order and regularity He next argues that God, this 
maker, must have made the World for some end or purpose: 
... Since on the evidence of the senses it must be concluded 
that there is some maker of all these things, whom it is nec-
essary to recognise as not only powerful but also wise, it 
follows from this that he has not created this world for 
nothing and without purpose. For it is contrary to such 
great wisdom to work with no fixed aim. (ELN 157, 5-10) 
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As man is part of the world it would follow that God must have made him 
for some purpose for again "it is contrary to. such great wisdom to work 
with no fixed aim,,7. It could not be possible that God who "has him-
self created the soul and constructed the body with wonderful art, and 
has thoroughly explored the faculties and powers of each (ELN 155, 3-6) 
should have done so for no good reason. Locke suggests that God must 
have made "cert~in definite principles of a.~tion" which, if accomplished, 
fulfil his purposes for man. He could not have intended man to live a 
life of indolence because he has made him with "an agile, capable mind", 
and with "a body besides which is quick and easy to be moved hither 
and thither by virtue of the soul's authority,,8 Such "equipment for 
action" could not have been given 
l"sPlendidlY idle and sluggiSh,,9 
to man so that he should remain 
Thus, Locke concludes, "God intends 
d . ,,10 man to 0 somethLng 
Locke thus attempts to prove that (1) there is a "lawmaker to whom we 
are necessarily subject" and (2) that he has made a law "with respect 
t th · b d b ,,11 o Lngs to e one y us This Natural Law which is a set of 
moral propositions, a standard of right and wrong, may be known to us 
by both reason and revelation. "Reason and revelation are alternative 
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or conjunctive paths to the Law of Nature" . "Anyone can understand 
it (i.e. the Law of Nature) who is willing to apply diligent study and 
direct his mind to the knowledge of it,,13. 
Given, then, that man is dependent on God in the sense that he has been 
made by, and thus owes his existence to God, why is it the case that 
man is morally obliged to fulfil the ends for which his Creator 
.. 
designed him? How does moral obligation arise from this fact of 
creation and dependency? Locke argues: 
And this obligation seems to derive partly from the divine 
wisdom of the Lawmaker, and partly from the right which the 
Creator has over his creation. For, ultimately, all obli-
gation leads back to God, and we ane bound to show ourselves 
obedient to the authority of his will both because our being 
and our work depend on his will, since we have received these 
from him, and so we are bound to observe the limits he 
prescribes. (ELN 183, 15-21). 
Locke argues that God, as man's creator, has a "Creator's right" in man 
which gives him the right to use man for the ends for which he designed 
him14. When man acts according to God's purposes, that is, according 
to Natural Law, he is acknowledging the fact that God has such "rights 
of creation". Man's obligation, Locke says, :rises from "the authority 
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and dominion which someone has over another ... by natural right and 
the right of creation (jure naturae et creationis), as when all things 
are justly subject to that by which they have first been made,. and are 
15 
also constantly preserved" If men know that there is a God who is 
their Creator, they cannot, Locke believes, deny that h.e "has right 
and authority over themselves; for who will deny that the clay is 
subject to the potter's will, and that a piece of pottery can be 
, 16 
shattered by the hand by which it has been formed" . When God 
, 
imposes obligations or Natural Laws on man, he is merely exercising 
his "rights of Creation". The idea that the fact of creation gives 
the creator rights over that which he has created was not uncommon in 
. ..Locke's time. Baxter makes a similar point: 
! God's kingdom is not constituted primarily by contract, but 
by His right resulting immediately from His being our Creator, 
and so our owner; our obligation is founded on our being His 
creatures, and so His own. The most absolute slave imagin-
able, cannot be so much obliged to you antecedently to his 
consent, as man is unto his Creator, from whom he is, and 
hath all that he has. (HC3. 28)17 
1.2 The Four Natural Laws 
According to Locke,a law is "that which prescribes to everything the 
form and manner and measure of working,,18 In his account, law is not 
a negative concept in the sense that it merely prohibits a certain 
range of activities; for Locke, law is a positive concept in that it 
prescribes or enjoins certain actions: it directs the agent in such a 
way that his good and best interests are attained: 
For law, in its true Notion, is not so much the Limitation as 
the direction of a free and intelligent Ag@llt .. to his proper 
Interest and prescribes no further than is for the general 
Good of those under that Law. Could they be happier without 
it, the Law, as a useless thing, would of itself vanish; and 
that ill deserves the name of confinement which hedges us in 
only from Bogs and Precipices. So that, however it may be 
mistaken, the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but 
to preserve and enlarge Freedom. (TT 2:57, 10-18) 
What actions or activities does the Law of Nature prescribe? 
(i) That Man should live the life which suits his nature: 
Locke, as we have seen, argues that God never works without a purpose. 
He has made the world for a purpose and he has similarly made man for 
a purpose. He has given man "equipment for action", in particular, 
17 
he has furnished him with an "agile, capable mind" - the power to reason 
- that he may be a self-direct.ing agent, and the author of his own 
actions. "A manner of acting is prescribed to him which is sui table 
. 19 .. 
to his nature" ,Locke says. The form of act1v1ty which suits man's 
nature is rational activity in accordance with natural law. "The 
2(), 
proper function of man is acting in accordance with reason'" Man has 
a duty to live ~ccording to reason and natural law, for this is the 
~ 
proper function of man - proper in the sense that is the purpose that 
God has in mind for him, and proper also in the sense that his proper 
or best interest can be served only by living in this way. 
~(ii) That Mankind should be preserved: 
I 
This second law of nature is called by Locke "the fundamental law of 
Nature". He says "the fundamental law of nature being the preser· ... 
vation of mankind,,2l or "the fundamental law of nature, man being to 
22 be preserved" By this concept of "preservation" Locke seems to 
mean what we would call "conservation" or the continued existence of 
mankind in the world. It is God's intention, Locke says, "that man 
should abide for some time upon the face of the Earth", and it is not 
his intention that mankind "should perish again" after only "a few 
moments continuance,,23. (TT 1: 86, 4-9). In the Second Treatise, Locke 
expresses this fundamental law of preserving mankind in two different 
ways: The natural law enjoins that each man (1) must preserve himself 
and (2) must preserve the rest of mankind (where this action is not 
detrimental to his own preservation)~4. 
In the Second Treatise, Locke does not discuss natural law in great 
detail, yet the key ideas found in the ELN, of man's dependency on God, 
of the Creator's rights, and man's obligation to fulfil God's purposes 
are clearly stated in the reasons he gives for this natural obligation 
to preserve oneself and others. The following statement shows that 
he did not abandon these earlier ideas when he came to write the Two 
Treatises even though he does not discuss them in detail. 
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and 
infinitely wise Maker; All the Servants of one Sovereign 
Master, sent into the World by his order and about his 
business, they are his Property, whose workmanship they are, 
made to last during his, nor another~s Pleasure Every 
one as he is bound to preserve himself ... so by the like 
reason when his own preservation comes not into competition, 
ought he, as much as he can to preserve the rest of Mankind. 
(TT 2:6, 10-22). 
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The fundamental law of nature to preserve mankind may be otherwise 
expressed as the obligation to preserve mankind in the person of one-
self and in the person of others. Locke sees self-preservation as an 
objective natural law; it is not merely a subjective desire on the 
part of the agent to preserve his own life (although, of course, an 
agent may have such a desire in additiOn)25. Self-preservation 
expressed as mere psychological propensity would lead to a Hobbesian 
, 
theory as Locke points out: "An Hobbist, with his principle of self-
preservation, whereof he himself is to be the judge, will not. easily 
admit a great many plain duties of morality". Clearly, if self-
preservation were mere subjective desire and not a natural law 
bbligation as well, it would follow that those who happened .to lack 
I 
'the desire to preserve themselves would be at liberty to commit suicide. 
Locke, of course, denies that a man has a right to take his life. His 
26 life belongs to God and he has no moral power to throw it away what-
ever desires he happens to have. 
(iii) That Society should be preserved: 
27 The third natural law is that society ought to be preserved. Locke 
holds that part of God's purpose in making man was to "put him under 
strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive 
him into society, as well as to fit him with understanding and language 
to continue and enjoy it,,28 In the manuscript, Locke says: 
If he finds that God has made him and all other men in a 
state wherein they cannot subsist without Society, and has 
given them judgment to discern what is capable of preserving 
and maintaining that society, can he but conclude that he 
is obliged and that God requires him to follow those rules 
which conduce to the preserving of Society~ (MS f.3, fols,201-2) 
According to Locke, man is not only dependent on God, he is also depen-
dent on other men. His very existence depends on the society of other 
men. Clearly, if men have a natural law obligation to preserve man-
kind, then they must also have a natural law obligation to preserve 
society, since mankind can have no existence but in society. In 
Locke's analysis, men are not seen as a collection of atomic units 29 
who pose and impose contrary and frequently conflicting egoistic 
demands upon each other and the world. This is the kind ,of view one 
finds in Hobbes and (as we shall see in the next chapter) in Hume too. 
Rather, Locke assumes a conception more in keeping with the organicist 
tradition - a conception more approximate to the principles of trad-
itional Christian thought. According to this organicist tradition, 
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men are not seen as a collection of conflicting and disorganised 
individuals but rather as an integrated or composite whole whose 
elements are inseparably connected with each other and their social 
context in a fundamental way. Locke considers only fully socialised 
30 
and inter-dependent men, not isolate~ atomic units. Without natural 
law there can be no society, and without society the individual is 
not a man but a "noxious beast,,3l. 
(iv) That man should worship God: 
32 
The fourth natural law concerns men's obligation to worship God I,' 
shall not discuss this law as it has no particular relevance to Locke's 
Itheory of property. 
1.3 Freedom and Equality 
We have seen that according to Locke's theory men do not make themselves, 
they do not own themselves, and they are the workmanship of God. They 
are his servants, sent into the world on his business and they are even 
his property. "From this common sense starting point, Lazlett says, 
Locke" proceeds to two inferences, that we are all free·and we are all 
33 
equal" Such inferences could not, of course, be drawn if it could 
be shown that God had given any man, or order of men, superiority over 
other men - if, for example, the hierarchical relationship of God to 
man could have an analogous use between some men and other men on Earth 
thus justifying positions of social superiority and inferiority. One 
theorist, Robert Filmer, had attempted to show that such inequality 
and differences in men's freedom was God's intention. He had claimed 
that "there was to be found in Revelation a proof that God had set 
some men above other men, fathers above sons, and men above women, the 
34 
older above. the younger and kings above all others" . His theory 
had attempted to justify a right to absolute authority for any father 
or prince, and this, of course, meant that the concept of a free human 
being subject to no authority but his own will was absolutely impossible. 
Lock~summarises Filmer's position thus: 
Rights of Fatherhood in our A---'s sense is a Divine un-
alterable Right of Sovereignty whereby a Father or Prince 
hath an Absolute, Arbitrary, Unlimited and Unlimitable 
Power over the Lives, Liberties and Estates of his Children 
and Subjects; so that he may take or alienate their 
Estates, sell, castrate, or use their Persons as he pleases, 
20 
they being all his Slaves, and he Lord or Proprietor of 
every Thing, and his unbounded Will their Law (TT 1:9, 6-12) 
Filmer, following Grotius, had argued, in particular, that it was pro-
creation, one individual creating another individual by begetting him 
that gave a right of superiority, subjection of one will to another 
35 
and even ownership According to this theory, Locke says, "Every 
man that is born is so far from being free that by his very Bi'lHh he 
becomes a subject of him who begets him". (TT 1:50, 13-14) "Fathers 
have a power over the Lives of their children because they gave them 
Life and Being,,36 Now, clearly, if it is the case that the father 
puts "life and being into the child", it is the father who is the 
creator of that child and not God. It is then the father, not God, 
who has the "makers rights", the jure creationis I and, if this is the 
case, it would demolish Locke's argument for man's dependency on God. 
Moreover, if this dependency relation of man on God is demolished the 
very foundations of Locke's theory of Natural Law and hence his 
political theory would fall to the [,-,.'ound. It was thus necessary for 
37 Locke to refute Filmer's traductionist theory that the life or being 
of the child comes from the father and argue for a creationist theory 
according to which the soul or being of the child comes from God alone. 
They who say the Father gave Life to his children, are so 
dazzled with the thought of monarchy, that they do not, as 
they ought, remember that God who is the Author and Giver 
of Life: 'Tis in him alone we live, move and have our 
Being. (TT 1: 52, 10-14) 
It is not necessary to look in detail at the arguments Locke employs to 
refute Filmer'~ traductionist theory and to establish his own case that 
all men are the workmanship of God and hence equal to one another. But, 
briefly, Locke argues that a creator must really know what life and 
soul are, but such knowledge is not available to men. "How can he 
(i.e. man) be thought to give life to another, that knows not wherein 
his own life consists?,,38 Parents cannot therefore be the knowing or 
real makers of their children for they remain ignorant of what that 
soul really is. Parents "are but the occasions of (their children's) 
being,,39 and God "alone can breathe in the Breath of Life,,40. Locke 
concludes: This is 
Sufficient to convince us of an Almighty Contriver, and he 
has so visible a claim to us as his Workmanship, that this 
Fatherhood is such an one as utterly excludes all pretence 
of Title in Earthly Parents; for he is King because he is 
indeed Maker of us all, which no parents can pretend to be 
of their children (TT 1:53, 17-26) 
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In this way Locke argues his case that all men are the workmanship of 
God, and not of other men. They all stand in the same relationship 
to their creator and are thus all equal and free. Men do not make 
other men so there are no natural superiors on Earth. "The Lord and 
Master of them all" has not "by any manifest Declaration of his Will 
set one above another" (TT 2:4). All men have the same faculties, the 
same natural adyantages; "power and jurisc!,iction is and must be 
reciprocal among them"; there must be no "subordination" or "sub"';' 
jection,,4l Only a maker has special rights and no man is a maker. 
No man has made another man nor the external objects in the world. 
Man made not himself nor any other man. Man made- -not the 
world which he found made at his birth. Therefore, noe man 
at his birth can have noe right to anythin~ in the world 
more than any other. (MSc28fols. 139-40)4 
1.4 Natural Rights 
43 The state of Nature is a "state of perfect Freedom" and it is a 
"State also of Equality,,44 in that no man is the natural master of any 
other man. - 45 However, it is "not a state of Licence" for men may not 
live just as they please; they must live according to the Law of 
Nature. 46 They must live "within the bounds of the Law of Nature" . 
The Law of Nature, as we have seen, enjoins the preservation of mankind. 
In order to preserve himself a man will need, among other things, food, 
raiment and shelter. In short, he will need to have possessions. 
Further, if he is to live according to the Natural Law he will have to 
be a free agent. Clearly, a man could not preserve himself if other 
men could come and attack him and remove his po~e~sions. Thus the 
Natural Law enjoins men not to harm one another. 
The Law of Nature teaches all mankind who will but consult 
it that being all equal and independent, no one ought to 
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or Possessions. 
(TT 2:6)47 
The Law of Nature, in addition to imposing obligations on men also 
grants them rights. Locke mentions the "right to preserve mankind,,48, 
"the right to self-preservation,,49, the "right to the means of 
preserving" (one's life)50, and the "right of one's freedom". Every 
man thus has the natural right to preservation (life), the natural 
right to the means of preservation (property), and the natural right 
51 
to freedom . 
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The Law of Nature imposes obligations of forebearance or obligations 
to abstain from harming in respect to just those goods to which men 
are said to have rights. Lamprecht states that the rights mentioned 
52 by Locke "may be summed up as the right to life, liberty and property" 
and it is these goods regarding which there are obligations of non-
53 interference imposed by Natural Law. Raphael also draws attention 
to the duties of forebearance or non-interference which Natural rights 
impose upon others: 
Locke is not altogether consistent in his usage, but on the 
whole he follows the tradition. The obligations of Natural 
Law include obligations to other men, and therefore, natural 
rights are, by and large, rights of recipience against other 
men. My natural right to life is a right against other men 
that they should not deprive me of my life; it corresponds 
to their natural obligation not to kill me. My natural right 
to liberty is a natural right against other men that they should 
leave me in peace; it corresponds to their obligation to leave 
me in peace. 54 
Raphael adds that the right to estate or property is a combination of a 
right of action (a freedom from obligation not to appropriate what is 
available for common use, that is, a right to consume), and a right of 
recipience (to the non-interference of others. in the use of what one 
has appropriated). According to Raphael, "has a natural right" means, 
for Locke, that "others are obligated under the Law of Nature not to 
interfere,,55. 
According to most interpretations of Locke's theory of rights (such as 
those of Raphael, Lamprecht, Bedau, and Peffer) every right is met with 
a corresponding duty on the part of someone else. This analysis is 
correct as far as it goes. But it is not the whole story for it 
seems to be the case that some of Locke's rights additionally impose 
duties upon the rightholder too. The natural rights to preserve one-
self and to preserve mankind (which spring directly from the fundamental 
Law of Nature to preserve mankind) are not discretionary rights; that 
is, their exercise is not at the rightholder's discretion, but is simply 
the exercise of the natural duty to preserve mankind. 
It is clear, then, that while all rights, for Locke, correlate with 
duties of others, two types must be distinguished. The first type 
. . ,,56 
we may call "discretionary" or "optional clal.m rl.ghts This type 
covers most of the familiar Lockean freedoms, those rights whose 
exercise is protected by duties of non-interference on. the part of 
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others, but those exercise is optional for the rightholder. While I 
need not exchange my plums for nuts or employ a servant, for example, 
should I decide to do so, others are bound to permit me to exercise 
my rights to do so. In general, I am entitled to determine the 
course my life will take, within the bounds of Natural Law, without 
interference from others. Locke's second type of rights, in contrast, 
are non-optional. They are rights which are held as a direct con-
sequence of duties which the rightholder has. Thus, if I have a duty 
to do X, I must also have a right to do X, and this in turn correlates 
wi th others' duties to allow me to do my duty. This kind of right is,. 
therefore, a consequence of my possessing a duty; if I have a moral 
ruty to do X, I must be left free by others to perform it. This kind 
of right Feinberg calls "mandatory" in order to distinguish it from 
the "discretionary" kind. A "deontic" right would be another name. 
The natural rights Locke specifies at TT2:2 (the right of self-
preservation and the right of preserving mankind) are simply rights to 
do what we are said to be bound to do at TT2:6 '" Similarly, at TT2:58, 
in his discussion of parents' rights over their children, he writes: 
"The power (rights), then, that parents have over their children arises 
from that duty which is incumbent upon them, to take care of their 
offspring" and he adds that parental rights might just as well be 
called duties (TT2:67 and 69). All parents have a mandatory right or 
duty to "preserve what they have begotten"; this right to preserve 
one's children itself stems from the fundamental Law of Nature to 
preserve mankind. 
The rights to preserve oneself and to preserve mankind are mandatory, 
not discretionary, for Locke, of course, because ail lives belong to 
God. An individual has a mandatory right to preserve his life and 
take the requisite means to preserve his life even if he is desperately 
unhappy and would prefer to end it 57 . He has a right and duty to 
preserve his life and the lives of others) because human lives belong 
to God, and a man has no right to throwaway what belongs to another. 
For no Man or Society of Men, having a Power to deliver up 
their preservation or consequently the means to it 
They will always have a Right to preserve what they have 
not a Power to part with. (TT 2: 149, 18-25) 
They have no moral power (right) to part with their lives. They have 
a mandatory right or duty to preserve what they have no moral power to 
part with. It would have made as much sense if Locke had said that 
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they have a (mandatory) right to preserve what they have a duty to 
preserve. According to his theory, as we have seen, all men are the 
workmanship of God, and every man exists at God's pleasure, and not at 
the pleasure of other men. A man can no more throwaway his own life 
than he can throwaway another's life. He has a mandatory right and 
duty to preserve both. Moreover, he has a mandatory right and duty 
to take the requisite means to preserve human life. Thus, it is not 
simply that an individual must not kill himself (or others) by act of 
commission; he must not do so by act of omission either (let himself 
or others die). In respect of one's ~ preservation, for example, 
one has no right to forfeit voluntarily one's inclusive claim right to 
~se the goods of the world for one's survival (see pages 26-28). 
~here can be no such negative in personam right in Locke's theory. 
"No one", he says, "may forego that which is necessary to his life" 
(TT2:23). In respect of others' preservation, it follows that one may 
not deny the needy those goods necessary for their preservation - to 
let other people die of hunger or lack of shelter is to kill them by 
act of omission. These perpetual duties or mandatory rights of 
preservation, thus, have clear implications for property rights as we 
shall see shortly. 
It is held by most commentators such as Lamprecht, Raphael, Bedau, 
Peffer, Paul, Wolff and Williams that all the natural rights in Locke's 
theory are rights that are correlative to obligations of forebearance 
(on the part of others) and that none are correlative to obligations of 
performance (on the part of others). In terms of Feinberg's classi-
fication of rights (see Introduction) all Locke's natural rights are 
negative in rem rights; there are no positive in rem rights for there 
are no rights to be given goods that one lacks - even if they are vital 
to one's very survival. Thus, Locke's statements that: 
and 
Men being once born have a Right to their Preservation and 
consequently to Meat and Drink and other such things as 
Nature affords for their Subsistence (TT 2: 25, 1-4) 
He that is Master of himself and his own Life has a Right 
too to the means of preserving it (TT 2: 172, 26-7) 
are usually interpreted in a purely negative sense. The right to one's 
preservation is merely the right to be left alone to fend for oneself 
and one's family, by, for example, gathering nuts from unowned trees, 
or moving on to unowned land to cultivate it and make it productive. 
One has a right that others do not thwart one in such activities. Others 
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have a correlative duty of forebearance. But, as we have just seen, 
it follows from Locke's argument, that there should be positive in rem 
rights to welfare as well. I shall argue, later in this chapter, 
that while most of the rights in Locke's theory are negative as commen-
tators have pointed out, he does admit, in addition, a positive in 
rem right to aid, and that this has been neglected for philosophers 
have concentrated their attentions on Book Two of the Two Treatises 
and have ignored Book One in which Locke gives his clearest statement 
of the positive in rem right to aid. 
theory of property. 
It is now time to turn to Locke's 
2. Common Ownership and Private Appropriation 
2.1 Common Ownership 
Locke's theory of property begins with an assumption derived from the 
Natural Law notion that man inhabits the Earth in accordance with a 
Divine Plan and that those things which are present on the Earth were 
put there for the use and benefit of all men." The assumption, then, 
is that land and its fruits are, or were, given to men as a class of 
beings. They were not, as Filmer thought, given to a particular man 
or set of men, namely, Adam and Adam's heirs. Because Filmer took 
positions diametrically opposed to some of Locke's deepest theological 
and political convictions, he felt compelled to contest them. 
Locke attempts to refute Filmer's theory by offering an alternative 
interpretation of the Scriptures. The importa~ce of scriptural 
interpretation is fundamental to the argument for the scriptures are 
a revelation of God's intentions for man. In them God reveals how 
the Earth and its fruits are to be used. Clearly, if there is a 
Natural Law obligation to preserve mankind and men also have natural 
rights to their preservation it is very important to know how the 
world is to be used to secure this end. The text that occasions the 
dispute is r Gen. 28 
And God blessed them and said unto them, be fruitful and 
multiply, and replenish the Earth and subdue it, and have 
dominion over the Fish of the sea, and over the fowl of 
the air (TT 1:23,1-5) 
According to Filmer, such dominion and property is private dominion 
and private property. Thus, he argues that God gave Adam (and Adam's 
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heirs) private property in the Earth and its creatures. It is this 
equation of dominion and property with private ~ominion or private 
property that Locke denies. Locke agrees that property or dominion 
was granted to Adam but this is not the same as private dominion or 
private property: 
And: 
I shall show ... that by this grant God gave him (i.e. Adam) 
not Private Dominion over the Inferior Creatures, but right 
in common with all mankind; so neither was he Monarch upon 
the account of Property here given him. (TT 1:23, 15-16) 
Whatever God gave by the words of this Grant, 1. Gen. 28, 
it was not to Adam in particular exclusive of all other men. 
Whatever Dominion he had thereby it was not a Private 
Dominion, but a Dominion in common with the rest of Mankind. 
(TT 1:29, 1-4) 
Locke thus denies that God gave to Adam and his heirs exclusive private 
property rights over the World and its fruits such that other men 
could be denied access to the use of these goods. Dominion is not an 
exclusive right of ownership, the right to exclude others from poss-
ession. Dominion is dominion in common. "God in this donation gave 
the World to mankind in common and not to Adam in particular,,58 
Dominion is an inclusive right in that it includes all men. Men have 
a right not to be excluded from the use of the world; they have a 
right to use the world which was donated to them all. They have a 
moral title or claim to be able to use the world which God gave them 
all for the sake of preservation and support. 
God ... himself gave them all a Right, to make use of the 
Food and ',Rayment, and other conveniences of Life, the 
materials whereof he had so plentifully provided for them. 
(TT 1:41, 12-17)59 
By this idea of "dominion in common" Locke attempts to establish the 
social and economic equality of men in the state of nature. We have 
seen how, for Locke, there are no natural superiors on Earth. All 
men are equally God's workmanship and no man makes other men. Filmer's 
right of private dominion would in fact ensure that some men were 
superiors, for some men, by virtue of their birth, by virtue of being 
Adam's successors, would be at an advantage over the rest of mankind. 
It is this that Locke is seeking to deny in his lengthy and detailed 
rejection of Filmer's interpretation. God did not favour some men 
over others. (The significance of this point and its relation to the 
duty and right of preservation will become clearer later in the 
chapter.) 
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Men have only a use right in respect of the World for God is the real 
maker and thus the sole proprietor or owner of it. The ~orld is en-
trusted to men for their use. God has given them permission.to use it. 
In respect of God the Maker of Heaven and Earth who is sole 
Lord and Proprietor of the whole World, man's propriety in 
the Creatures is nothing but that Liberty to.use them which 
God has permitted. (TT 1:39, 49-52) 
Men may only use the World for the ends that God prescribes, namely 
, 
subsistence and enjoyment. Locke clearly notes that God intends use 
to cover more than bare subsistence. God, he says "gives us all 
things richly to enjoy" and "the Earth and all that is therein is 
given to men for the Support and Comfort of their being". (TT 1:26,3-4) 
2.2 The Need for Private Appropriation 
A moral title or claim right to use the World which belongs to us all 
is, by itself, insufficient, for with this right alone there is no 
possibility of actually using any objects in the World. This inclusive 
claim right is not, as we have seen, a right of private property or 
private possession. By this right no ownership is possible. There-
fore, at some stage an exclusive right is required so that men may eat 
and wear what is necessary for their preservation. There needs to be 
some individuation of that to which all men equally have a moral title. 
Locke argues, as we have seen, that God '~ath given th~ World to man-
kind in common for the support and comfort of their being". Clearly, 
if the Earth is to provide such support and comfort, there must be a 
morally permissible means to appropriate portion£ 9f it, for if no 
particular man were entitled to use any of it, it would support and 
comfort no one. Men have a natural right to their own self-preservation 
and since this right only makes sense if we understand it to imply that 
we may appropriate what we need to keep us alive, Locke concludes that 
there must be a way in which men may justifiably acquire or appropriate 
what he needs to preserve himself: 
... Nobody has originally a private Dominion exclusive of the 
rest of Mankind ... as they are thus in their natural state, 
yet being given for the use of men, there must of necessity 
be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they 
can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular 
Man. (TT 2:26, 8-12) 
Again, with respect toland, Locke argues: 
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God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he gave it 
to them for their benefit, and the greatest Convenience of 
Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be 
supposed he meant it should always remain common and un-. 
cultivated. 
The justification of individual appropriation from what is common to 
all rests on two fundamental assumptions; namely, that the Earth is 
given to all men in common, and that all have a natural right to life 
(or preservation). The right to appropriate what one needs is a 
natural right just because it is a consequence of the assumptions of 
Natural Law . It is a right that can be known to us by Reason and 
• Revelation. 
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We can summarise Locke's argument thus far as follows: 
1. God's intention in giving the Earth to all men is "the support 
and comfort of their being". 
2. For the fulfilment of this purpose, a certain kind of action 
is required of men, namely, private appropriation. 
3. If a certain kind of action is demanded of men for the fulfil-
ment of a Divine Intention, it must be morally permissible for 
men to do the action in question. 
4. Therefore, it is morally permissible for men to appropriate. 
2.3 The Problem of Private Appropriation 
Locke agrees with Grotius and Pufendorf that the Earth has been given 
to mankind in common and Filmer's theory that Gdtl has given the Earth 
to Adam "and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his 
Posterity" is brushed aside with disdain. However, the theory of a 
common donation poses a problem, namely the problem of accounting for 
the emergence of the exclusive rights associated with ownership. 
Since all men have an equal claim to all things, how does the mere 
physical act of appropriation have the effect of excluding others from 
the object? The problem is posed by Locke thus: 
This being supposed, it seems to some a very great difficulty 
how anyone should ever come to have a property in anything. 
(TT 2:25, 8-10) 
The solution that Pufendorf and Grotius offer is that it was a primeval 
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compact among men in which each agreed to respect the acquisitions of 
others that gave rise to particular exclusory rights and obligations 
with respect to things. Pufendorf asserts: 
The first convention among men was about those very concerns, 
to the effect that whatever one of those things which were 
left open to all, and of their fruits, a man had laid his 
hands upon, with the intent to turn it to his uses, could 
not be taken from him by another. 60 
The agreement need not have been explicit; ~tacit acceptance was a 
61 
sufficient mark of consent 
This idea of a primeval compact among men was subjected to a very 
~horough criticism by Filmer. 
! 
Jure Belli et Pacis he writes: 
In his Observations upon Grotius's De 
Certainly it was a rare felicity that all the men in the 
World at one instant of time should agree together in one 
mind to change the natural community of all things into 
private dominion; for without such a. unanimous consent 
it was not possible for community to be altered; for if 
but one man in the world had dissented, the alteration had 
been unjust, because that man by the Law of Nature had a 
right to the common use of all things in the world ... 62 
Locke also considers it implausible to presume that a social contract 
had been made at this stage to regulate the distribution of the neces-
sities of life. He does not comment on Filmer's point about the one 
"mean and base" individual being sufficient to wreck the pact. Instead 
he makes his own criticism. "If such consent as that was necessary", 
he argues, "Man had starved notwithstanding the Plenty God had given 
him,,63 It is sometimes argued that Locke rejects the idea of a con-
tract because such a contract tends to limit the holdings of each 
individual, and Locke is interested in justifyin~ extensive accumulation 
of property - the kind of extensive accumulation that an emerging 
Capitalism would demand. It seems instead that Locke rejects the idea 
of a contract because he judges that it is implausible. If each man 
has to wait for the consent of all others before he can gather one nut, 
he would starve "notwithstanding the Plenty" in the World. Thus, for 
Locke, there must be some morally permissible means for individuals to 
appropriate those things they need for preservation, some way for 
particular men to establish a claim to make certain external goods 
"their own", that overrides the common claim of all men, but a way 
that excludes a social contract. 
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2.4 Locke's Argument for Private Appropriation 
Though the Earth and all inferior Creatures be common to all 
men, yet every rn~n has a Property in his own Person .. This 
nobody has any right to but himself. The Labour of his Body 
and the Works of his Hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever, then he removes, out of the State that Nature hath 
provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and 
joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it 
his Property. It being by him removed from the Common 
State Nature placed it in, hath by this Labour something 
attached to it that excludes the common right of Men. For 
this Labour being the unalterable Property of the Labourer, no 
man but he can have a right to what that is once joyned to, at 
least where there is enough and as good left in common for 
others. (TT 2:27) 
~e steps in Locke's argument for individuation or particularisation of 
I 
common property are as follows: 
1. Every man has a property in his own person. 
Though the Earth and all the inferior Creatures be 
common to all Men, yet every man has a Property in 
his own Person. This nobody has any right to but 
himself. 
2. Therefore, (from 1) every man has property in the labour of his 
body and the work of his hands. 
3. By mixing his labour with something, he removes it from the commons 
by having "joyned to it something that is his own". Therefore, 
goods he removes from the State of Nature become his property. 
This argument, the "labour argument" has been the subject of much criti-
cism. A particularly strong attack has recently been made on it by 
J.P. Day who goes so far as to claim that Locke's first premiss is both 
"absurd and meaningless,,64 I shall try to show that Day misunder-
stands the point that Locke makes, and that his criticism is not valid. 
Day summarises Locke's argument as follows: 
"1 . Every man has a right to own his person. 
2. Every man has a right to own the labour of his person. 
3. Every man has a right to own that which he has mixed the 
labour of his person with. ,,65 
PREMISES 1 and 2 
Day states that the kind of right that Locke intends in his first premiss 
is clearly a moral and not a legal right. But this premiss makes no 
sense for "it is unintelligible to talk of A having a moral right to do 
X, unless there is a possibility of him not doing X". The premiss is 
as absurd as, for example, the premiss that bachelors have a right to 
be unmarried. The latter is absurd because they can be no other. Day 
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is clearly correct that a bachelor insofar as he is a bachelor is 
unmarried, and can only be unmarried to be referred to as a "bachelor". 
But suppose one thought that all had the duty to enter into a .marital 
relationship and propagate offspring ("increase and multiply"). It 
seems then that one could deny bachelor, A, his moral right to be a 
bachelor even though he is in fact one. That is, one could deny the 
bachelor his moral right to be unmarried even though, as a bachelor, 
he can be no other. Similarly, a thief insofar as he is a thief is 
one who steals. But is it absurd to deny the thief's right to be a 
stealer, since as a thief he can be no other? 
'Moreover, it does not seem to be at all absurd to talk of a man's having 
:: 
a right to own his own person for there is a possibility of a man's 
being owned by another as in a relationship of slavery. For Locke, 
of course, all men in the State of Nature are "free and equal", and in 
this passage, Locke is simply restating the point. 
What does Locke mean when he says "Every man has a Property in his own 
-Person"? Locke argues, as we have seen, that menYs lives are 
entrusted to them by God. God has given to each individual the use-
right of his person. Each has the right to use (control, direct and 
manage) his person, to determine the course his life will take, but 
within the bounds of the Law of Nature. He is, in this respect, 
"Master of himself and of his own Life". No other person is:his master. 
"Each one has a Liberty to dispose of and order as he lists his Person 
and Actions '" and his Whole Property within the Allowance of those 
Laws under which he is" (TT 2:57). For example, an individual may 
make a contract in which he places his labour under the direction and 
disposal of someone el.se for a specific time or for a specific task. 
The rights to use and dispose of one's own person are not without 
limitations. The Law of Nature (and, as we shall see shortly, Civil 
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Law) regulates the extent of one's rights. Thus, for example, one 
may not sell oneself into slavery, nor may one dispose of oneself by 
suicide. To have a property (right) in one's person and in the labour 
of one's person is, then, to have the right to dispose of one's person 
and actions (one's labour, skills and capacities) as one chooses but 
within the bounds of the Law of Nature or Civil Law (which must be 
compatible with Natural Law). 
The Lockean concept of "a property in" one's person must, therefore, 
be carefully distinguished from full liberal self-ownership. Full 
Liberal self-ownership includes the rights to destroy oneself and to 
~ell oneself into slavery. Lockean ownership or property in one's 
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person does not include these rights. Moreover, the Lockean limit on 
the power of disposal (as we shall see) applies to property in external 
goods as well as to property in one's person. Individuals may not 
destroy, damage or waste any natural resources in which they have a 
property right. Again, Lockean rights in external goods must be care-
fully distinguished from full liberal ownership in such goods which, 
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according to Becker and Honore, lnclude the. rights to destroy and 
waste. 
The labourer, Locke argues, mixes his labour which is his "unquestion-
able property" with that which is to be appropriated, and by so doing 
he annexes something to it that "excludes the common right of other 
men" . Locke thus treats the case of labouring upon something as 
analagous to the case of mixing a substance we own with another that 
-we do· not own. Olivecrona suggests that the concept of mixing is a 
metaphor. "It would be absurd to contend that the labour of killing 
a deer or picking an acorn from the ground is, in the exact sense of 
the expression, 'mixed' with the deer or the acorn respectively,,67 An 
activity may be directed upon a substance, and may affect or alter the 
substance, but it makes no sense to speak literally of an activity being 
mixed with a substance. Besides the conceptual problem associated with 
"mixing", there is the further problem that there seems to be no 
intuitive warrant for the supposition that mixing gives title. "If I 
own !l can of tomato juice and spill it into the sea", Nozick asks, "do 
I thereby come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato 
juice?" 68 A property claim thus cannot be granted on the basis of the 
kind of "mixing" that Locke has in mind. If it is to be granted at 
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all, it would have to be granted on the basis of the more usual concept 
of "labour". The question of whether labour entitles will be examined 
shortly. But first we must examine the charge that premises.l and 3 
are incompatible. 
THE COMPATIBILITY OF PREMISS 1 AND CO~~L~\Q~ 
o:>ru:..\u.s.~~,,-
The compatibility of premiss I and ~ has recently been called into 
question by Becker: 
The fact is that without some modification of one or both 
proposi tions, "Everyone has property in his own body or 
person' and 'Everyone is entitled to the fruits of his labour' 
are strictly incompatible. They are incompatible because, 
supposing they are true of everyone, then either (1) parents 
are entitled to property rights in their children (as the 
fruits of their labour) in which case not all people have 
property rights in their own persons (or bodies) - namely 
those with living parents who have not relinquished their 
rights in their children; or, (2) parents are not entitled 
to property rights in their children, in which case they are 
not (always) entitled to property rights in the fruits of 
their labour. 69 
If the two premises are incompatible, one of them must be dropped or 
modified. Becker argues that it is unlikely that Locke would want to 
drop or modify the first one, that is, drop or modify his claim that 
h . ht t h' 70 Th" 1 t every man. as a rJ.g 0 J.S own person J.S J.S sure y correc , 
for, as we have seen, Locke argues against Filmer that all men are born 
free and equal. There are no natural superiors on Earth for the 
hierarchical relationship between God and man has no counterpart on 
Earth.between some men and others. It was not God's intention, Locke 
argues, to set some men above other men, fathers above sons, men above 
women, or older above younger. 
Becker suggests that it must be the premiss that grants to each the 
fruits of his labour that must be rejected or modified. One may take 
the "other alternative" and "insist that people do not always have a 
right to the products of their labours - specifically, that they do 
not have such rights when their labour produces other people". But 
how, Becker asks, is "such a restriction to be justified as anything 
other than an ad hoc device to square Locke's arguments with conven-
tional moral principles?" After all, "if anything is clearly a product 
of one's labour, a child is. It seems unlikely that anything will be 
found in the nature of the labour involved in conception, gestation, 
birth and nurturing which will distinguish it sufficiently from the 
labour involved in cultivating a garden to justify using the latter 
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71 in a Lockean argument but forbidding the use of the former" . 
Now Becker is clearly correct that if one has a property right. in the 
fruits of one's labours, and if one's children are the fruits of one's 
labours, then one would have property rights in one's children. But 
are one's children the fruits of one's labours? It is Becker, not 
Locke, who contends t.hat "one's children are properly described as the 
fruits of one's labours". Earlier in this chapter, it was pointed out 
that Locke argues for a Creationist and not a Traductionist account of 
life. All men are "God's workmanship", no man creates other men; 
only God can do this. "T'is in .him alone that we live, move and have 
our being". (TT 1:52, 10-14) 
His Fatherhood is such an one as utterly excludes all 
pretence of Title in Earthly Parents; for he is King 
because he is indeed Maker of us all, which no parents 
can pretend to be of their children. (TT 1:53, 17-26) 
Children are thus the fruits of God's labours; they are his workmanship, 
not their parent's workmanship. Becker wrongly attributes to Iiocke 
the Traductionist theory - the very theory that Filmer holds and Locke 
rejects. Thus, it is not the case, as Becker argues, that "Everyone 
has a property in his own person (or body)" and "Everyone is entitled 
to the fruits of his labours" are incompatible. They are compatible 
because children are the fruits of God's labours and not the fruits 
of men's labours. Men are still entitled to the fruits of their 
labours for this excludes one's children, and children have rights to 
their own persons. 
A VALID DEDUCTION? 
Day argues that Locke's deduction of '-hit e:.(ltlL~\<lt\. f-;'om premiss 2 is invalid 
in that it is possible to accept the premiss that "every man has a 
right to own the labour of his person" while rejecting the conclusion 
that "every man has a right to own that with which he has mixed his 
72 labour" "How is it", Becker similarly asks, "that the property 
rights to one's body 'transfer' or extend to property in the products 
of one's labour? Insofar as one's labour is inseparable (by way of 
ownership rights) from one's body, it is understandable how the first 
"extension" from ownership of the body to ownership of the labour - is 
warranted. But the same can hardly be said for the second extension 
- from ownership of labour to ownership of labour's products. The 
products of one's labour are clearly separable from one's body. And 
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Nozick's question remains: Why is it that investing one's labour in 
something causes one to come to own that thing? Why does it not 
instead just mean that one has lost the investment? ... (or) Why does 
it not just mean that you are entitled to public admiration? Or, the 
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gratitude of your fellows? 
It is clear that both Day and Becker believ_~ that Locke, in this 
passage, is advancing a full justification for private appropriation. 
But this is not so. He has already provided an argument to show that 
men have the right to take and use natural resources for their pres-
ervation and comfort. Becker and Day lift the "labour argument" out 
?f its context, ignoring all that Locke has said before, and, thereby, 
miss this important right upon which the rest of the argument depends. 
Locke never supposes that without a prior right to the goods in 
question, labour alone will give a man title. If a man mixes his 
labour with goods to which he has no right - say, he has stolen them 
from someone else, or taken more than his share (see p.38) then he will 
have no title to the goods, however painstaking or diligent his labour. 
In Locke's account, men have a Permissive or Liberty Right to take and 
set to use unowned goods in the world because God gave the world to 
mankind in common for their support and enjoyment. His intention was 
that they should appropriate the goods of the world and he therefore 
gave them a permissive right in this respect. If a man had a right to 
own the labour of his person, but no right to appropriate the goods of 
the world, then his "mixing" his labour with them would not give him 
title. He would merely lose the investment of his labour. The 
Liberty (Permissive) Right to use and appropriate the goods of the 
world is as important as the right to own one's person and labour. 
Both rights are clearly required for "mixing" to give title. The 
importance to Locke's theory of the Permissive Right to appropriate 
and the consequences of not admitting such a right are humorously out-
lined by Spencer: 
If no man can equitably become the exclusive possessor of any 
article, or as we may say, obtain a right to it ... then 
among other consequences it follows that a man can have no 
right to the things he consumes for food ... wherefore pursuing 
this idea we arrive at the curious conclusion that as the whole 
of his bones, muscles, skin etc. have been built up from 
nutrients not belonging to him, a man can have no property in 
his own flesh and blood, can have no valid title to himself, 
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has no more claim to his own limbs than he has to the limbs 
of another, and has as good a right to his neighbour's body 
as his own. 74 
In their analyses of Locke's argument, both Becker and Day fail to 
take account of this Permissive or Liberty Right. But once this 
right is omitted, it becomes unclear why labour alone may give a man 
title to that upon which he has laboured. ' 
It is important to note that the right to take goods for one's 
preservation is not even optional; it is, for Locke, a mandatory 
right or duty - that is, one must take some of the world's resources 
for this end. 
to his life". 
"No one", Locke says, "may forego what is necessary 
Thus, a man cannot even waive his right to take those 
goods with which he has mixed his labour when those goods are 
necessary to his preservation. 
3. Individual Labour and Familial Property Rights 
Earlier in this chapter, reference was made to the Natural Law 
requirement to provide for one's children. Although, in Locke's 
account, it is individual labour which gives rise to property entitle-
ments, the entitlements to which it gives rise are familial, not 
individual. Locke's primary economic unit is the family. 
For Children being by the course of Nature, born weak, and 
unable to provide for themselves, they have by the appoint-
ment of God himself, who hath thus ordered the course of 
Nature, a Right to be nourish'd and maint~ined by their 
Parents, nay a right not only to a bare Subsistence but to 
the convenience and comforts of Life, as far as the Con-
ditions of their Parents can afford it. (TT 1: 89) 
Property and labour of the parents are the necessary means to acquire 
the provisions required for the maintenance and (if possible) the com-
forts of the children. Thus, a parent does not acquire an indefeas-
ible personal title to property simply by the investment of labour. 
Any nuts that a parent gathers, any deer he hunts, the produce of any 
land tilled and sown, is his but subject to the joint rights of his 
dependents. 
Men being by an Obligation bound to preserve what they have 
begotten, as to preserve themselves, their Issue come to 
have a Right to the Goods they are possessed of. (TT 1:88) 
By propagating offsprin~ parents have the mandatory right and duty 
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under Natural Law to supply their children with the necessities and 
(if they can afford it) the comforts of life. To this end, parents 
incur an obligation to remain within the relationship of marriage 
for the full term of their children's dependency. The marriage must 
last "so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the 
young ones, who are sustained by those that got them, till they are 
able to shift and provide for themselves" (TT 2 :79) . 
While the parents live, their children share a title to their goods; 
the parent's entitlement is a kind of joint tenancy with their chil-
dren. When the parents die, their children acquire the whole of the 
property, also by natural right, (but subject to the needs of other 
persons, see pages 57-64). 
Every Man is born with A Right before any other man, to 
inherit with his Brethren, his Father's Goods (TT 2:190) 
The parent's obligation to preserve what they have begotten: 
Gives Children a Title, to share in the Property of their 
Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions. Men 
are not proprietors of what they have merely for them-
selves, their Children have a Title to part of it, and 
have the ir Kind of Right j oyn 'd with thelir Parent s, in the 
Possession which comes to be wholly theirs, when death 
having put an end to their Parents use of it, hath taken 
them from their Possessions, and this we call Inheritance. 
(TT 1: 88). 
All the children have a right in the parent's property. Locke, thus, 
argues against Filmer's doctrine of primogeniture. If the rationale 
of inheritance is the parental duty to preserve offspring and, if 
possible, to maintain and leave them in comfort, then there can be no 
distinction between first- and last-born, male and female. This by 
itself is sufficient to dispose of Filmer's contention that all the 
property in the world is vested in a single line (TT 1:91). Locke, 
in fact, adds that, if any child is to have precedence, it should be 
the last-born, not the first-born, since it is the last-born who is 
likely to be in greatest need of sustenance at the parent's death. 
4. The Limits to Property Acquisition 
Locke's argument for the justification of original individual 
appropriation is as fOllows: if we assume that (1) the Earth is given 
to all in common, and (2) all men have a natural right to life (self-
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preservation), and (3) all men have a property in their own person; 
and if we argue that (2) implies some justifiable form of appropriation 
and (3) implies that this justifiable form of original appropriation 
is possible via human labour (as the latter is part of our property in 
our person), we may then conclude that an individual man may with 
justification appropriate something if he mixes his labour with it 
with the objective of satisfying what he will need for "the advantages 
of life". 
Pufendorf, as we noted earlier, argued that any exclusive right to 
external property must be based on a contract so that the interests 
of others will not be prejudiced - the idea being that if every man is 
party to the contract, the holdings of each will be limited to the 
extent that they do not prejudice other men's interests. Locke, 
therefore, has to show how, in the absence of such a contract, others' 
interests are not prejudiced. 
As Locke sees his assumptions (1) and (2) in the above argument as 
having limiting implications, the above conclusion gives the necessary 
but not sufficient conditions for justifiable appropriation. 
Assumptions (1) and (2) clearly imply certain restrictions on the 
amount and degree of morally legitimate appropriation. As regards 
assumption (1), that each man has the claim right to use and enjoy 
the fruits of this world naturally limits the amount of things in which 
any particular person can have a property. If a man comes to have a 
property in things to the extent that it excludes others from the 
exercise of that claim right, then this possession ceases to be his 
property. At the foundation of Locke's theory is not an exclusive 
right of the type found in Filmer's theory (and, as we shall see, in 
Hume's and Noz ick's theories) but a right of all to be included in the 
use of the World's goods. That there is this prior right makes all 
the difference. A similar limitation is engendered by assumption 
(2). As a man's right to life i~ inalienable, and he has a natural 
right to preserve himself, it is clear that any attempt to appropriate 
what is necessary to fulfil the needs of another, would infringe upon 
the right to life of that other man, the right he has to preservation 
or a continued existence in this World. For Locke, natural rights 
have correlative duties, one of which is the duty to forebear when 
another is engaged in a practice that Natural Law enjoins. The very 
39 
possibility of ascribing an individual right to each man seems to 
demand this. 
Locke explicitly discusses two limits to appropriation. 
be discussed separately. 
Each will 
By the first limitation, a man is entitled to that which he acquires 
by the labour of his person only "where there is enough and as good 
75 left in common for others" We can call this the Sufficiency 
Limitation. It is clearly both a quantitative (enough) and a quali-. 
tative (as good) limitation on original acquisition. The idea is 
that when a man takes so much that he fails to leave others with "as 
much and as good", he has taken more than his fair share; he has no 
right to own that with which he has mixed his labour. If the World 
belonged to nobody, and there was no contract between men, the idea 
of a fair share would make no sense. A man who seized a very large 
portion would not, by so doing, be taking that which belonged to 
another. An unfair share is an excess that deprives another of his 
right, of that which belongs to him, or to which he has a claim. It 
is a share that excludes another who has a right to be included in 
the distribution. 
Locke argues that before the introduction of the institution of money 
this Sufficiency Limitation was met naturally because of the abundance 
of land and the limited ability of men to labour: 
and 
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land by improving 
it, any prejudice to any other Man, since there was still 
enough and as good left; and more than t~e yet unprovided 
could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less 
left for others because of his enclosure for himself. For 
he that leaves as much and as good as another can make use 
of, does as good as take nothing at all (TT 2:33, 1-7) 
Men were more in danger to be lost, by wandering from their 
Company, in the then vast Wilderness of the Earth, than to 
be straightened for want of room to plant in. (TT 2:36, 11-14) 
We may call the second limitation the Spoilage Limitation. Locke argues: 
It will perhaps be objected to this, That if gathering the 
Acorns, or the Fruits of the Earth etc., makes a right to 
them, then anyone may ingross as much as he will. To 
which I answer, Not so. The same Law of Nature that does 
by this means give us Property does also bound that 
Property too. God has given us all things richly, 1 Tim. 
vi. 17 is the voice of Reason confirmed by Inspiration. But 
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how far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as anyone 
can make use of before it spoils; so much he may by his 
labour fix a property in. (TT 2:31, 1-9) 
Locke thus argues that individual appropriation is to be limited so 
that one does not accumulate more than one can use and hence have a 
surplus that would go to waste. Since the World is given to all in 
common and thus does not belong to anyone person, and since being 
able to appropriate what one needs to live is implied by the right to 
life, allowing something to spoil could infringe on the natural right 
of others (especially in conditions of scarcity). Any more than a man 
can use is thus not his share; it belongs to others. 
his neighbour's share. 
He has invaded : 
A man can thus appropriate what is necessary for the advantages of life. 
This does not restrict him to the current consumption of necessities. 
Locke points out in this passage that "God has given us all things 
richly" and "to enjoy". It is not bare subsistence. Man can thus 
appropriate property for the sake of need and enjoyment; both are 
rightful uses. 
Locke's argument, justifying original individual appropriat~ion may be 
summarised as follows: 
An individual can justifiably appropriate some external good if and only 
if: 
1. He has mixed his labour with it with the objective of preserving 
and enjoying his life. 
2. In so appropriating he does not either: 
(a) accumulate more than would leave "as much and as good" 
for others, or 
(b) accumulate so much that there would be a surplus which would 
spoil. 
These restrictions are not restrictions on appropriation per se; they 
are restrictions on appropriation beyond certain limits. They limit 
the amount of property anyone man can hold. When these conditions 
are met, the goods become a man's legitimate property. 
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It is held by some philosophers such as Macpherson that Locke intends 
"to supply the moral basis of that stage of economic advance called 
the dictatorship of the Bourgeoisie; that is, a state of unrestrained 
Capitalism, brutal in its treatment of the labouring classes, ruthless 
in its destruction of traditional values, of all social ties that 
impede the advance of the propertied classes. Locke is thus arguing 
for nothing less than the rightful absolute power of the propertied 
classes, for a morally justified tyranny of the employers over the 
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employed" Ryan summarises Macpherson's interpretation of Locke 
as follows: Locke's doctrine marks "an important break with Medieval 
attitudes to labour and property which were concerned to emphasise 
the obligations of a man to society, and to his fellows, not his 
rights against them". So the rational man sets about accumulating 
property, and because his right is derived from his absolute right to 
77 his own labour, this right is absolute too 
If it is labour, a man's absolute property, which justifies 
appropriation and creates rights, the individual right of 
appropriation overrides any moral claims of the Society. 
The traditional view that property and labour were social 
functions and that the ownership of property involved 
social obligations is thereby undermined~78 
Macpherson argues that Locke secures the right to unlimited accumulation. 
Such unlimited accumulation which an emerging Capitalism would demand 
clearly could not be justified in the light of the limited rights of 
ownership resulting from Locke's basic Natural Law assumptions and the 
two explicit restrictions that he makes. In order to justify this un-
limited accumulation, both the Sufficiency and Spoilage Limitations 
must be transcended. 
According to Macpherson, Locke never explicitly argues against the 
Natural Law restrictions. However, they are transcended by being shown 
to be irrelevant once the institution of money has. been introduced into 
the State of Nature. Before turning to the issue of the alleged trans-
cendence of the two limitations, I want to deal with some preliminary 
points that are pertinent to the argument. 
Macpherson argues that one of the key concepts in Locke's theory is 
that of rationality. "God", Locke writes, gave the World "to the use 
of the Industrious and Rational,,79. Rationality, according to 
Macpherson's interpretation, is equated with the ability to amass goods 
and to go on amassing them up to the limits set by the Law of Nature. A 
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rational man is one who obeys the Law of Reason. A moral man is one 
who obeys the Law of Nature which is a declaration of God's will and a 
standard of right and wrong. As the Law of Reason and the N~tural Law 
are one and the same, it follows that it is not only rational but 
morally commendable to acquire and accumulate goods. It is morally 
excellent to accumulate. Success in so doing is a moral virtue and 
failure in so doing a moral vice. Hence the man with property is of 
more moral worth than the man who lacks it. The man with property is 
fully rational while the man who lacks it is not so. As citizenship 
and freedom, according to Macpherson, depend on the possession of 
rationality, it will follow that he who lacks it, (he who is property-
~ess) will have no rightful claim to full membership of Civil Society. 
Hence the Labouring Classes are, according to this reading of Locke, 
said to be lacking a rational and moral faculty, and hence they are 
rightly denied the full citizenship which depends on the possession of 
these faculties. 
My first criticism of Macpherson's account concerns his interpretation 
of the concept "reason". "Reason", he believes, is a faculty 
possessed by the Bourgeoisie alone. That the rational faculty and the 
ability to use it fully is the prerogative of one set of men only is 
expressly denied by Locke. "Reason" is a name which 
Stands for a faculty in man, that faculty whereby man is 
supposed to be distinguished from beasts, and wherein it 
is evident he much surpasses then. (EHU 3, vi, 4) 
It is by using this faculty that men are able to know what the Law of 
Nature requires of them: 
The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to~overn it, and 
Reason which is that Law teaches all mankind who will but 
consult it. (TT 2:6, 6-8) 
Locke states that the Law of Nature "obliges everyone". We also saw 
earlier that one of the Natural Law obligations is that men should lead 
a rational life. Now, clearly if the Labouring Classes lack rational-
ity they could not be expected to lead a rational life. As "ought" 
implies "can", adherence to a rational life could only be expected of 
them if they possess the faculty of reason. Locke admits this: 
For although the Law is binding on those to whom it is 
given, it does not, however, bind those to whom it is not 
given, and it is not given to those who are unable to 
understand it. (ELN 203) 
But only "children" and "ideots" are unable to understand the Natural 
Law. Locke is clear that the faculty of reason is not possessed by 
43 
one class alone. All men are rational. In addition to the quotes 
given above, he also says: 
... We are born Free, as we are born Rational; not that we 
have actually the exercise of either; Age that brings one, 
brings with it the other too. (TT 2:61, 1-3) 
The only persons other than the young who are not qualified by ration-
ality are: 
"Lunaticks and Ideots" and "Madmen" Q.'T 2: 60, 9 + 12) 
However, it may be the case that while the working poor are morally 
rational, that is, capable of rational insight into the Law of Nature, 
they are not economically rational, that is, capable of liv.ing an 
rconomically rational life. In Macpherson's view, Locke regards the 
working poor as incapable of such a life. He offers as evidence 
Locke's attitude towards them in his essays on interest and.money and in 
the Reasonableness of Christianity. There they are characterised as 
"living from hand to mouth", incapable of any thoughts above those of 
securing immediate subsistence, and subject to fomenting civil dis-
turbances in times of great distress. Landowners, in contrast, are 
supposedly, in Locke's view, the epitome of rationality. 
But this is far from the case. Macpherson does not take into account 
instances where labourers are described as being economically rational 
or instances where property owners are described as irrational. 
sider the following passage: 
For it cannot be thought that all or most of the labourers 
pay away all their wages constantly, as soon as they receive 
them and live upon trust till next pay-day. This the farmer 
and tradesman could not well bear; were it every labourer's 
case, and everyone to be trusted; and, th~refore, they must 
of necessity keep some money in their hands to go to market 
for victuals, and to other tradesmen as poor as themselves, 
for tools; and lay up money too to buy cloaths, and pay for 
those they bought upon credit. (Con. Int Money pp.33-34) 
Con-
There is clear evidence here that Locke holds labourers to be, on the 
whole, economically rational in their circumstances. They resist the 
temptation to spend all their wages immediately they receive them; they 
make purchases within their means, and calculate future contingencies. 
They buy on credit those goods they need such as tools and clothes but 
which they cannot afford at the time. Labourers "may well enough 
carryon their part if they have money enough to buy victuals, cloaths 
and tools". Locke shows how they set about securing these goods in an 
economically rational way. They live "from hand to mouth" only in the 
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sense that they never have "any great sum of money lying still in 
their hands". 
Landowners, however, are not always described as being economically 
rational. In considering the question of what are the causes of a 
high number of landlords wanting to sell their property, Locke avers: 
And to that the answer is obvious, general ill-husbandry, 
and the consequence of it, debts. I~a neglect of govern-
ment and religion, ill examples, and depraved education have 
introduced debauchery; and art, or chance, has made it 
fashionable for men to live beyond their estates; debts 
will increase and multiply, and draw with them a necessity 
on men, first of encumbering, and then selling their 
estates. (Con. Int. Money, pp.83-84) 
Here, significantly, economic irrationality is linked to moral depravity, 
in Locke's view. Nor is this the only example of the economic 
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The celebrated passage which Macpherson cites to demonstrate Locke's 
views on the irrationality of the labourer comes in the middle of a 
discussion of the causes and consequences of the reduction by one-third 
of the money supply used in trade. Locke's description shows that 
everyone is apt to become irrational in such circumstances. 
The usual struggle and contest, as I said before, in the 
decays of wealth and riches, is between the landed man and 
the merchant, with whom I may here join the monied-man. 
The landed-man finds himself aggrieved, by the falling of 
his rents, and the streightening of his fortune, whilst the 
monied-man keeps up his gain, and the merchant thrives and 
grows rich by trade. These, he thinks, steals his income 
into their pockets, build their fortunes upon his ruins, and 
ingross more of the riches of the nation .than comes to their 
share. He, therefore, endeavours, by laws r to keep up the 
value of lands which he suspects lessened by the other's 
excess profit: but all in vain. The cause is mistaken and 
the remedy too. It is not the merchant's nor monied-man's 
gains that makes land fall: but the want of money and 
lessening of our treasure, wasted by extravagant expenses, 
and a mis-managed trade, which the land always first feels. 
(Con. Int. Money p.115) 
In Locke's account, economic irrationality is no respecter of class. 
My second criticism concerns Macpherson's point that rationality and 
morality are chiefly displayed in the acquisition of capital goods. 
Locke, as we have just seen, argues that rationality and morality are 
displayed in a man's knowing and abiding by the Law of Nature. But are 
they also displayed in the acquisition and accumulation of capital 
goods? 
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Acquisitiveness, covetousness and self-interest are clearly not moral 
virtues in Locke's theory: 
Covetousness, and the desire of having in our possession~ 
and under our dominion, more than we have need of, being 
the root of all evil, should be early and carefully weeded 
out; and the contrary qualities of a readiness to impart 
to others, implanted. (Works IV. 64) 
Thus the vice of covetousness, the desire of possessing more than one 
needs is the root of all evil and should be-- "weeded out" and replaced 
by the virtue of generosity or liberality. 
For Locke, self-seeking can never be the foundation of morality; the 
~oral man more frequently deprives himself: "In fact a great number of 
\ 
~irtue~ and the best of them, consist only in this: that we do good 
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to others at our own loss" To accumulate private wealth and pursue 
one's private interests is quite opposed to a moral life. 
82 
all moral life would be "completely blotted out" 
Besides (since there is nothing so sacred that avarice 
has not at one time or other treated it with violence), 
In fact, 
if the ~ound of duty were made to rest on gain, and if 
expediency were acknowledged as the standard of rightness, 
what else would this be than to open the door to every 
kind of villainy? (ELN 211) 
To amass goods is always vicious, Locke argues, for the World's 
resources are finite. When a man is covetous and amasses goods, he 
is thus growing rich at the expense of others. 
The inheritance of the whole of Mankind is always one 
and the same, and it does not grow in proportion to the 
number of people born. Nature has provided a certain 
profusion of goods for the use and convenience of men, 
and the things provided have been bestowed "'in -a definite 
way and in a predetermined quantity; they have not been 
fortuitously produced nor are they increasing in prop-
ortion to what men need and covet. (ELN 211) 
And so when any man snatches for himself as much as he 
can, he takes away from another man's heap, the amount 
he adds to his own, and it is impossible to grow rich 
except at the expense of someone else. (ELN 211) 
It is not surprising that Locke should argue in Book two of the 
The Treatises that God gave the world "to the use of the Industrious 
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and Rational" and not to the Covetous He who is industrious and 
rational labours according to the Law of Nature, and abides by the 
restrictions it imposes; he who is covetous desires to have in his 
possession more than he needs and he grows rich at the expense of 
other men. The traits and desires that Macpherson ascribes to the 
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industrious and rational man who are the very ones that Locke ascribes 
to the covetous man. The desire to amass goods and the power it 
engenders are the "two roots of about all the injustice and contention 
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that so disturb human life" 
For Locke, neither economic rationality nor morality are displayed in 
the accumulation of capital goods. It is interesting to note that 
when Locke travelled in France in 1670, the people who most impressed 
him were not the successful accumulators, but the Huguenot peasantry. 
1 d ·· 85 1 h He said they were "rationa creatures an Chrlstlans" ,and a thoug 
"under pressure of want and poverty" were diligent and sober, industrious 
and frugal. 
) 
Again economic rationality and morality are closely 
i 
linked. Locke does not equate virtue with achieved economic success 
in the market. Rather he approves of a certain personality-type and 
a social ethic appropriate to its functioning. 
Earlier it was noted that those like Macpherson who believe that Locke 
is attempting to justify the process of capital accumulation argue 
that the two limitations on acquisition are transcended by being shown 
to be irrelevant once the institution of money has been introduced 
into the State of Nature. Once these two limits are transcended, no 
Natural Law restrictions stand in the way of he who wishes to accumulate. 
The door to unrestrained Capitalism is open; the way is paved for the 
rightful absolute power of the propertied classes and the morally 
justified tyranny of the employers over the employed. The labouring 
and unemployed classes have their rights so ruthlessly eroded that 
"their status is to be subject to civil society without being full 
members of it; they are in it, but not of it". The state in Civil 
Society is set up by and for the propertied classes; it does not exist 
to protect the interests of all members of society and is totally in-
sensitive to those in need. The propertyless have no rights; they 
are forced to sell their labour power for a pittance to keep body and 
soul together; if they fail to get work they must live off the charity 
of those generous enough to supply it and, if none is forthcoming, they 
must starve. 
I shall try to show that while the Spoilage Limitation clearly becomes 
irrelevant, the Sufficiency Limitation does not become irrelevant. It 
is carried over into Civil Society, that social organisation that 
follows the State of Nature. In Civil Society no one is able to 
47 
appropriate freely as they did in the State of Nature; appropriation 
at this stage requires the consent of the current users of that land -
precisely so that the interests of these users are not prejudi.ced, and 
they are left with as much and as good as before. I shall argue 
further that in Civil Society government regulates property; it does 
not act as' a mere protection agency. Finally, in the following 
section I shall argue that, according to Locke's theory, the needy are 
not to be left to the mercy of those with property for they have a 
right or title to that which they need for the preservation of their 
lives . 
. 
I 
4.1 The Introduction of Money into the State of Nature 
Locke argues that men's labour in cultivating land enables a family to 
satisfy its needs from one-hundredth the amount of land required in a 
more primitive hunting society. Thus, "he who appropriates land to 
himself by his labour does not lessen but increases the common stock of 
mankind". Locke argues that the "labour theory" of appropriation would 
work naturally enough for even double the population if it had not been 
for the introduction of the institution of money86 
Money has the effect of rendering the Spoilage Limitation irrelevant. 
The reason is that once money is introduced, a man can acquire more 
land and sell the products grown on it which he cannot use himself to 
others for the "use" and "convenience" of their lives. His selling his 
goods to others prevents their spoiling. Thus a man can control 
extensive amounts of property (in land) without~reaking the basic 
restriction of Natural Law. 
and 
Thus I dare boldly affirm, That the same Rule of Propriety 
(viz) that every Man should have as much as he could make 
use of, would hold still in the World, without straightning 
any body, since there is Land enough in the World to suffice 
double the Inhabitants had not the Invention of Money and 
the tacit agreement of Men to put a value on it, introduced 
(by consent) larger possessions, and a Right to them. 
(TT 2:36, 33-40) 
They having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a 
way, how a Man may fairly possess more land than he himself 
can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the 
overplus, Gold and Silver which may be hoarded up without 
injury to anyone, these metals not spoiling or decaying in 
the hands of the possessor. (TT 2:50, 4-10) 
Money as a commodity to which men have tacitly consented functions not 
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merely as a means of primitive barter or exchange, but rather as 
something with value in itself, that is, as capital. It has a value 
which goes beyond its simple usefulness in exchange relationships. 
The result of the introduction of money is that some men become 
weal thy and powerful and.others become poor. There is, as Locke says, 
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"an inequality of private possess10n" 
If Locke were attempting to justify the process of capi tal- accumulation 
and pave the way for unrestrained Capitalism, we should expect that he 
would argue that the institution of money was a great advance, a new 
era for man, the dawning of the Golden Age. But not so. The intro-
tluction of money, for Locke, signifies not the dawning of the Golden 
Age, but rather the end of the Golden Age. Ryan points out that 
Locke "identifies the desire of having more than we need with simple 
greed, and suggests that the pre-monetary State of Nature was the 
Gofden Age". Further, "he clearly places the arrival of greed at the 
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time of the invention of money" In early times, Locke says, men's 
natural desires coincided with the demands of Natural Law. Their needs 
d t 1 · . d89 h 1 A h an wan s were 1m1te . T is was the Go den ge. T is 
Golden Age (before vain Ambition, and amor scleratus 
habendi, evil Concupiscence, had corrupted men's minds 
into a mistake of true Power and Honour, had more Virtue, 
and consequently better Gouvenors, as well as less 
vicious subjects. (TT 2:111, 1-5) 
90 It lasted only while there was no ambition or luxury There was 
"little matter for Covetousness or Ambition", "the equality of a simple 
poor way of liveing confineing their desires within the narrow bounds 
of each man's smal propertie made few controverses and so no need of 
many laws to decide them". The desire for more'" than one needs, the 
"enlargement of possessions" arrives only with the introduction of 
money. When money is introduced "you shall see the same Man will 
begin presently to enlarge his possessions,,9l Money alters man's 
desires but, not for the better, for, as we have seen, covetousness 
and the desire for more than we need is "the root of all evil" and 
should be "weeded out" before all morality is "completely blotted out". 
Money and the alteration of men's desires that accompanies its intro-
duction are the causes of the disproportion and inequality of private 
. 92 possess10n 
Money can be hoarded up without spoiling and it is thus responsible 
for the "enlargement of possession". This hoarding at first produced 
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no problems; it was "without injury to anyone" for land was still 
abundant. As land becomes scarce such hoarding does deprive others 
for there is no longer as much and as good left in common for .others. 
The resources of the World are finite, so hoarding up when land is 
scarce ensures that there will not be as much and as good left in 
common for others. Does Locke then intend that this Natural Law 
limitation should disappear? Is it now irrelevant? Do the covetous 
and ambitious now have free reign to enclose land at wiil"impoverishing 
others and growing rich at their expense? It could be that this is 
what Locke intends, yet if so, it would be a radical change of heart 
on his side. Having argued that it is impossible to grow rich 
~xcept at others' expense, that accumulation at the expense of others 
I 
is the "most specious thing of all" and that the World was not given 
to the "use of the Covetous", it would be odd if he now argued just 
the opposite case. 
Locke never argues that the Sufficiency Limitation becomes irrelevant 
or is suspended and what he says suggests that he does not intend that 
it should be suspended. Immediately after he has shown how the intro-
duction of money into the State of Nature gives disproportionately 
large holdings to the covetous and ambitious he announces that Civil 
Law and government is introduced to regulate property. 
It is plain that the consent of Men have agreed to dis-
proportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth. This 
partage of things (has been made) practicable out of the 
bounds of Societie For in Governments the Laws 
regulate the right of property, and the possession of 
land is determined by positive constitutions. (TT 2:5~4-l5) 
And amongst those who are to be counted the'" Civilis' d 
part of Mankind who have made and multiplied positive 
Law to determine Property. 
In Locke's view, it is the increased inequality of wealth (especially 
in land) which money makes possible that leads to a state of violence 
and self-seeking in which the regulation of property by government and 
civil law become necessary. Locke argues that in civil society it is 
the job of government to regulate and determine property. In the next 
section, I shall examine in depth Locke's views and arguments for the 
legitimate role of governmental activity in respect of private property. 
I shall end this section by considering Locke's views on the civil or 
governmental regulation of common property. 
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4.2 Civil Law and Common Land 
In Macpherson's interpretation, the government in civil society exists 
to protect the interests of the propertied Bourgeoisie. To this end, 
to aid the process of accumulation of wealth, civil laws may legit-
imately be passed enabling the Bourgeoisie to appropriate what they 
will from the common land without the consent of the commoners, thereby 
impoverishing these poorer members of socie~y, and depriving them of 
their only means of livelihood. Now in the seventeenth century, 
wealthy men, members of the new propertied Bourgeoisie, were all too 
willing to appropriate from "the common" to enlarge their possessions. 
In the last quarter of the century, a number of Bills were introduced 
~ 
fnto Parliament to allow appropriation to occur without the consent of 
the commoners. It seems to be Macpherson's view that Locke is 
attempting to argue for the legitimacy of this process of expropriation 
of the poor by the wealthy. Civil law in Locke's theory is, thus, an 
instrument of oppression used by the Bourgeoisie to subjugate and 
impoverish. the labouring classes. 
This interpretation of Locke's position seems to be wide of the mark. 
Locke does not seem to be arguing for such a situation at. all. He 
states that before Civil Law is introduced a man may appropriate from 
land held in common but without the consent of other men. This was 
legitimate appropriation because men were then under the law for 
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appropriation. It was God's will that they should do so Once 
Civil Law is introduced (by contract), men are no longer under the law 
for appropriation. Thus, they cannot appropriate without the consent 
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of others - these others being "the commoners ':" or present users of 
the land. 
In Land that is common in England '" no-one can inclose 
or appropriate 'any part, without the Consent of all his 
Fellow-Commoners: Because this is left common by Compact 
i.e. by the Law of the Land which is not to be violated. 
The land is common with respect to the commoners of a particular Parish 
or County. It is their "joint property" and cannot be taken from them 
without their consent. The reason is that if others could come and 
ingross from this common there would not be enough and as good as 
before. Locke is quite explicit on this point. 
Besides the remainder after such inclosure, would not be 
as good to the rest of the Commoners as the whole was, 
when they could all make use of the whole. 
That Locke should suggest that no appropriation should take place 
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without the consent of the Commoners because, were this to happen, 
enough and as good would not be left implies that he did not after 
all abandon the Sufficiency Limitation. 
Now it might be pOinted out that Locke in the first quotation does 
not argue that common land may not be appropriated by a member of the 
Bourgeoisie. Locke writes: 
No-one can inclose or appropriate any part, without the 
Consent of his Fellow-Commoners. 
This seems to mean that "no-one (commoner) may inclose or appropriate 
any part of the common land without the consent of his Fellow-
~ommoners". In other words, Locke is not saying "no part (of the 
t 
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common) may be taken by a non-commoner (e.g. a member of the 
Bourgeoisie) without the consent of all the commoners", but only that 
no part may be taken by one of the commoners without the consent of 
his fellow-commoners. 
That Locke is making this reduced claim in respect of appropriation of 
the commons is most implausible for it would still be the case that 
The. remainder. af.ter sucll inclosure would not be as good 
to the rest of the Commoners as the whole was 
Whether that enclosure was carried out by another commoner or a member 
of the Bourgeoisie, enough and as good would not be left for the others. 
The sufficiency limitation would be violated whoever enclosed a part of 
the common. 
It should also be observed that Locke regards all attempts by the 
wealthy and powerful to use their positions to e~ploit, oppress or 
expropriate the poor with contempt, and it is therefore, most unlikely 
that he should believe such enclosure by the wealthy Bourgeoisie to be 
justifiable. 
Is it reasonable '" that a Rich Man, who possessed the 
Whole Country, should from thence have a Right to Seize, 
when he pleased, the Cottage and Garden of his poor 
Neighbour? The being rightfully possessed of great 
Power and Riches exceedingly beyond the greatest part of 
the Sons of Adam, is so far from being an excuse, much 
less a reason, for Rapine and Oppression, which the en-
damaging another without Authority is, that it is a great 
Aggravation of it. For the exceeding the Bounds of 
Authority is no more a Right in a great, than a petty 
Officer; no more justifiable in a King, than a Constable. 
(TT 2:202) 
Persons "possessed of great Power and Riches" have neither "reason" nor 
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"excuse" to "oppress" the poor or take from them the little they have. 
Moreover, enclosure of the common land by the wealthy and powerful 
seems to be a clear case of "endamaging others without Authority" for 
Locke argues that common land remains such "by the Law of the Land 
which is not to be violated". Civil law, in Locke's theory, is, 
thus, not an instrument of oppression used by the rich and powerful 
Bourgeoisie to subjugate and impoverish the labouring classes. 
5. Private Property and Welfare in Civil Society 
. 
According to many interpreters of Locke's theory, it is the job of , 
government in civil society to protect property, but not to regulate 
or determine its distribution and (where appropriate) its redistribution. 
In other words, it is believed that Locke is arguing for the minimal, 
nightwatchman state of the classical liberals, "limited to the narrow 
functions of protection against force, theft, fraud and enforcement of 
contracts". The state may not redistribute property at all - that is, 
it may not use its coercive apparatus to "get· some citizens to aid 
others" - nor may it initiate substantive social and economic policies 
even to alleviate great hardship and poverty. I shall show in this 
section that, for Locke, government has a fiduciary role, that it is 
intended to be first for the good of the community and all the 
individuals who make it up, second to be supportive of the Law of 
Nature, and third, to be a vehicle of God's care for his people. I 
shall show further that this fiduciary role encompasses not only the 
(negative) safety and security of life, liberty ~and estate, but also 
some positive public welfare in the form of redistribution of property 
and appropriate economic policies. 
5.1 Regulation of Private Property and the Common Good 
It is true that Locke often speaks of protection of property by govern-
ment. Yet it is equally true that he speaks of its regulation and 
95 determination by government Regulation implies direction, control, 
adjusting, ordering, disposing of, whereas protection implies guarding, 
defending, securing and preserving. Locke writes: 
It is fit to consider that every Man when he, at first, 
incorporates himself into any Commonwealth, he, by uniting 
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himself thereunto, annexed also, and submits to the Community 
those Possessions, which he has or shall acquire that do not 
already belong to any other government. For it would be a 
direct contradiction, for anyone to enter into Society with 
others for the securing and regulating of property: And yet 
to suppose his Land whose Property is to be regulated by 
the Laws of the Society should be exempt from the juris-
diction of the Government ... By the same Act therefore 
whereby anyone unites his Person which was before free, to 
any Commonwealth; by the same he unites his Possessions, 
which were before free, to it also; and they become, both 
of them, Person and Possessions subject to the Government 
and Dominion of that Commonwealth as long as it hath a being. 
(TT 2:120) 
According to Gale's interpretation, I·'cke implies in this passage 
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ownership of persons' possessions by the state There is, in short, 
a transfer of ownership from the individual to the state so that the 
state becomes the new owner of what the individual possesses on entering 
civil society, and of any goods he might acquire at a later date. This 
interpretation of transfer of ownership seems incorrect. Locke clearly 
links property and persons; both are treated alike on entering civil 
society - "both of them, Person and Possessions" become "subject to the 
Government and Dominion of the Commonwealth". It is doubtful whether 
Locke would want to say, or indeed could say, that the state 
(commonwealth) comes to own persons for ultimately persons are God's 
property. If people do not own themselves, they cannot transfer 
ownership of themselves to any other person or body for "nobody can 
. 97 give more power (Le. right) than he has h1mself" Men cannot 
alienate rights they do not possess. Thus, if whatever happens to 
persons on entering civil society is the same as what happens to 
property it is surely not transfer of ownership. Now, each one has 
the right to use (control, direct, and manage) his person (and propert~, 
to determine the course his life will take, but within the bounds of the 
Law of Nature. Thus, the jurisdiction or dominion that government 
acquires when men enter civil society would appear to be what 
eighteenth-century philosophers call eminent dominion - the power to 
regulate (the extent of) the rights to property and liberty. Eminent 
dominion does not imply ownership of persons or possessions. Ownership, 
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of course, entails dominion, but dominion does not entail ownership 
This interpretation is supported by what Locke says at TT 2:57: 
Each one has a Liberty to dispose and order, as he lists, 
his Person, Actions and Possessions, and his Whole Property 
(but) within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is. 
(My italics) 
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In other words, the individual's rights to liberty and property - his 
rights to control, direct, and manage his life and property - are 
limited or regulated by "those (civil) Laws under which he is". 
It is the job of government in civil society to regulate property 
(the right to property) 99 according to the "Common Good" . If a 
government does this, there "cannot be an incroachment upon anybody 
since no government can have a right tending to any other end". 
"Whatsoever alterations" it makes (to the right of property) that 
promote that end or even merely "tend to that end" are morally legit-
imate, even obligatory. 
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the publick good" . 
"Those only are incroachments which hinder 
But whose good is included in this "publick good"? Is it perhaps the 
good of the Bourgeoisie, of just one group of men rather than of each 
and every member of society? 
this interpretation: 
What Locke says clearly runs counter to 
And: 
The end of Civil Society is Civil peace and prosperity or 
the preservation of the Society and every member thereof 
in a free and peaceful enjoyment of all the good things 
of this life that belong to each of them. (My italics)IOla 
The magistrate should make use of that power which was 
given him only for the preservation of all his subjects, 
and every particular person amongst the~Olb 
(He) shall be accountable for his laws and administration 
as a magistrate, according as they are intended to the 
good, preservation and quiet of all his subjects in this 
world as much as possible; which is a rule so certain and 
so clear that he can scarce err in it unless he do it 
Wilfully.102a 
In fact, Locke argues that the good of one man or group of men cannot 
be considered apart from the good of all; for men's interests in Civil 
Society are interwoven. "In Civil Society", he writes, "one man's 
102b good is involved and complicated with another's" 
We have just seen in the quotes above that Locke argues that it is the 
job of Civil Society to (i) preserve society and (ii) to preserve each 
man. The fact that the ends of Natural Law and Civil Society coincide 
is not an accident at all; a Civil Society that is moral always acts 
in accordance with Natural Law. 
In the State of Nature, men have rights that are correlative to 
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obligations of Natural Law. In addition to having these rights, each 
man also possesses the moral power to enforce his rights. "In the 
State of Nature", Locke says, "everyone has the Executive Power of the 
103 Law of Nature" He has the power to preserve his person, his 
liberty and his property, and, further, he has the power to punish 
transgressors of the Law of Nature. When men move into Civil Society 
they give up this moral power they previously had to enforce their 
rights and punish transgressors of the Law of Nature. They "quit 
this Natural Power" and "resign it up into the hands"of the Community 
in all cases,,104. In Civil Society men give up "all their natural 
105 powers to the Society" This move to Civil Society is not forced 
~pon them; it is done only with men's consent. "It is nothing but 
) 
the consent of any number of Freemen capable of a majority to unite 
and incorporate into such a Society" 106 
The reason why men consent to leave the State of Nature and form a 
Civil Society is that property in the State of Nature becomes very 
unsafe and very insecure . In the early stages of the State of 
Nature when land is plentiful and men have not given their tacit con-
sent to the use of money, property is safe and secure. It is not an 
age of covetousness, ambition and self-seeking. These features and 
the contentiousness that accompanies them appear, as we have seen, with 
the introduction of money. The problem is that men are biased in 
their judgements and their self-seeking leads them to judge in their 
own favour. But the position is not hopeless for God has provided a 
solution to the problem. "God hath certainly appointed government to 
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restrain the partiality and violence of men" 
The important point is that when men move into Civil Society they give 
up the Power they formerly had to enforce the Law of Nature and the 
Natural Rights associated with it; what they do not give up is either 
the Law of Nature itself or their Natural Rights. 
The obligations of the Law of Nature do not cease in Civil Society: 
And: 
The obligations of the Law of Nature cease not in Society, 
but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have by Humane 
Laws known penalties annexed to them, to inforce their 
observation. Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal 
Rule to all Men. No Humane Sanction can be good or valid 
against it. (TT 2:135, 25-32) 
Municipal Laws of Countries ... are only so far right, as 
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they are founded on-the Law of Nature, by which 
they are to be regulated and interpreted. (TT 2: 12) 
Neither do the rights cease in Civil Society: 
For no Man or Society of Men, having a Power to deliver 
up their Preservation or consequently the means of it to 
the Absolute will ... of another. . .. They will always 
have a Right to preserve what they have not a Power to 
part with and to rid themselves of those who invade this 
Fundamentai, Sacred and unalterable Law of Self-
Preservation for which they entered into Society. 
(TT 2:149, 18-25) 
Men do not have the power (right) to part with their lives for their 
lives are not their own; as God's workmanship, they belong to God. 
Men may morally use their lives only for the ends that God sanctions. 
The right a man has to his preservation and hence to the means to it 
is "fundamental, sacred and unalterable". It is the job of the 
government in Civil Society to aim "to save all". Preservation is 
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something "to which even the meanest have a tltle" 
A good Civil Society is one that acts in accordance with the ends of 
Natural Law and respects men's rights. In the discussion on Natural 
Rights no answer was given to the question as to whether there are any 
positive rights in Locke's theory, (that is, rights to be given goods) 
or whether all the rights are negative. This is the question to which 
we now turn. The point is that if there are any positive rights in 
the State of Nature (such as the right to be given what one needs for 
the preservation of one's l~fe) then such a right will also have a 
place in Civil Society which we have just argued retains the same goals 
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and the same rights as existed in the preceding State of Nature 
5.2 Welfare Rights 
Dunn writes: 
The fulcrum of Macpherson's (and also Strauss's) position 
is an interpretation of the role of justice in Locke's 
theory. The purpose of the theory is claimed to be the 
justification and protection of Bourgeois property rights 
and the freeing of these from the constraints of traditional 
Natural Law theory, more specifically from the duty of 
charity. This operation is effected by the reduction of 
the concept of justice, the key term in the evaluation of 
human social existence, to the guarantee of property rights, 
embodied in positive law and secured by the constitutional 
apparatus of the modern Bourgeois state. Human duty which 
used to be a construct out of the needs of all men becomes 
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merely a construct of the legally-articulated power of 
private capital. The virtue of charity which used to be 
a constituent of justice is covertly elided or explicitly 
rejected. Men confront each other as discrete organisms~ 
incapable of sympathy, and devoid of moral claims upon each 
other, united merely by the utility of their social division 
of labour in the 'joyless quest for joy' .110 
Macpherson's idea is that in Locke's theory, the individual's right to 
appropriate "overrides any moral claims of the society. The trad-
itional view that property and labour were social functions and that 
the ownership of property involved social obligations is thereby 
undermined". The new Capitalist system caters only for the interests 
6f the propertied classes and ignores the interests of the needy. The 
I 
needy have no right or title to a share in the- surplus" goods of the 
wealthy as they formerly had when charity "was a constituent of justice". 
This Natural Law idea of charity being a constituent of justice and 
hence something to which a man had right or title is "covertly elided" 
or "explicitly rejected" in Locke's new Capitalism. The needy are 
left to reap the benefits of charity in the modern sense of that word. 
Charity is a purely voluntary contribution on-the part of the wealthy. 
It is never an obligatory contribution on their part; it is something 
to which no man has a right or title however urgent his needs. If the 
wealthy are generous enough to donate it, the needy man survives; if 
it is not given, he dies of starvation. But distribution according 
to need is no longer a constituent of the principle of justice and men 
can never be compelled to honour it. 
In this connection, Miller makes a distinction between "Conservative 
--justice" and "Ideal or Prosthetic justice". He says: 
Sidgwick believed that in our thinking about justice we 
were inevitably led to contrast Conservative justice, 
consisting in the recognition and protection of legal and 
other customary rights, with Ideal justice consisting of 
principles for changing these rights in accordance with 
some ideal standard '" Raphael anal~gously contrasts 
Conservative justice whose 'object is to preserve an 
existing order of rights and possessions, or to restore 
it when breaches have been made' with Prosthetic justice 
which 'aims at modifying the status quo' .111 
The notion of conservative justice is usually expressed in the form "To 
each according to his rights". These rights generally derive from 
past transactions or established practices. Conservative justice is 
concerned with the "continuity of a social order over time, and with 
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ensuring that 
men's expectations of one another are not disappointed". In contrast, 
ideal or prosthetic justice aims at "modifying the status quo".. It 
can be modified in various ways. Miller notes that Sidgwick argues 
for a modification principle of desert ("to each according to his 
deserts") and Raphael argues for a modification principle of need 
112 ("to each according to his needs ") . 
Those who argue that Locke is a Capitalist lackey would put him firmly 
in the "conservative justice" camp. A man is entitled to all his 
property; his property is his and cannot be taken from him under any 
circumstances or else it is no property at all. The needs of others 
f 
are irrelevant to the issue. I shall argue that this is a misreading 
of Locke. Locke in the typical Natural Law tradition admits need as 
a "Secondary" principle of justice. Need can create a legitimate 
title to a share in the surplus goods of another. 
Earlier we quoted Locke as saying: 
Men also have a Right to their preservation, and con-
sequently to Meat and Drink and other things as Nature 
affords for their subsistence. 
This, of itself, suggests that there are real limits on an individual's 
(or any group of individuals') property acquisition. For if some man, 
M, is unable to acquire sufficient meat and drink and such other 
things necessary for his subsistence, then those who have it, it seems, 
would have to provide those necessities (or, at least, could not by 
their acquisition of goods, G, hinder the poor man's possibility of 
acquiring these goods) otherwise, those who hav~ these goods would be 
violating the right (according to Locke's account) of those who are 
unable to appropriate G. 
However, it could be argued that the right of which Locke is speaking 
is not an "entitlement to" anything, but a right of non-interference. 
Thus nobody can actively prevent M from acquiring P if P is available 
for acquisition. Thus, if M sets about the task of picking up acorns, 
he has a right that others do not actually prevent or threaten him as 
he does so. Although this interpretation is possible, it is clearly 
not what Locke says in Book One of the Two Treatises in which he attacks 
the historical entitlement analysis of property put forward by Filmer. 
The significance of Locke's attack on Filmer will now become clearer. 
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Filmer, as we saw, claims that God first gave Adam complete sovereignty 
over the Earth, and that, therefore, all property is eternally subject 
to the power of Adam's heirs. Adam historically acquired all the 
land and its future is thus determined by that acquisition; other 
people can legitimately come to hold property only if they received it 
as afree gift from Adam's heirs. Thus, ~ter an individual C justly 
acquires some property, some one else can come to hold that property 
only if it is legitimately transferred to him by C. But in no case 
is land ever returned to the community, nor are the needs of the 
community or any members of it, however urgent and pressing, relevant 
to the continued holding of that property by C. 
The problem is clear. If it were possible for some people, that is, 
Adam's heirs, to acquire ownership of all the land, access to the land 
by non-owners, by those who are not Adam's heirs would be contingent 
upon the consent of the owners. The consequences of such a theory of 
property rights are indeed very unpalatable as Spencer argues: 
Supposing the entire habitable Earth to be ... enclosed, 
it follows that if landowners have a valid right to its 
surface, all who are not landowners have no right at all 
to its surface. Hence such can exist on Earth by 
sufferance only. They are all trespassers. Save by 
permission of the owners of the soil, they can have no 
room for the soles of their feet. Nay, should the others 
think fit to deny them a resting place, these landless 
men might equitably be expelled from the Earth altogether. 113 
There is thus a fundamental conflict between the absolute right to 
property and the right to the means of preservation. This conflict 
was not ignored or cast aside as irrelevant by Locke. QUite the 
contrary. In the First Treatise he directly c~nsiders and challenges 
Filmer's claim that Adam and his heirs have a right to all property. 
He asks: "How will it appear that property in land gives a man power 
over the life of another, or how will the possession even of the whole 
Earth give anyone arbitrary authority over the persons of men?" His 
answer is that it cannot legitimately do so. I shall quote Locke's 
answer in full because philosophers who write about his theory of 
11 " "t l14 property genera y 19nore 1 It is clearly a pity that they 
should do so as this passage is the only one where Locke discusses 
the casuistry of an explicit conflict between property rights and the 
right (and duty) of preservation. 
The most specious thing to be said is that he that is 
Proprietor of the whole World may deny all the rest of 
mankind food, and so at his pleasure starve them, if they 
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will not acknowledge his Sovereignty and obey his will. 
If this were true, it would be a good argument to prove 
that there never was such property ... (For) it is more 
reasonable to think that God .,. should rather Himself 
give them all a Right to make use of the food, and raiment 
and other conveniences of life ... than to make them 
depend upon the will of a man for their subsistence who 
should have the power to destroy them all when he pleased, 
and who being no better than other men, was in succession 
likelier by want and the dependence of a scanty fortune 
to tie the~ to hard service. (TT 1:4l~ 7-21) 
He further argues: 
We know that God hath not left one Man so to the Mercy of 
another, that he may starve him if he please: God the 
Lord and Father of all, has given no one of his Children 
such a Property, in his peculiar Portion of the things of 
this World, but that he has given his needy Brother a Right 
to the Surplusage of his Goods; so that it cannot justly 
be denyed him, when his pressing wants call for it. And 
therefore no Man could ever have a just Power over the Life 
of another, by Right of property in Land or Possessions; 
since 'twould always be a sin in any Man of Estate, to let 
his Brother perish for want of affording him Relief out of 
his Plenty. As Justice gives every Man a Title to the 
product of his honest Industry, and the fair Acquisitions 
of his Ancestors descended to him; so Charity gives every 
Man a Title to so much out of another's plenty, as will keep 
him from extream want, where he has no means to subsist 
otherwise; and a Man can no more justly make use of another's 
necessity, to force him to become his Vassal ... than he 
that has more strength can seize upon a weaker, master him 
to his Obedience, and with a Dagger at his throat offer him 
Death or Slavery. (TT 1:42) 
In this passage Locke clearly says that what a man needs for the pres-
ervation of his life "cannot justly be denyed him", that he has a 
"Right to the Surplusage of (the wealthy man's) goods, and "a Title to 
so much out of another's Plenty as will keep him from extream want". 
However, he also says that supplying another man's needs is an act of 
charity. In the twentieth century this sounds contradictory for we 
do not speak about a Right or Title to charity, nor do we say that 
certain goods cannot justly be denied a man and at the same time say it 
is a duty of charity to supply the goods. The contradiction is in fact 
only apparent not real. Dunn writes: 
The crucial test for this interpretation must be the status 
of charity. Medieval conceptions of property rights made 
them in functional basis, contingent on the performance of 
social duties, preeminently the duty of charity. Charity 
was a right on the part of the needy, and a duty on the 
part of the wealthy. Such it remained for Locke. (My 
italics)115 
Dunn also notes that the distinction between charity and justice was not 
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so clear-cut as it is to-day, for "cLuity was a constituent of 
justice,,116 Goods necessary for one's preservation are goods to 
which one has a Right or Title; they cannot justly be denyed one. 
Clearly, Locke must argue that goods which are necessary for a man's 
preservation are goods to which he has a Right or Title, for, without 
such a Right or Title, the poor man's preservation would be contingent 
on the generosity or benevolence of the wealthy men - which was the 
thrust of his criticism of Filmer's theory. 
It could be argued that the Right or Title that Locke acknowledges is 
not a "Welfare Right": it is not a posit ive right to receive or be 
given (for example by society) anything whatever - it is not, in short, 
a positive in rem right to aid. Rather it is an active, negative 
right, a right to do certain sorts of things, in particular, to seize, 
to utilize, to consume those goods which are absolutely indispensible 
for one's preservation, and to do so even if the goods are owned and 
the owner does not consent provided there is no other way of obtaining 
the necessary goods. While this is a possible interpretation, it is 
clearly not what Locke says. Locke does not say in these passages 
that the prosperous man is merely required not to prohibit another 
from taking his goods if he needs them for survival, but that the 
property owner is morally required to give relief to the needs of 
another person. He must "afford him Relief out of his Plenty". As 
we shall see, if the wealthy man refuses to "afford him Relief out of 
his Plenty" the poor man would be entitled to do certain sorts of 
things such as utilise and consume the goods which were indispensible 
for his survival - for if he were not justified in doing so, he would 
surely die. And "this would be good argument to prove that there 
never was such property". 
The man's need thus creates a title in the goods of another. Even if 
the man of property refuses to "afford him relief" and the poor man is 
forced to seize his wants, his act cannot be described as robbery, for 
he is merely exercising his moral claim right not to be excluded from 
preservation. This limitation on the right of ownership is not· merely 
an ad hoc device on Locke's part to "soften" the worst effects of his 
Capitalist theory. Rather the exception is motivated by the very same 
consideration that gives rise to the rule on property acquisition. 
Locke who has derived the right of appropriation from the right of a 
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man to his preservation argues that a man cannot effectively preserve 
himself if his very survival is contingent upon the consent of another 
person. Although this argument is found in the First Treatise, I 
believe it is quite consistent with what he says in the Second Treatise. 
For Men being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent and 
infinitely wise Maker, All the servants of one sovereign 
Master, sent into the World by his ~rder and about his 
business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they 
are, made to last during his, and not another's Pleasure 
(TT 2:6, 10-14, my italics) 
It is in Filmer's account, but not in Locke's, that a man's existence 
becomes contingent upon the consent of other men; the poor man in 
Filmer's account exists during the pleasure of another man. But in 
Locke's theory no man may exist at the pleasure of another man, for 
each man is the property of God and is never the property of other men. 
If a man had no right or title to that which he needed for his pres-
ervation, then he would be totally dependent on the gifts of other men; 
he would exist at their pleasure. If, on the other hand, he has a 
right or title, his position is different. If those with wealth 
refuse to "afford him the relief" which is his due according to the 
fundamental Law of Nature, he would be entitled to enforce his right 
himself by taking that which he needed. 
no wrong; his act would not be robbery. 
In so doing he would commit 
In the State of Nature, as 
we have seen, each man has the executive power of the Law of Nature; 
he has the power to enforce his righ~s, and this would include, of 
course, the power to enforce his moral claim right not to be excluded 
from preservation. When he moves into Civil Society, he hands over 
this executive power to the Civil Society. He does not, of course, 
renounce the Law of Nature or the rights associated with it for "the 
obligations of the Law of Nature cease not in society", they are an 
"eternal rule to all men". "The Law of preservation" as "the funda-
mental, sacred, and unalterable law" cannot be cast aside. It becomes 
the job of civil government to enforce it by Civil Law. From this we 
may conclude that although the needy man loses power he formerly had 
to enforce his right to preservation, the enforcement of his right 
becomes the task of Civil Society. Its civil laws must coincide with 
the Law of Nature; the good Civil Society must aim at the same goals 
and respect the same rights as had existed in the State of Nature. It 
must aim for the good of society and all its members, and this must 
include those in need. Indeed, Locke puts this point very clearly: 
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Only common charity (i.e. justice) teaches that those should 
be most take~6~ by the law (i.e. civil law) who are least 
capable of taking care for themselves. 117 
The civil law must "take care of those least able to take care for 
themselves" first by redistribution of wealth - transferring some of 
the "surplusage" of the wealthy to them, and secondly, by introducing 
appropriate economic policies. LeE'" '.slation of economic matters, and 
intervention in trade is necessary to ensure "the good and preservation" 
of all subjects. For example, an artifical lowering of the rate of 
interest by the state is at times necessary to prevent economic hardship 
among the poor and necessitous and to prevent their exploitation and 
oppression by men of wealth. It is necessary, he says, to prevent 
"young men and those in want" from bein~ "too easily exposed to 
extortion and oppression". Men of capital, "in particular, must not 
be permitted to take advantage of the ignorance and necessity of 
118 borrowers" . Such state intervention, Locke argues, helps to break 
up those large accumulations of capital which result in hardship and 
119 
oppression to the poor and needy 
That Locke should argue that a poor man should have his needs supplied 
by others who are more fortunate than he, that he should have his 
"food", "raiment" and "conveniences of life" given to him by others and 
that government should introduce economic policies aimed to prevent 
hardship may come as a surprise to those who see Locke as a Capitalist 
lackey, as an apologist for laissez-faire Capitalism, as the philosopher 
who provided the moral justification for unlimited accumulation and the 
absolute right to property. I have trted to show the importance to 
Locke's theory of Natural Law, especially of the fundamental Law of 
Nature, to preserve mankind and the right associated with it. It is 
a feature of Natural Law theory that need is included as a subsidiary 
principle of "justice". David Miller writes: 
Although justice was predominantly identified in the minds 
of medieval Christian writers with the protection of legally 
established rights, secondary recognition was given to the 
claims of need. Here the doctrine that by natural law all 
property was originally held in common became of practical 
importance. Because God had in the beginning given the 
Earth to all men to enjoy in common, it followed first, that 
no one had a right to take for himself more than he needed, 
and, second, that a man had only a right to take that of 
which he made good use. A distinction was drawn between 
necessities and superfluities ... Superfluities were the 
goods which a man possessed over and above this accepted 
standard of living. It was a matter of justice that super-
fluous goods should be given to those in need, whereas if a 
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man gave away his own necessities to another this was an 
act of charity or mercy.120 
The latter as an act of "real" charity or mercy was, of course, not 
enforceable. But the former was enforceable. If the man of wealth 
failed to give some of his superfluous goods to those in need, "the 
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man in need was entitled to avail himself of another's property" 
Miller quotes Aquinas: 
It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and 
use another's property in a case of extreme need; because 
that which he takes for the support of his life becomes his 
own property by reason of that need. 122 
Pufendorf's analysis is similar: 
Further such is the force of Propriety that the Proprietor 
has a Right of delivering his own goods with his own Hands; 
even such as he is oblig'd to give others. Whence it 
follows that when one Man has anything owing from another, 
he is not presently to seize on it at a venture, but ought 
to apply himself to the Owner, desiring to receive it from 
his Disposal. Yet in case the other Party refuse thus to 
make good.his Obligation, the Power and Privilege of 
Propriety does not reach so far as that the things may not 
be taken away without the Owner's Consent, either by the 
Authority of the Magistrate in Civil Communities or in a 
State of Nature by violence and Hostile force. And though 
in regard to bare Natural Rights, for a Man to relieve another 
in Extremity with his goods, for which he hath not so much 
occasion, be a duty obliging only imperfectly, and not in the 
manner of a debt since it arises wholly from the Virtue of 
Humanity; yet there seems to be no reason why by the add-
itional Force of Civil Ordinancei it may not be turned into a strict and perfect Obligation. 23a 
And Cumberland writes 
That necessaries ... be allowed to all without violation, 
that is, that they become their properties, at least for 
the time they continue necessary to them, whence they are 
called their rights (iura)123b 
In Natural Law, there is no clear-cut distinction between charity and 
Justice. Charity is, as Dunn says, a constituent of justice. Natural 
Law philosophers argue that, in the State of Nature the needy man has a 
right or title to be given or to take that which he needs and when he 
does so he does not commit a robbery. According to Aquinas the needy 
man may "take secretly and use another's property". According to 
Pufendorf, if the wealthy man refuses "to make good his obligation", 
his superfluous goods may be taken away without his consent anyway 
either by the needy man himself or by another person acting on his 
behalf. Finally Locke argues that the wealthy man must "afford him 
relief" for this relief is something to which the poor man has "Right 
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or Title", "it cannot justly be denyed him". Moreover, Natural Law 
philosophers such as Locke and Pufendorf argue that once Civil Society 
is introduced, Civil Law becomes the appropriate vehicle for satisfying 
the rights of the needy. 
Barry argues that statements of the form "A needs X" are incomplete and 
must be filled out in the form "A needs X in order to do (or be) y,,124. 
Locke writes that "we are in an estate, the necessities whereof call 
for a constant supply of meat, drink, cloathing, and defence from the 
weather; 
l25a 
and our conveniences demand yet a great deal more" Thus, 
according to Locke's theory, (and the theories of other Natural Law 
philosophers) the statement may be filled out as: '~needs a constant 
supply of meat (sustenance), drink, cloathing, shelter and firing 
(firewood) in order to be preserved (to have continued existence in the 
WOrld),,125b. Clearly, the end for which these goods are required in 
Natural Law theory is a very basic one and it would be regarded as 
totally inadequate by many theories of justice in the twentieth century. 
Miller, for example, suggests that what a man needs are all those goods 
that are necessary for the realisation of his "plan of life,,126 
Clearly, many more goods and resources: are necessary for the "realisation 
of a plan of life" than are necessary for simple preservation. Yet 
the fact remains that Locke's theory, in admitting need as a principle 
of justice, as something that "cannot justly be denyed one", may be 
clearly distinguished from purely laissez-faire theories. Locke's 
theory admits an element of Ideal or Prosthetic justice for it allows 
some modification of the status quo in favour of those who lack what 
they need for preservation. This Prosthetic or Ideal element of need 
could not, of course, h-ave been an essential part of his theory of 
property if, as Macpherson argues, Locke had based his theory of 
property on the absolute right of a man to the property of his person. 
Apart from the fact that Locke never speaks of "absolute" rights - the 
word is Macpherson's - Locke's theory of property is really based on 
the fundamental obligation and right to preserve mankind. 
writes: 
Gough 
Locke did not found the complete right of property solely 
upon this 'property' which each man has in his own person. 
Its real foundation is the Law of Nature which 'willeth 
the peace and preservation of mankind' .127 
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CHAPTER TWO 
HUME'S THEORY OF PROPERTY 
Introduction 
From Heaven to Earth; 
From the Law of Nature to the Laws of Human Nature 
Locke, Aiken notes, is "rightly regarded as the father of British 
Empiricism, for his Essay Concerning Human Understanding stands as 
a landmark in the progress towards a scientific conception of 
I knowledge" . But, as we have seen, Locke does not apply this 
Empiricism to all areas of study. His ethical and social philosophy 
is clearly within the framework of the rationalistic Medieval trad-
ition. This blend of rationalistic and empiricist elements in 
Locke's philosophy while apparently quite acceptable to him was much 
less acceptable to his successors. Hume was among those who 
accepted the empiricism of Newton and Locke while rejecting the 
rationalism of Locke's moral and social world. For Hume this also 
meant rejection of Locke's theory of Natural Law and property. 
The alternative theory which Hume puts forward is the subject of this 
chapter. However, it is necessary to preface this positive account 
with a brief summary of his empiricist views of religion and causality, 
as his views on these subjects are central to his rejection of the 
theory of Natural Law, and hence of the natural right to property. 
This section will make clear why Hume's theory of property assumes 
the form it does why it is firmly rooted in Earth and not in 
Heaven, in the Laws of Human Nature and not in the Law of Nature, and 
in men's desires and inclinations and not in God's will and purposes 
for men. 
We saw that Locke's account of property is firmly anchored in the 
Natural Law which is the expression of the will of a purposeful 
creator. The world was created for a purposei man as part of that 
world was also created for a purpose. The creator is also a law-
maker; man standing in a relation of created to creator has certain 
duties to his creator. Men can infer their obligations. "What is 
to be done by us can be gathered from the end in view of all things,,2 
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It is this idea of a final cause, of "an end in view of all things" 
that Hume rejects. The significance of Hume's analysis of causality 
for the theory of Natural Law is stated very explicitly. He says: 
That all causes are of the same kind, and that in particular 
there is no foundation for that distinction which we some-
times make betwixt efficient causes, and causes sine qua non; 
or betwixt efficient causes and formal, and material, and 
exemplary, and final causes. 3 
According to Hume's analysis of causality in which every cause must 
be prior in time and contiguous in space to its effects, there can be 
no acceptance of material, formal and final causes which do not always 
precede their effects in the way Hume demands. All causes for Hume 
must be efficient causes. The only causal necessity that Hume acknow-
ledges is efficiency and this idea of efficiency is derived from 
experience of the constant conjunction of two objects. We come to 
believe in a causal relation, Hume argues, only when we observe, and 
only insofar as we observe, such constant conjunction. His denial of 
any other type of causality other than that of efficiency is a break 
with an older tradition which maintained a four-fold order of causality. 
Hume's denial of final causes, in particular, is an attack on the con-
ception of a purposefully ordered nature, and the doctrine of ends in 
ethics - "an end in view of all things", as Locke puts it. As such, 
his denial of final causes is an attack on the doctrine of Natural Law. 
Hume's opposition to the doctrine of final causes and of ends in 
ethics is firmly stated in a letter he wrote to Francis Hutcheson: 
I cannot agree with your sense of natural. T'isfounded on 
final causes; which is a consideration that appears to me 
pretty uncertain and unphilosophical. For pray, what is 
the end of man? Is he created for happiness or virtue? 
For this life or the next? For himself or for his maker? 
Your definition of natural depends on solving these 
questions which are endless. 4 
Hume also employs his analysis of causality in his critique of natural 
religion which he discusses at length in the Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding, and in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. He 
argues that we can establish a causal relation only when we observe, 
and insofar as we observe, constant conjunction. But we cannot 
observe God at all, and natural phenomena remain what they are what-
ever explanatory hypothesis we adopt. "I very much doubt whether it 
5 be possible for a cause to be known only by its effects" The 
religious hypothesis is, indeed, one way of accounting for the visible 
phenomena of the universe; and it may be true, even though its truth 
is uncertain. At the same time, it is not a hypothesis from which we 
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can deduce any facts other than those which we already know. Nor 
can we derive from it principles and maxims of conduct. In this 
sense it is a "useless" hypothesis. 
It is useless because our knowledge of this cause being 
derived from the course of nature, we can never, according 
to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the 
cause with any new inference, or, making additions to the 
common and experienced course of nature, establish any new 
principles of conduct and behaviour.~ 
The idea that no norms of human conduct, either ethical or political, 
can be inferred from the religious hypothesis is put even more force-
fully by Hume a few pages before: 
All the philosophy in the world, and all the religion 
which is nothing but a species of philosophy, will never 
be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience, 
or give us measure of conduct and behaviour different 
from those furnished by reflections on common life, No 
new fact can be inferred from the religious hypothesis; 
no event foreseen or foretold; no reward or punishment 
expected or dreaded, beyond what is already known by 
practice and observation ... nor have the political inter-
ests of society any connection with the philosophical 
disputes concerning metaphysics and religion. 7 
It is this idea that no norms of human conduct, neither ethical nor 
political, can be inferred from the religious hypothesis that has the 
greatest implications for the doctrine of Natural Law. Throughout 
its long life-time that doctrine has served as a philosophical foun-
dation for social, political and ethical theory. Where employed, it 
was generally accepted that it had both a private dimension and a 
social and political dimension. The social and political dimension 
was of great importance. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in 
the theory of Locke. Natural Law is premised as a key foundation of 
all moral and social theory and" activity. It is of fundamental 
importance both in the State of Nature and in Civil Society which 
succeeds it. From it are derived all men's rights and duties 
including the right to own property. We saw how the philosophical 
foundations of the institution of property lay completely in Natural 
Law. Hume's account is thus intended to strike at the heart of the 
theory of Natural Law. He leaves religion bereft of any supernatural 
content. He leaves only an account of the approximate origin of the 
natural world. There is no explanation of the relationship of man 
and his moral and social world to God and the order of the world. 
The theological is bracketed off. All considerations of God and of 
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, 
final causes in moral and social affairs are rejected. Hume 
severs all links between theology, such as it is, and human and 
social affairs. The atmosphere is one of fundamental secularism
8
. 
It is clear that once this severance between theology and human 
and social affairs is effected, all the principles of conduct, and 
all social and moral institutions must be explained without recourse 
, 
to God and Natural Law. Hume must produce a moral and social theory 
that owes nothing to the principles of authentic Natural Law, and 
nothing at all to the less than simple aspect of man's relationship 
to God. 
i. We are now in a position to turn to Hume' s theory of property. We 
shall see that his arguments are thoroughly purged of all references 
to, or assumptions explained in terms of, Natural Law. Hume's 
explanation of the conditions necessary for the institution of 
Property, and his arguments for the particular principles and rules 
9 
of property are wholly and conSistently secular 
We shall see that the institution of property is explained and justi-
fied not by reference to God and Natural Law, but by reference to the 
desires, inclinations and needs of men, by reference to a set of 
related facts about men and nature. That this is so is not surprising. 
Once God and Natural Law have been removed from the picture, we are 
left with the world as we see and know it, and with men as we see and 
know them. Men must be considered as autonomous beings in that they 
are independent and not subject to a superior authority and will. 
Being autonomous, they choose their own institutions, and frame their 
own principles of conduct, and they do this in accordance with their 
own needs and natures, rather than in accordance with the dictates of 
a divine will. It is sufficient that such institutions and principles 
of conduct are appropriate to their natures, to their desires and 
needs, and to the material conditions of the world. We shall see that 
it is a central theme in Hume's account that social institutions such 
as that of property take shape in contexts where men, in virtue of 
their basic conditions, have or develop needs for these institutions. 
Institutions arise so as to fulfil certain needs, and they thus have 
utility and value to men. They are totally dependent on men's needs 
and interests, that is, on men's natures, and on the material con-
ditions that exist in the world. 
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1. Hume's Account of Men's Need for the Institution of Property 
We have just stated that Hume's central theme is that social insti-
tutions arise because men have, or develop, needs for them, in virtue 
of their needs and inclinations, and of the material conditions in 
the world. What then are these material conditions, and these needs 
and inclinations that make the institution of property so necessary 
to men? 
For Hume, the nature of the human condition is such that it is only 
when men mutually participate in society that they can expect to 
achieve a reasonable level of well-being. Man, according to Hume, of 
all creatures has received from the hand of nature the most modest 
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endowments in proportion to his wants and needs His physical 
powers are scarcely sufficient for survival in an unfriendly world; 
the food for his sustenance requires the hardest labour to be produced, 
and, physically, he has neither protection against the elements, nor 
strength and agility for his defence. To this catalogue of natural 
handicaps, we must add yet another: man has a prodigious number of 
desires, requiring for his wellbeing a great variety of goods, while 
the world and his abilities are such that he can satisfy only a small 
fraction of them. There is, in short, an imbalance between what he 
needs and desires and what he is able to obtain. Too weak alone to 
be successful in any major project, too limited in skill, too dis-
tracted by the diversity of his needs to perfect himself in any art, 
man in the solitary state is inevitably doomed to "misery and ruin"ll. 
T'is by society alone he (man) is able to supply his 
defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his 
fellow creatures, and even acquire superi~ity over 
them. 12 
The advantage of society is that it provides a remedy for the three 
great inconveniences with which man in the natural state would be 
burdened: physical weakness, limited skill, and insecurity of 
13 person Society provides a remedy for the first inconvenience by 
a sheer conjunction of force and numbers. While one man may have a 
problem removing a boulder from his field, a few hundred working to-
gether can clear scores of them. 
The second inconvenience is overcome in society by a division of labour. 
Many of the commodities we need require complex skills for their 
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production, skills that take years of effort to perfect. It follows 
that if every man is forced to be a jack-of-all trades, he will never 
become sufficiently proficient at any particular endeavour and many 
of his wants will go unfulfilled. Society, on the other hand, 
provides a large reservoir of skills and services which the individual 
can employ in exchange for services in which he himself excells. 
Thus the availability of a large number of goods and services is one 
important advantage derived from society. 
The third advantage which Hume lists is security against "fortune and, 
accident,,14. This security is not to be confused with the security 
of possessions which results once the institution of property is 
established. Security of possession (which we shall discuss shortly) 
is more property a condition of society, than a result of it, for 
without it, society in any real sense is impossible. The kind of 
security to which Hume is referring now is that which derives from 
"mutual succour" or the practice of rendering mutual aid in times of 
need. An example would be the security every villager enjoys in 
knowing that if some natural disaster like a, flood were to occur, all 
the other villagers would help even if they themselves were not so 
badly affected. Thus, social organisation makes men less subject to 
the potentially devastating powers of nature. 
Hence, according to Hume, men establish society in order to remedy 
their several environmental difficulties; by a conjunction of forces 
15 d . . . 1 b' d t' 't 16 to augment power ,by a ~V1S10n of a our to ~ncrease pro uc ~v~ y , 
d b t 1 t t d and acc ;dents17. Th' , an y mu ua concern 0 preven angers ~ 1S ~s 
-not to say, as Hume is quick to observe, that men"in their "rude 
condition" have sufficient insight to perceive the advantages of a 
complex and sophisticated society18 The basic socialising motive 
for Hume does not result from abstract reflection on the advantages 
to be derived from increasing one's force, ability and security, but 
from an original instinct, shared by man with the whole animal king-
dom, to perpetuate the species. The ultimate basis of sociality is 
not rational, but grounded in our passions. Beginning with the 
attraction between the sexes, and the development of concern for 
children, small societal units naturally arise which make men 
sensible of the advantages which they may reap from 
society, as well as fashion them by degrees for it, by 
rubbing off those rough corners and untoward affections 
which prevent their coalition. 19 
7fj 
The family which counts as an all important micro-society for Hume 
thus provides the context in which the idea of social life arises. 
Hume believes that society gradually evolved from the family unit 
through the clan and tribe to form extensive society, and that at 
each successive stage of development there was an increasing awareness 
on the part of at least some members that certain ends were promoted 
by this new relationship. In this way, it became possible for men 
to see the value of social life, and to have a motivation to form 
larger and more advantageous social units. 
But where does the institution of property fit in? Hume 's argument 
thus far has only shown that in order to enjoy a reasonable level of 
well-being, men must live in society. What then is the connection 
between property and society? Why do men need the institution of 
property? 
follows: 
Hume's answer to this question may be summarised as 
Human well-being depends upon societal organisation. 
Societal organisation depends l'pon the institution of property 
Therefore, human well-being depends upon the institution of 
property. 
We have just looked at Hume's arguments for the first premiss. We 
have seen why it is the case that individuals can achieve a reasonable 
level of well-being only when they live in societies. We must now 
turn to Hume's second premiss. Why is it the case that a society 
cannot exist without the institution of property? 
In discussing Hume's arguments for the first premiss, we mentioned the 
advantages to be derived from societal organisation. However, equal 
to, or even surpassing these advantages, are certain natural impedi-
ments that stand in its way. Hume does not have in mind impediments 
that have been eliminated or set aside at some remote time in the past 
from which extensive society can be dated. Rather he has in mind 
continuous and ever-present impediments in the form of certain natural 
qualities of human nature and the world. These impediments can never 
be completely eliminated by the social institutions that men set up, 
but they can be controlled and contained. The impediments may be 
divided into two classes: (1) the psychological qualities of human 
nature, and (2) the physical nature of the world and its objects. 
Hume refers to these as the internal and external impediments to 
society, or the impediments arising out of "our natural temper and 
d . ,,20 out war c1rcumstances . 
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The impediments of "natural temper" that Hume has in mind are those 
of selfishness and greed. He holds that every human being has a 
selfish element in his nature, and this universal selfishness mani-
fests itself in an insatiable avidity for acquiring goods for himself, 
. 21 his family, and fr1ends. It is important to note that Hume does 
not claim that men are wholly selfish; he does allow that they have 
a desire to promote the well-being of their families and friends as 
22 
well . Yet their selfishness is sufficient to present a serious 
obstacle to the formation and continuance of society and this is 
because it manifests itself in an insatiable desire to amass the 
goods and resources of the external environment. 
The natural environment provides men with the means for well-being in 
the form of goods which serve their needs and interests. It is 
possible to imagine circumstances under which even wholly selfish men 
might live together in a society unregulated by rules of property. 
This would be the case in a mythical Golden Age in which "Nature 
spontaneously produc' d her greatest delicacies in infinite quantities,,23. 
Under such conditions of natural abundance, men could freely approp-
riate as much as they wished, and there would still be more than 
enough for others. But, unfortunately, the world is not in a Golden 
Age, but in an age of scarcity, and this state of affairs, coupled 
with man's selfish nature is sufficient to constitute a serious 
obstacle to the formation and continuance of society. These impedi-
ments of "our natural temper" and "outward circumstances" are not those 
of some remote and distant age. They are ever-present. Men's 
natures do not change - they are inherently selfish and greedy, and 
external goods remain in short supply. There is '; in short, an 
imbalance between the goods available and what men desire. 
is inevi table24 
Conflict 
Every man, Hume believes, will attempt to satisfy his desire for 
goods, and since the supply of goods is limited, the success of some 
will be at the expense of others. However, as this desire is equally 
strong in all men, and since, according to Hume, all men are basically 
equal in strength and ability25, the success of one man will only be 
temporary - it will last only until other men find a way of taking 
his possessions away from him. The natural equality of uncivilised 
man rules out any long-term domination of some men by others. The 
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result is that there would be a comp1 3te instability of possessions, 
and possibly of life as well, for every man will be pitted against 
every other man in ceaseless competition and conflict. Such com-
petition and conflict is neither eliminated nor reduced by the 
"limited benevolence" that characterises men's natures, for it is 
clear that men may quarrel over goods that they desire for their 
families and friends just as much as they may quarrel over goods they 
desire for personal use. Conflict is still inevitable. It is impor-
tant to note that, for Hume, the evil is not the acquisition of goods 
as such, but the form this acquisition of goods takes. What is wrong 
is that the acquisition is completely unregulated and unprincipled. 
As long as human nature retains its selfishness and goods remain scarce, 
and as long as there is no system of property, the endless competition 
resulting will produce an inherently unstable state of affairs26 The 
acquisition of goods must be regulated if society is to exist. 
The scarcity of goods is thus one impediment to society. The other 
27 impediment is their quality of being "transferable without loss" 
from one person to another. There are, indeed, other human goods 
besides material possessions as Hume points out. There are "the 
external advantages of the body" and "the internal satisfaction of 
28 
the mind" and, clearly, health, strength, good looks and intelligence 
are also scarce, and, indeed, as much wanted by people who lack them 
as any material goods. However, the goods of the mind and body do 
not threaten the stability of society because they are not "trans-
ferable without loss". Hume notes: 
We are perfectly secure in the enjoyment of the first 
(the goods of the body), and although the second (the 
satisfaction of the mind) may be ravish'd from us, it 
can be of no advantage to him who deprives us. 29 
It is only the goods of "industry and good fortune" that are "exposed 
to the violence of others and may be transferred without suffering any 
loss or alteration". It is only external goods that can have the 
same value for their new possessor as they did for the old one. 
Thus, in Hume's analysis, it is only these external or material goods 
that threaten society since it is only in relation to such goods that 
vicious behaviour can be advantageous to him.. who indulges in it .. Hume 
assumes that a man may behave viciously and maliciously towards 
another if that other has superior or more plentiful possessions. He 
does not believe that such behaviour would be manifested merely on 
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account of superior intelligence or unusually good looks. The 
principal occasion for discord and conflict is the moveable nature 
of external goods. Thus, what is required to escape from the State 
of Nature is a convention or system of principles and rules which 
stabilises and fixes the possession of eiXternal goods. External goods 
must be assigned or fixed to persons thus creating a situation in 
which men are as secure in the enjoyment of these goods as they are 
secure in the enjoyment of the goods of the mind and body which, 
Hume believes, could never be the source of contention and discord. 
Thus, what is needed is a system of mine and thine by reference to 
which disagreements over who is to have what can be settled without 
recourse to force and violence. What is needed is "a convention 
for the stability of possession, and for mutual restraint and 
forbearance" . 
Such a system of mine and thine, that is, a system of property rights, 
is not merely one way in which discord and contention can be avoided: 
it is an indispensible condition for avoiding the situation. Such a 
system is "absolutely requisite both to the support of society and to 
the well-being of every individual,,30 Without some system for 
assigning and fixing possessions, "society must immediately dissolve, 
and everyone must fall into that savage and solitary condition, which 
is infinitely worse than the worst situation that can possibly be 
supposed in society,,31 
For Hume, then, social institutions like that of property arise and 
take shape where men have, or develop needs for them. There is an 
intimate connection between men's natures, the material conditions of 
the world, and the kind of institutions which arise given these facts 
and conditions. More specifically, we may say that, for Hume, 
property relations are an adjustment to a conflict between two basic 
aspects of the human condition, namely, the natural necessity of men 
and their natural avidity and contentiousness. It is clear that 
Hume is offering an explanation of the origin of property in terms of 
these facts and conditions. But, it is important to note that Hume 
is also offering a justification of that institution too - a justifi-
cation for its existence in past ages, aswe[l as a justification for 
its continued eXistence32 . The internal and external impediments to 
society have not disappeared over the centuries. Men remain selfish 
and greedy, and desired goods remain in short supply. Hume's 
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statement that without some system for fixing possessions "society 
must immediately dissolve, and everyone must fall into that savage 
and solitary condition which is infinitely worse tha,n the wor.st 
situation that can possibly be suppos'd in society" thus has current 
application too. Hume is saying that the institution of property 
is always vital to human social life - it is an indispensible con-
dition for it provided limited sympathies and scarcity will always 
endure. It is so fundamental to social life that savagery and chaos 
would result without it. If it is the case that the institution of 
property is necessary for the avoidance of savagery and chaos, there 
would seem to be little need for justification beyond this point. 
~ Only a "thoroughgoing moral skeptic", Becker argues, would require 
t 33 justification of such a statement 
Now that we have examined in some detail Hume's arguments for the 
institution of property, some comment and criticism would be 
appropriate. It is clear that central to Hume's arguments for 
property is the idea of man's innate greed and selfishness. It is 
man's anti-social qualities of selfishness and "insatiable avidity" 
that make the institution so vital to men. If men's natures were 
characterised by "extensive benevolence", u.hat is, if "every man had 
the utmost tenderness for every (other) man, and felt no more concern 
for his own interests than for that of his fellows,,34, the institi-
tution of property would serve no useful end. 
Why should I bind another by deed or promise to do me any 
good office, when I know that he is already prompted by 
the strongest inclination to seek my happiness ... Why 
raise landmarks between my neighbours field and mine, 
when my heart has made no division betwee~our interests; 
but shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force 
and vivacity as if originally my own?35 
Hume's answer is that if men's natures were characterised by such ben-
evolence, there would be no point in binding others by deeds and 
promises, or raising landmarks between fields. The institution of 
property would have no purpose11or value. But how can we know that 
Hume's assumption that men are innately greedy and self-seeking is 
true? If it were not, it might seem that the second premiss and con-
elusion of Hume's argument are in trouble. We may recall that Hume's 
argument is as follows: 
Human well-being depends upon societal organisation 
Societal organisation depends upon the institution of property 
Therefore, human well-being depends upon the institution of 
property. 
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If men were not self-seeking and greedy in the way Hume asserts, it 
might be that societal organisation does not depend at all upon the 
institution of property, and that, therefore, human well-bei~g does 
not depend upon it either. 
Some philosophers like to distinguish between men's innate qualities 
and the kind of qualities they develop and exhibit when they live in 
particular kinds of social systems. They argue that claims that 
human beings are selfish and greedy are true about men, not as they 
are naturally and fundamentally, but as they appear in one specific 
type of socio-economic conditions, that is, in full market societies. 
~ Hume, as we saw, argues that there is an essential connection between 
[ 
institutions and the satisfaction of human needs and desires. Social 
institutions arise so as to satisfy such needs and desires. Other 
philosophers have argued for a two-way relationship between insti-
tutions and men's needs and desires. They agree with Hume that 
institutions arise so as to fulfil needs and desires, but they also 
argue that such institutions, when fully established, can function 
so as to mould and shape those needs and des.ires, perhaps even creating 
desires that did not exist before. On this account, then, it becomes 
less clear that "insatiable avidity" is an inherent characteristic of 
men. Such philosophers argue that Hume assumes as natural and 
eternal the very qualities that were in fact created by the insti-
tutions of property and market society. Marx, perhaps, is one of 
the first to argue that institutions can mould and shape men's 
natures in this way, but elements of the idea can be traced back to 
Locke. For Locke, greed and selfishness are not innate character-
... 
istics of men. In the Golden Age before money was introduced into 
the State of Nature men had limited and moderate desires. The 
introduction of money changed all this; it made men greedy for goods 
that far exceeded their needs, and it made them further "contentious" 
and "quarrelsome". 
Critics could thus point out that Hume is employing contentious or 
unproven claims about men's innate qualities in his argument for 
property. But, if it were the case that men were not so greedy and 
avid as Hume argues, or, if we were to assume that this were the 
case, where would this leave his argument for property? Would it 
collapse? Would the institution be redundant? Hume, as we saw, 
assumes that it would be so, that extensive benevolence would make 
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property redundant and, thus, valueless. But surely Hume is wrong. 
It is clear that men's intentions to use goods and resources from 
the natural environment can conflict even if their natures were 
characterised by extensive benevolence and moderate desires. That 
this is so is clear from the following case: 
A and B are two farmers in a peaceful and amicable State of Nature. 
Their habits are different. A cultivates his field in the morning 
and goes fishing in the afternoon. B fishes in the morning and 
cultivates his field in the afternoon. Quite unwittingly they have 
chosen the same field or area of land for cultivation, but they do 
not know this because there is no "landmark" or sign to show occupation 
and use. (Being benevolent such a practice is never used. Landmarks 
are only necessary when "their hearts have made a division of 
interests"). A cultivates the field with crop x, and B with crop y. 
But crops x and y need tending in different ways. What is advan-
tageous to one is detrimental to the other. The problem is that A 
and B are unwittingly destroying each other's crops. After six 
months they discover the mistake. Being benevolent A says, "You 
have the bigger share of whatever grows. I will take just my needs". 
But the equally benevolent B says, "No. We'll do just the opposite". 
The problem is that as they have destroyed each other's work, nothing 
grows at all. 
there must be 
Each has no goods with which to be benevolent. Thus, 
rules excluding persons generally other than the 
"owners" from taking or using material things. If 
crops are to grow, land must be secure from indis-
criminate entry, and food must in the intervals 
between its growth or capture or consumption, be 
secure from being taken from others. At all times 
and places, life itself depends on these minimal 
forbearances. 36a 
Hart thus argues that some form of property institution is inseparably 
connected with human life and well-being. Property rules are vital -
even if men are extensively benevolent and have moderate desires. I 
said earlier that if the contentious claims about men's greed and 
selfishness are dropped, it might appear that Hume's second premiss 
and conclusion are in trouble. It should now be clear that this 
would not be so. Although Hume did not see it, he could have justi~ 
fied the institution of property usibg less contentious claims. He 
could still say that "Human well-being depends upon the institution 
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of property". However, one important qualification must be made. 
The type of property institution necessary to men if they are assumed 
to be potentially extensively benevolent is very different from the 
one necessary to men if they are assumed to be inherently selfish and 
greedy. If men are assumed to be benevolent, a few "minimal for-
bearances" should suffice. But if men are "insatiably avid" and 
contentious, it would take more than minimal forbearances to ensure 
, 
that society does not collapse. The kind of extensive individual 
control over property that Hume attempts to justify does indeed 
require the assumption of avidity and selfishness. Hume's pessimism 
is a topic to which we shall return in Section 4. It is enough to 
note at this stage that greed and selfishness do not have to be 
assumed in order to show that the institution of property is necessary 
to men. Extensive benevolence and moderate desires do not make the 
institution redundant and valueless. 
2. Self-interest and Mutual Agreement 
Now that we have completed this digression concerning the relationship 
between benevolence and property, we must return to the main dis-
cussion. We saw that Hume's argument is as follows: The principal 
occasion of discord and conflict is the moveable nature of external 
goods. Thus what is required to escape from the State of Nature is 
a convention or system of rules and principles which stabilise or fix 
the possession of external goods, assigning them to particular indi-
viduals. What is required is a system of "mine and thine" by 
reference to which disagreements concerning who is to have what can 
be settled without recourse to violence. 
Such a system of "mine and thine", of property rights, is not simply 
one way in which discord and conflict can be avoided. It is an 
indispensible condition for its avoidance. Hume is very clear on 
this point. Such a system, he says, is "absolutely requisite both 
to the support of society, and to the well-being of every individual". 
Without such a system of assigning and fixing possessions "society 
must immediately dissolve, and,everyone must fall into that savage 
and solitary condition which is infinitely worse than the wors~ 
q6b 
situation that can be suppos'd in society'~ . 
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The words, "well-being of every individual" and "everyone must fall 
into that savage condition" without such a convention, are most 
important. Humeis not saying that it is better for the majority of 
people if a system of property rights is implemented; he is saying 
that it is better for each and every individual that such a system 
be implemented. "Every individual person must find himself a 
36c gainer on balancing the account" . 
Gauthier writes: 
The distinction is crucial. 
Hume is frequently interpreted as a proto-utilitarian. 
(But) the utilitarian considers overall well-being a suf-
ficient condition for the conventions of property. The 
contractarian considers the well-being of every individual 
a necessary condition for such conventions ... A utilitarian 
will consider a property convention acceptable if there is 
some feasible set of circumstances in which it affords the 
group a total utility greater than the total utility of any 
circumstances attainable in its absence. A contractarian, on 
the other hand, will consider a property convention only accep-
table if there is some feasible set of circumstances in which it 
affords each member of the group no less utility, and some 
members more utility than is afforded either by the existing 
circumstances, or than by any other set of circumstances 
voluntarily attainable in the absence of any property con-
vention. A sufficient condition of utilitarian acceptability 
is that a convention maximises total utility; a necessary 
condition of contractarian acceptability is that a convention 
increases the utility of some, and decreases the utility of 
none. 37 
Hume's approach is thus clearly contractarian, not utilitarian. 
Moreover, his contractarian claim is a very strong one - the property 
convention increases the well-being of every individual and decreases 
that of none. 
Hume is clearly thinking of the "well-being of every individual". It 
is true that he sometimes uses the words "public utility", but this, 
Gauthier says, is not "overall utility", but rather "mutual expected 
utility". "Hume is not appealing to total utility as would a 
utili tarian, but rather to mutual advantage as befits a contractarian,i38 . 
The reason is clear enough. According to Hume, as we saw, all men 
have only limited benevolence. They are equal in strength and 
ability and thus not able to dominate each other in the long-term. 
A self-interested (or limitedly benevolent) individual, equal in 
strength and ability to his fellow me~ would clearly not agree to 
have his personal (or family) interests submerged in an overall good. 
The argument that, although he and his family will not benefit from 
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an agreement, others - complete strangers - will benefit, would carry 
no weight with him. Before making an agreement in respect of 
external goods, he will want to know how it affects him and his 
family. If complete strangers fare well, but he will fare badly, 
he would not agree to it. Having said that all men are self-
interested and equal in native strength, Hume must mean mutual 
advantage and not overall advantage. 
We have just said that a self-interested individual would not enter 
into a convention or agreement that had the effect of leaving him 
worse off than he would have been if he had not entered into it. It 
~ would not be "rational" for him to do so. An individual who is 
, 
rational in a self-interested sense would choose to maximise expected 
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utility or expectation of well-be1ng It would be rational for a 
particular individual to assent to a principle, or set of principles, 
P, (assuming for the moment that there is only one such P) if and 
~a.R 
only if his expectation of well-being is greater (or equal to)his 
A 
expectation of well-being given that no agreement at all is reached 
between himself and the rest of the group. . It would be irrational 
(in this self-interested sense) for him to accept less than he can 
expect to get if no agreement is reached. The individual's 
expectation of well-being given that no agreement is reached stands 
as a reference point against which to judge and measure various 
principles and rules. The absence of agreement point for Hume is, 
of course, the State of Nature. 
This criterion of rational individual choice can be expanded to 
mutual agreement or choice in the following way: 
(1) Mutual agreement on. the adoption of principle, (or set 
of principles), P, is rational iff every man's expectation 
of well-being given the adoption of P, is greater than, 
or equal to, expectation of well-being given that no 
agreement is reached. 
In the games theory language of "dominance" this could be reformulated 
as follows (where AA stands for Absence of Agreement, or the State of 
40 
Nature for Hume) : 
(la) Mutual agreement on the adoption of principle, (or set 
of principles), P, is rational. iff P dominates AA. 
The emphasis is still on individual well-being. One principle, or 
set of principles, does not dominate another principle, or set of 
principles if it makes the majority in a group better off. P only 
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dominates AA (or the State of Nature) if it is the case that every 
man's expectation of well-being is greater when P is adopted than 
41 
when no agreement is reached 
Applying Formula (la) to Hume's account, we can say that, for Hume, 
a society based upon a system of property rights will dominate the 
State of Nature, and any form of social co-operation that lacks a 
system of property rights will be dominat~d by a form of social co-
operation that has such a system. This is because any social system 
that lacks such property rights will be inherently unstable. The 
conflict and discord which results from the absence of property 
" rights will ensure that no society endures for any length of time. 
\ 
It is, therefore, clearly in the rational self-interest of men to 
agree to a system of property rights. "Every individual person", 
Hume writes, "must find himself a gainer on balancing the account". 
Gauthier writes: 
Hume's argument, then, is that the expected benefit to 
each person, of a system of property, in comparison with 
no system, is very great, so that each has a strong 
interest in reaching an agreement with his fellows on 
some system. 42 
We have seen that rational mutual choice is choice which maximises 
expectation of well-being for each and every person. There is a 
further condition which we can add to Formula (1). We can say that 
mutual agreement to adopt PI is rational only if there is not some 
other principle which yields a still greater expectation of well-being 
to each and every person. We can formulate this as follows: 
(2) Mutual agreement to adopt principle (ax ~et of 
principles), PI' is rational iff it is not the 
case that there is another principle (or set of 
principles), P 2 , which is expected to yield each 
and every person a greater amount of well-being. 
Again, we can reformulate this in the games theory language of 
"dominance". If PI yields a greater expectation of well-being for 
every man than does P 2 , we can say PI dominates P 2 . So: 
(2a) Mutual agreement on the adoption of principle (or 
set of principles), PI, is rational iff PI domin-
ates AA (or the State of Nature) and there is no 
other principle (or set of principles), P 2 , which 
dominates Pl. 
No problem arises if there is only one principle (or set of principles), 
P, which dominates the State of Nature. Clearly, P must be chosen. 
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There is also no problem if there are two principles (or sets of 
principles), P l and P2 , and it is the case that P l dominates P 2 
which in turn dominates the State of Nature. Clearly, P l must be 
chosen by self-interested individuals. 
But suppose there are a number of principles (or sets of principles) 
which clearly dominate the State of Nature, the state of absence of 
agreement, but none of which clearly dominate the others. There 
can be no uniquely rational solution if it is the case that Pl , P 2 , 
and P 3 
or P3 ; 
f or P2 · 
all dominate the State of Nature, but Pl does not dominate P 2 
P
2 
does not dominate P l or P 3
; and P 3 does not dominate P l 
It would not be rational to leave matters at the absence of 
agreement point, the State of Nature, for this would simply be 
agreeing to accept a lower standard of well-being than is necessary. 
As we shall see, it is just this type of situation that we encounter 
in Hume's theory. Hume's convention or system of property is con-
stituted by a set of principles and rules. The principles, he 
argues, are clearly in the rational self-interest of all individuals 
in the society. If they are accepted and adhered to, "each 
individual must find himself a gainer on balancing the account". One 
of these principles is that "possessions be stable". But possessions 
can only be stable if they are firmly fixed or assigned to individuals. 
Thus the principle must be backed or supported by a set of rules 
which assign or distribute these possessions to individual persons. 
On the question of these rules, Hume writes: 
We must distinguish between the necessity of a separation 
and constancy in men's possessions, and the r.ules, which 
assign particular objects to particular persons. The 
first necessity is obvious, strong and invincible: the 
latter may depend on a public utility more light and 
frivolous, on the sentiment of private humanity and 
aversion to private hardship, on precedents, analogies, 
and very fine connections and turns of the imagination. 43 
Thus, Miller notes that, for Hume, "what is most important is that 
there should be some rules ensuring the stability of possessions; 
exactly what form these rules take is less important,,44 But we can 
clarify Hume's position even further. If the rules are rules "which 
assign (or distribute) particular objects to particular persons, and, 
if it is the case that it is of no great significance which rules are 
adopted, then, it must be the case that it is of no great signifi-
cance which particular objects are assigned or distributed to 
91 
particular persons. Hume does in fact argue that this is the case: 
That there be a separation or distinction of possessions, 
and that this separation be steady and constant; this is 
absolutely required by the interests of society, and 
hence the origin of justice and propert~ What possessions 
are assigned to particular persons; this is, generally 
speaking, pretty indifferent; and is often determined by 
very frivolous views and considerations. 45 (My italics) 
We shall examine the idea that it is of no great significance which 
rule of distribution or assignment of possessions is adopted in 
Section 4. At the moment we shall just continue to analyse Hume's 
views. 
We can say that, according to Hume, the dominance criterion fails 
to yield the uniquely rational and determinate solution, but men must 
still reach a consensus on some rules. Gauthier says that, for Hume, 
The solution is acceptance of the "most obvious rule" 
which could be agreed on! What is obvious turns on 
"connections of the imagination" so that the basis for 
agreement among persons is to be found in that feature 
which is a member of the set of possible circumstances 
each of which picks out a particular rule, and which has 
a stronger effect on the imaginations of those concerned 
than any other member of this set. 46 
In the absence of a uniquely rational solution, ap~eal is made to 
"salience" ("S") which is a co-ordinating device. Gauthier 
continues: 
A rule is required to connect objects as property to 
persons in situations of type S. Each possible rule 
appeals to some feature of S. Among these features, we 
suppose that there is one, fl' which establishes a 
stronger imaginative connection between particular 
objects and particular persons than any other feature, 
at least, for most individuals. Each person, then, 
whether or not he shares this imaginative apprehension, 
will expect most others to respond to it, and so the 
feature, fl' provides the salient basis for agreement 
on that rule which appeals to it.47 
In less technical language, this means that, in the absence of a 
uniquely rational solution, it is necessary to turn away from a con-
sideration of which rules are rationally dominant to a consideration 
of what is, in the terms of the laws of the operation of the 
imagination, psychologically salient. According to Hume, the laws 
governing the imagination (the prinCiple of association of ideas) are 
such that men faced with such a choice will naturally tend to focus 
on certain features, rather than upon others, and they will be led 
naturally to a consensus. 
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In the next section we shall see how this rational dominance and 
psychological salience apply to Hume's principles and rules of 
property. 
3. The Principles and Rules of Property 
. 
Hume finds that there are three principles which promote the con-
ditions of human well-being, and which are, therefore, in the rational 
self-interest of men to acknowledge in their dealings with each other: 
These are: (1) The Principle of Stability of Possessions, (2) The 
[Principle of Transference of Property by Consent, and (3) The 
Principle of Performance of Promises 48 
(1) THE PRINCIPLE OF STABILITY OF POSSESSIONS 
The first and most important principle is that possessions be stable. 
This principle compensates for one of the greatest natural obstacles 
to society, which, as we have seen, is the transferability of 
possessions without loss or alteration. By means of this principle, 
loose, external, material goods are made as secure as the goods of 
the body and mind which Hume believes are never the source of social 
strive. The adoption of such a principle is the only possible 
solution to man's natural situation, a situation in which selfish 
people live in a world in which essential goods are scarce and 
transferable without loss. Men cannot be made generous; goods 
cannot be produced in infinite quantities, but circumstances can be 
created in which goods will be re'garded as if they were not loose and 
transferable. 
This first principle, in fact, creates "property". Without this 
convention of property, and without this principle, only "possessions" 
exist. The distinction between "possessions" and "property" is very 
significant in Hume's theory. A man may occupy a plot of land left 
to him by his father. He may clear it, and labour on it to make it 
productive, and, further, other men may allow him to enjoy it in 
peace. But this land is still only a "possession". It is not 
"property". It becomes "property" only when other men recognise 
that he has a right to enjoy the land in peace, and when they further 
49 
recognise that they have a duty of restraint and forbearance ,that 
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is, that they must not interfere with that man's enjoyment of his 
land. And, of course, such rights and duties arise from the con-
vention; they do not pre-date it. They are not natural rights; 
they are not God-given. They are adopted by men simply on account 
of their promotion of. human well-being. 
The convention, Hume says is for "stability of possession and for 
mutual restraint and forbearance". His idea is that stability of 
possession can only be ensured if there is a duty on the part of 
others (the non-owners) not to trespass or interfere. The rights 
and corresponding duties to which the convention gives rise are thus 
negative or classic rights. A man's right to property correlates 
wi th a negative duty on the p.art of others - the duty not to trespass 
or interfere with that to which the rightholder has a right (in this 
. 50 
case, h1S property) . 
The convention thus creates "property"; it also creates "justice". 
Gauthier pOints out that, in Hume's account, the two concepts are 
"closely linked". For Hume, 
Property is determined by a system of rules for the 
possession and use of objects, so that my property is 
what, in accordance with the rules, I possess and use, 
and my exclusive property, what I alone possess and use. 
Justice, then, is the virtue determined by such a system, 
so that just behaviour consists in adhering to the rules 
governing the possession and use of objects. For Hume, 
a theory of property and justice explicates the rationale 
for systems of rules determining possession and use. 51 
We can thus say that a man behaves justly towards another when he 
fulfils his duty of restraint and forbearance, that is, when he leaves 
that other to enjoy his possessions in peace. By so doing he is 
implicitly acknowledging that that other has a right to the goods in 
question. 
The first principle thus creates "property" by making possessions 
stable. But, taken by itself, it will fail to achieve its purpose 
which is "to cut off all occasion of discord and contention" for it 
is pitched at too general and abstract a level. In addition, there 
must be other supplementary rules defining the conditions under which 
possessions are to be stable. These supplementary rules are called 
by Hume the "Rules Determining Property". 
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The Rules Determining Property 
We have seen that, for Hume, it is in the rational self-interest of 
all men to agree to some system of assigning property rights. 
However, the calculus of rational self-interest takes us to this 
point, but no further. If we ask what rules should be adopted, 
Hume is ready to offer an answer, but he makes it clear that that 
answer cannot be defended by appeal to considerations of rational 
self-interest 52 . What is indispensible ~~ the maintenance and 
stability of society is that men are willing to act in accordance 
with rules in their dealings with one another; but the content of 
these rules is largely a matter of indifference from'the point of 
view of rational self-interest. We find that it is not rational 
self-interest that provides the rationale for the supplementary 
rules, but the principles of the imagination, that is, the principle 
of association of ideas. Thus, at this level, psychological salience 
replaces rational dominance. We shall see that what is psycholog-
ically salient owes much to custom and habit. 
Hume discusses f-ive separate rules for the determination of property 
rights. These are: (i) The Rule of Present Possession: or the 
rule that every man shall retain as property that which he held as 
mere possession before the agreement. (ii) The Rule of First 
Possession: or the rule that a person shall have a right to that 
which he is the first to possess or occupy. (iii) The Rule of Long 
Possession or Prescription: or the rule that long term de facto 
possession of property shall be sufficient to establish a right. 
(iv) The Rule of Accession: or the rule that an object shall be the 
... 
property of he who already has property in another object intimately 
related to it. (Thus, the fruits of an orchard, or the offspring 
of cattle are said to belong to the person who owns the orchard or 
cattle in question). Finally, (v) The Rule of Succession: or the 
rule that a man's property shall pass to his nearest family after 
his death. 
(i) The Rule of Present Possession 
Hume notes that we can think of men coming to deliberate together 
for the first time, with no previous background of mutual co-operation 
in a society, and further, we can think of such men as already in 
possession of certain external goods at the time of deliberation. The 
problem is to understand how such external goods which may have been 
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acquired by force or cunning can suddenly be transformed into rightful 
property. There is no "rational" way of settling this matter for 
self-interested reason can only tell us that there should be.rules, 
but not what their content should be. The only way is to find that 
which is most agreeable or harmonious to the natures of those who 
must abide by these rules, and it is in this respect, Hume believes, 
that the Rule of Present Possession has clear advantages. Such 
advantages arise from various accidental features of the imagination. 
It is a fact of human nature or a general disposition of men to 
pref er goods to which they:',are accustomed. Clearly, men are more 
accustomed to goods they already possess than to new goods, so it 
follows that every man prefers his own goods to any other's. The 
effect of custom and habit is: 
That it not only reconciles us to anything we have long 
enjoy'd, but even gives us an affection for it, and 
makes us prefer it to other objects which may be more 
valuable, but are less known to us. What has long 
lain under our eye, and has often been employ'd to our 
advantage, that we are always the most unwilling to 
part with; but can easily live without possessions we 
have never enjoy'd, and are not accustomed to. 53 
It is this natural preference that the Rule of Present Possession 
gratifies - for each man is to continue to enjoy what he possessed at 
the time deliberation took place. The only difference is that now 
it is truly "property" whereas before it was only a possession. A 
rule that is so clearly in harmony with man's natural dispositions 
will not be opposed, Hume thinks. But one could, of course, question 
the claim that such a rule is in harmony with men's natural dis-
positions at least as Hume perceives them. If.- men have a greater 
affection for goods they already possess, and "can easily live without 
goods they have never enjoy' d", this scarcely demonstrates an 
"insatiable avidity" and "greed". To be greedy and insatiably avid 
is to be disposed to want to acquire more goods, not to be content 
wi th what one already possesses or to take the view that "what I've 
never had, I'll never miss". If men can live so easily without goods 
they have never enjoyed, it seems unclear why there should be such a 
scramble for goods, and the consequent threat to the stability of 
soc iety. 
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(ii) The Rule of First Possession or Occupation 
This rule specifies that a man is to have a right to that which he 
is the first to occupy or possess. It applies to external goods 
whose existence was not known about before, or which have just been 
discovered. While it is in the rational self-interest of men that 
there should be some rule for assigning goods of this type as they 
will be the source ,of confl ict, rational self-interest cannot tell 
us what the rule should be. However, Hume argues, the Rule of First 
Possession naturally suggests itself for "it engages the attention 
most" . We might think that it is reason which informs us of the 
utility or even the rightness of this rule, but Hume argues, our 
decision is really made by appeal to principles of the imagination, 
that is, the association of ideas. We might "reason" on the one 
hand that a person who hunts down a hare until it drops from 
exhaustion has a right to the hare - a right that another person does 
not join the hunt at the last minute and seize the hare. Yet, on the 
other hand, we are also likely to "reason" that a person who reaches 
up to pick an apple from a tree has no good grounds to complain if 
another man reaches up more quickly and picks the apple before the 
first man can reach it 54 . The difference between the "reasoning" is 
55a in fact due to the operation of the imagination, Hume argues . There 
is a stronger association in our imaginations between the idea of the 
hare and the idea of the hunter, than between the idea of the apple 
arid that of the apple picker. In the hare case there is a causal 
relation between the two objects: the hunter has chased the hare until 
it is exhausted. The hunter has caused or produced this state in the 
hare. But there is no such causal relation b~tween the apple picker 
and the apple. In accordance with the principles of the imagination, 
the mind, therefore, moves more naturally from the idea of the hunter 
to the idea of the hare than it does from the idea of the apple picker 
to the idea of the apple. The imagination "completes the union" by 
assigning a property right in the first, case but not in the second 
case. It should be noted that, for Hume, this relationship of 
association applies also in cases where no labour is involved. Thus, 
the first possessor or occupant of a piece of land or an island 
acquires a title to it. The association in our imagination is very 
strong in such cases, he claims. The individual "acquires the 
property" because the "object" (the island, piece of land) is "cir-
55b 
cumscribed in the fancy" 
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(iii) The Rule of Long Possession or Prescription 
This rule states that wherever the rights of property have become 
obscure, every man shall have property in whatever he has possessed 
for a long time. Once the title to property is obscure, contention 
will arise; it can only be avoided if there is a rule to re-assign 
the property to somebody. The imagination again functions to 
determine the rule. Clearly, if it is the case that men become 
attached to what they actually possess, then it is reasonable to 
suppose that they will also feel this strong attachment for what they 
have possessed for a long time. Custom and habit has the effect: 
That it not only reconciles us to anything we have long 
enjoy'd, but even gives us an affection for it, and makes 
us prefer it to other objects which may be more valuable .. . 56 
Moreover, the two relations - of long possession and permanent pos-
session are very much alike. The imagination often "conjoins" and 
even confuses resembling relations so it will naturally tend to con-
join the two relations of permanent possession and long possession. 
If the imagination assigns a property right or relation in the first 
case, then it will naturally do so in the second case as well. Clearly 
a rule that is in harmony with men's natural inclinations will appeal 
to them, and the Rule of Prescription has this harmony. 
Again we can question Hume's insistence that the rule is in harmony 
with men's natural dispositions. Custom and habit seem again to be 
at odds with "insatiable avidity" and selfishness. Hume notes that 
we h ave "greater affect ion" for goods we have "long enjoy' d" and that 
we prefer these to "other objects which may be-more valuable". I 
think it is fair to say that an "insatiably avid" individual would 
prefer the more valuable goods, and that he would prefer his own 
goods to other goods only if he felt sure his goods had the greater 
value. 
(iv) The Rule of Accession 
This rule assigns to a person goods which are intimately connected 
with other goods that a person already possesses by right. This rule 
is based completely on the imagination, according to Hume. There is 
no question of utility apart from the utility of getting the goods 
assigned so that they cannot lead to discord. 
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This source of property can never be explained but from 
the imagination; and one may affirm that the causes are 
here unmix'd. 57 
The imagination takes both the natural and existing moral relations 
as the sign for the determination of a further property right. Thus 
a man related to an object (for example, an orchard) by both a natural 
relation of present possession and a moral relation of property, 
inevitably bec9mes associated with that o~fhard in the imagination. 
But also any part or product (the fruits of that object) also tend to 
be associated with the object. So the fruit is associated with the 
orchard. The association is usually based on either a relation of 
causality or contiguity. If a particular man is associated with a 
particular object (the orchard) and the object (the orchard) is 
associated with a particular part or product (the fruit), the man will 
also tend to be associated with the part or product (the fruit). The 
imagination just makes the transition to form the new association. 
(v) The Rule of Succession 
Succession, or the rule that a man's property shall pass to his 
nearest kin when he dies, differs from the other rules i~ one signifi-
cant respect. In the case of the other rules, there is no utility 
to recommend them; their appeal is not to the understanding, but to 
the imagination. These other rules have some utility - the utility 
of getting possessions allocated so that they are no longer the cause 
of discord, but many kinds of rule could have this kind of utility if 
strictly enforced. The preference of the rules of First Possession, 
Long Possession etc. is that they are in harmony with man's nature; 
they appeal to his imagination. But the Rule of Succession is 
different. There are important utilitarian reasons served by a rule 
that requires that property pass to those who are the nearest kin. 
Such a practice serves to encourage men to be industrious and frugal, 
and they are, therefore, of more service to society than they would 
otherwise be. But such a rule, Hume makes clear, is not merely 
utilitarian. It is reinforced by the operation of the imagination 
which moves easily from the idea of a person to those who are related 
to him as children. Such utility as this rule has is thus clearly 
reinforced by the imagination, that is, by the principle of the 
association of ideas. 
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(2) THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSFERENCE OF' 'PROPERTY BY CONSENT 
Hume's analysis moves away from the role of the imagination towards 
that of rational self-interest again with the Second Principle of 
Property and Just Social Organisation that possessions be trans-
ferable by consent. This second principle is required for the 
following reason. The First Principle removes one great obstacle 
to human well-being, but it, in fact, introduces another. The 
advantage of societal living, as we have seen, is that it gives men 
an opportunity to satisfy more of their needs than would otherwise 
be possible. The division of labour which is one' ,outcome of society' 
enables a man to satisfy his multiple needs even though he may know 
only one skill. Thus a man who specialises in making horse shoes 
can make them for all the village, and he can buy his bread from 
someone else who specialises in making bread. But such an exchange 
of goods or services is only possible if men are able to transfer 
their possessions with their own consent. The First Principle which 
lays the foundations of society "fixes" possessions in the sense that 
it allocates possessions to a. particular person according to a number 
of different criteria. To abolish the First Principle would involve 
a return to chaos. Thus what is needed is another Principle which 
will complement the First Principle, but will not undermine it. The 
Second. Principle that possessions be transferable by consent does just 
this. Hume writes that the Rules and Principles of Property and Just 
Social Organisation: 
Seek a median betwixt a rigid stability and ... changeable 
and uncertain adjustment. But there is no better median 
than that obvious one, that possessions and property shall 
always be stable except where the proprieil-or .. consents to 
bestow them on some other person. This rule can have no 
ill consequence in occasioning wars and dissentions, since 
the. proprietor's consent, who alone is concerned, is taken 
along in the alienation; and it serves many good purposes 
in adjusting property to persons. 58 
Hume argues that while it is essential for the maintenance of society 
that property be stable, disadvantages would result if men's rights 
to property were limited to the five Rules for the Determination of 
Property. These rules do not take heed of the suitability between 
men and their external goods. If property is allocated in accordance 
with these rules alone, many will be left holding goods they do not 
want, or cannot use, and others will lack what they do want or could 
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use. It is clearly not possible to allow each man just what he wants 
bearing in mind man's nature, and the scarce supply of goods, but the 
excessive inflexibility of the five rules can be overcome if there is 
a principle which specifies that property is to be assigned according 
to these rules except where a proprietor consents to a transfer of 
his property to some other party. Moreover, such a principle cannot 
have the ill consequences of occasioning wars and discord, for it does 
not frustrate the end that is served by the rules for stabilising 
property - it allows only as much instability of property as the 
property owners are willing to sanction. But clearly, the principle 
is in the general interest, that is, it is in the interests of all the 
part icipants. The division of labour (the specialisation of skills) 
could never function to improve the conditions of human existence 
without the support of trade and commerce, and trade and commerce 
could only flourish if there is a rule that allows transference of 
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The relationship between the Five Rules for the determination of 
property and the Second Principle may be summarised as follows: 
First, the Five Rules stabilise property, and the Second Principle 
allows some instability by specifying conditions under which the Rules 
may be set aside. Secondly, while the Five Rules function to allo-
cate property to someone, the Second Principle functions to allow its 
reallocation or transfer by detailing the condition (that is, the 
proprietor's consent) which must obtain for this transfer or alienation 
to be valid. And this possibility of transfer or alienation becomes 
necessary once a division of labour is instituted. 
(3) THE PRINCIPLE OF PERFORMANCE OF PROMISES 
The principle that promises be honol'~ed or fulfilled Hume describes 
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as "one of the most considerable parts" of just social organisation 
and property. It is again a self-interestedly rational principle; 
it owes nothing to the principles of the imagination. 
In complex society, promising is indispensible. The Third Principle 
of Property and Just Social Organisation can be seen as complementary 
to the Second Principle that possessions be transferable by consent, 
We have seen that for the division of labour to work effectively 
there must be some provision for the distribution of surplus goods 
lO~ 
and services. The Second Principle in allowing transfer of goods 
and services by consent accomplishes this purpose, but only to a 
limited extent because, Hume says: 
It can only take place with regard to such objects as 
are present and individual, but not to such as are 
absent or general. 61 
The transference of property by consent can only take place when the 
consent and de.livery are simultaneous. My mere consent that you 
should have "five hogshead of wine" without specifying the particular 
hogsheads in question does not give you property. Similarly, I 
cannot transfer to you the property in a "house twenty leagues 
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distant" The same problem occurs with the exchange of services. 
I may consent to work for you to-morrow, but as this service is not 
performed at the moment of consent, you have no assurance that I will 
63 do so . 
It is clear that, without promising, transference of property is 
impossible unless the property in question is actually present and 
moveable. Services also could only be exchanged if it were possible 
to perform them at the moment of consent. But, if this were the 
situation, there would be no confidence and very limited commerce. 
Each man, knowing that only natural gratitude would prevent his 
neighbour from taking advantage of him, would be unwilling to risk 
his property or his labour time on the small chance that his neighbour 
might show him such natural gratitude. The division of labour, which 
was instituted to compensate for the limited range of skills each 
individual possessed, could never succeed without the institution of 
promising, for each man would be forced to pro~ide for most of his 
needs alone. 
4. The Validity of Hume's Justification 
of the Principles and Rules of Property 
According to Hume, the First Principle "that Possessions be Stable" 
can only be effective if it is supplemented by rules which assign .or 
distribute possessions to individuals. But, although rational self-
interest can inform men that there should be such rules, it cannot 
tell them which particular rules to adopt. From the point of view 
of rational self-interest, one rule or set of rules is as good as any 
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other rule or set of rules. Reason cannot provide the unique solution. 
To decide among rules; to decide, in short, which individuals are to 
have which goods, appeal must be made to what is psychologically 
"salient", to certain associations of ideas that men naturally tend 
to make. In this way, by means of the device of "salience", men's 
choices can be co-ordinated. 
Gauthier points out that the use of salience to select among possible 
rules is 
Highly conservative in its effects. This conservatism, 
of course, reflects Hume' s insistence that, while a system 
of property is essential, the choice among systems is of 
much less importance. In a critical discu ssion of Hume' s . 
theory, we might question whether present possession, in-
heritance, precedent would command the interested recognition 
of all concerned. 64 
It is to such a critical discussion that I shall now turn in this 
section. I shall question whether it is the case that while some 
rules of property are required, the choice among rules is of little 
importance. I shall argue that one set of rules is not necessarily 
as good as another set, and that it is not the case that "what 
possessions are assigned to particular persons is a matter of indif-
ference" . 
In Section 4.1, I shall first consider two self-interested individuals 
in the State of Nature attempting to choose a set of rules to fix 
property. I shall argue that it is unlikely that they would choose 
the rules Hume suggests. Then I shall discuss the application of 
Hume's rules and principles to modern society. r-shall be concerned 
not with the choice of principles and rules - for Hume does not argue 
that each new generation chooses new principles and rules - but with the 
more general question of whether they are in the interests of all men, 
whether which individuals have particular goods is a largely irrelevant 
matter, and whether all men would abide by Hume's rules and principles. 
My answers will all be negative. 
In Section 4.2, I shall try to show just how conservative are Hume's 
rules and principles by comparing his theory with Filmer's, and con-
trasting both theories with the theories of Locke, Hutcheson and Reid. 
Of key importance in the discussion will be the questions of (i) the 
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size or extent of each person's property holding and (ii) positive in 
rem rights to welfare. In respect of (i) I shall attempt to show that 
the Locke-Hutcheson view of "bounding" or limiting the size of each 
individual's property is more adequate than the view held by Hume (and 
Filmer) in which there appears to be ~o such limit, at all. In respect 
of (ii) I shall argue that by omitting positive in rem rights to welfare, 
the lives of some men become contingent upon the consent of other men, 
and that, therefore, it is implausible to argue: 
(1) taat a man whose life is contingent in this way will be 
"indifferent" to the question of "what possessions are 
assigned to particular persons" 
and 
(2) that all rules of property distribution are equally in all 
men's interests. 
Finally, in section 4.3, I shall look at the arguments Hume uses against 
redistribution of property or wealth, and show that these arguments fail. 
4.1 Advantaged and Disadvantaged 
Hume argues, as we have seen I that it is psychologically natural 
for men who seek an agreement on property rights to take their present 
possessions as a basic reference point. By the Rule of Present 
Possession each is to retain those external goods over which he exerts 
de facto control at the time deliberation occurs. But suppose that 
at the time deliberation occurs, there is considerable disparity between 
the amount of goods over which different individuals exert de facto 
control in that some possess a large number of goods, while others 
possess very few goods. It is clear that there will be some people -
those who possess a small number of goods - for whom this natural 
psychological disposition to accept the Rule of Present Possession will 
conflict with the self-interestedly rational disposition to maximise 
well-being. In short, an agreement to change this de facto control 
into a de jure control is clearly against the interests of those who 
are relatively disadvantaged. There are clearly alternative rules 
whose adoption would yield those who are disadvantaged a greater exp-
ectation of well-being than the Rule of Present Possession. For the 
initially disadvantaged the rule that all external goods are to be 
handed in and redistributed in equal shares to all is clearly pref-
erable to Hume's own rule of Present Possession. It is not clear that 
self-interested (or limitedly benevolent) men would give their consent 
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to such a rule if it worked to their (or to their family's) disadvan-
tage. It is more plausible to argue that if such a rule is implemented 
at all, it is the result, not of consent, but of imposition, that is, 
that the rule is imposed by the advantaged upon the disadvantaged. 
But this, of course, is not Hume's theory. We can, therefore, say 
.\# 
that it is against the interests of those who are disadvantaged in the 
sense that they exert de facto control over few goods to allow them-
selves to follow the promptings of the imagination. Further, there 
seems to be no good reason why an individual cannot submit what his 
imaginat.ion suggests to him to some sort of rational scrutiny to 
establish whether or not the rule conflicts with his self-interest. 
~This conflict is, of course, the conflict we mentioned earlier - the 
i 
'conflict between custom and habit and "insatiable avidity". 
Even if we allow that the Rule of Present Possession has such a strong 
imaginative appeal that those seeking to reach an agreement on property 
rights cannot bring themselves to reject it, it is not clear that they 
will reach an immediate agreement on this rule, or indeed that they 
will reach agreement at all. According to t.he Rule of Present 
Possession, goods are to be assigned to individuals on the basis of 
who exerts de facto control over them at the time agreement is reached. 
Thus, he who has few external goods in de facto control at the time of 
the agreement will have few of such goods in de jure control. Like-
wise, he who has a large quantity of external goods in de facto control 
will have a large quantity of such goods in de jure control. Thus, 
those who are relatively disadvantaged in respect of goods, if they 
have any hope of being able to improve their de facto position will 
-want to wait before making an agreement with others. For, if the ir 
de facto position improves, their de jure position will likewise be 
improved. They will, in short, emerge from the agreement on the Rule 
of Present Possession in a far better position than if they reach 
immediate agreement on the rule. If the terms of an agreement are 
likely to be shaped by the relative positions from which the parti-
cipants negotiate, then some will always be tardy to begin negotiation 
if they believe that procrastination will give them an opportunity to 
improve their initial positions. Negotiation can thus be very 
65 protracted Indeed the participants may not reach agreement at all. 
Suppose that A and B have been warring neighbours in Hume's State of 
Nature, and have been "stealing" each other's cattle for a long time. 
Eventually, at time T1 , they decide to come to some agreement in 
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respect of the cattle, but their positions are very different. At 
T
I
, A exerts de facto control over large numbers of cattle, but B 
exerts de facto control over very small numbers. If A proposes 
Hume's Rule of Present Possession, B would be disposed to reject it 
if he believes procrastination would be advantageous. By T2,B's 
waiting game has paid off in that the relative positions of A and B 
have been reversed. If B now proposes th~ same rule, A would be 
disposed to reject it. It might happen that T3 and T4 are an exact 
repetition of Tl and T2 . It would seem that agreement on the 
Present Possession Rule is unlikely to be reached until the negotiating 
positions of A and B are approximately equal, and that, of course, 
~ 
'may never happen. 
I 
If we add to the Rule of Present Possession, two other rules Hume 
suggests - those of Accession and Succession, the general criticism 
is still valid. According to the Rule of Accession, an object 
becomes the property of he who already has property in an object 
intimately related to it. Thus the offspring of cattle belong to 
the person who owns the cattle in question. If B is relatively dis-
advantaged in that he exerts. de facto control over only a few cattle, 
it is no more in his interest to assent to the Rule of Accession than 
it is in his interest to assent to the Rule of Present Possession. 
Few animals will have only few offspring. If A has ten times the 
number of animals, his prosperity will grow apace. Over the years 
the disparity in the property of A and B will become greater. If B 
sees this situation, he will have every reason to procrastinate an 
agreement until such time as his position improves. 
in his interests to make an immediate agreement. 
It would not be 
According to the Rule of Succession, a man's property passes to his 
nearest kin after his death. If B is relatively disadvantaged in that 
he exerts de facto control over very few cattle, it is no more in his 
interest to agree to this Rule of Succession than it is in his inter-
ests to agree to the other two rules. The Rule of Present Possession 
allows for an initial disparity; the Rule of Accession increases this 
disparity, and the Rule of Succession confirms this great disparity 
for the new generation. If A and B both have one son each, it is 
clear that B's son will start life at a sUbstantial disadvantage. It 
is most unlikely, therefore, that B would agree to these rules. If 
they suggested themselves to B's imagination, I think he would reject 
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them. He would submit to rational scrutiny the rules which his 
imagination suggested to him. 
The same arguments would, of course, apply if A and B were conceived 
to be, not two individuals, but two (limitedly benevolent) families 
or groups. 
Let us now leave our consideration of the State of Nature and turn to 
that of modern society. The question of choice or agreement over rules 
and principles is, of course, irrelevant because Hume is not arguing 
that a new property convention is entered into by each new generation. 
However, the question of abiding by rules and principles is very 
relevant. If there is to be security and stability in society, if 
there is to be general social co-operation, all men must abide by the 
rules and principles in the sense that they must allow them to govern 
their fundamental relations with one another. Now men could abide by 
these rules and principles of property and just social organisation 
because they see that it is in their "nterests to do so. In this way, 
their acknowledgement stems from "interested recognition". Alternatively, 
they could abide by them because custom and habit disposes them to do 
so. I shall argue that Hume's rules and principles would not command 
the "interested recognition" of all men for there are some who would 
be seriously disadvantaged by them. If, then, all men do abide by 
them, it is more plausible to argue that they do so out of custom and 
habit than out of interest. Habit and interest again point to dif-
ferent courses of action. 
When Hume says that the principles and rules of property and just 
social organisation are in the interests of all men, he makes an 
important distinction between what may be called "individual acts of 
justice" and "the complete system of justice,,66 A single act of 
justice, considered by itself, is not only frequently contrary to the 
immediate interests of the agent, but is also contrary to the immediate 
interests of society as well. A man may impoverish himself by his 
own integrity, or do a real disservice to the public interest by 
restoring a fortune to a seditious bigot67 In both cases he would 
be acting justly, but the immediate consequences would not be useful 
either to the agent or to the public. The advantages of the prin-
ciples of property and just social organisation, that is, the ends 
which such practices are useful in promoting and on the basis of which 
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they are judged valuable, are derived neither immediately nor directly 
from individual just acts. I may pay my debts and refrain from 
stealing, and (if I am poor) I may be unable to point to any advan-
tage in doing these things. It may result in impoverishment and 
subjection. Hume argues that the advantages lie in maintaining the 
whole system of rules and practices. "These rules", Hume says, 
" k h . ., d' t ,,68 At' 1 see t e1r end in an ob11que and 1n 1rec ~anner par 1CU ar 
individual's just practices are relevant to the particular advan-
tages he enjoys only insofar as his practices are part of a whole 
system of practices. And it is this whole system of practices 
which creates the advantages. Thus, if I pay my debts, I may finish 
up poorer but payment of debts contributes to a sense of mutual trust 
I 
in respect of property and this, Hume believes, contributes to my 
advantage quite as much as to the advantage of others. Equally, if 
I refrain from stealing, I may have insufficient goods, but mutual 
forbearance in respect of one another's property helps maintain the 
very institution that can save me and others from the chaos and con-
flict of the State of Nature. 
Hume thus argues that it is in the long-term interest of all men to 
adhere to the rules and principles even if their immediate or short-
term interest would be better served by infringing the rules and 
principles. But if people are not to succumb to the lure of 
immediate advantage, they must be trained to obey the rules and 
practices of society from a very early stage in their lives. It is 
in this respect that custom and habit play a vital role in social 
life. Miller writes: 
Custom and habit bear a great deal of weight in Hume's 
theory. Most just and virtuous acts are performed 
unreflectively ... simply because the individual has 
become used to doing acts of this kind ... The habit 
is inculcated in him by:l.his parents, and strengthened 
by the effects of education '" Hume's view is the 
ugly modern word 'socialisation'. Without socialisation 
from childhood, moral rules would not be followed. 69 
For Hume, custom and habit playa most important role in the lives of 
all. In highly developed societies, just as in primitive societies, 
the benefits of observing certain practices or rules is seldom per-
ceived by the majority of people, and is even more seldom taken into 
account as a motive for action. Habit, custom and education rule 
men in their daily lives, and it is just by building up such customs 
in the "tender minds" of children, and by "rubbing off those rough 
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corners and untoward affections" that the family prepares them for 
. 70 
soc1ety 
It is important to note that, according to Hume, custom and habit 
cohere with long-term self-interest. Custom and habit are very 
powerful influences, but they can only reinforce and further dispose 
men to do what is already in their interests. Custom and habit lack 
the power to override self-interest; nothing is strong enough to 
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counter the force of self-1nterest 
I shall now argue that Hume's rules and principles of just social 
organisation are not in the interests of all men, as he believes; 
that some people can be so seriously disadvantaged by the basic social 
system that is defined by these rules and principles that it is im-
plausible to argue that they are in the long-term interests of these 
people. It may be that custom and habit dispose such people to 
adhere to them, but then we would have to conclude that custom and 
habit conflict, rather than cohere, with self-interest. 
It is clear that Hume's system of property rights (constituted by the 
Rules for the Determination of Property, the Principle of Trans-
ference by Consent, and the Principle of Performance of Promises) 
provides the foundations for a basic social system which, if left 
completely unchecked, "tends to work to the advantage of men who 
possess certain qualities, but to the detriment of others who lack 
these particular qualities. They are principles and rules which we 
associate with an open competitive market in which trade and exchange 
form the basic mode of social interaction. Such a system will tend 
to favour those who have health, energy and talents, since it is 
essentially a competitive system. It will tend to favour them in 
that it will provide them with the greatest opportunities to grow 
wealthy and prosperous. Conversely, it will tend to be unfavourable 
to those who lack such advantages. It will also tend to work to the 
advantage of those who are born into families which are relatively 
well-off and against those who are not. This is because the Rule of 
Succession makes possible the accumUlation of wealth and power in such 
a way that there will be significant disparities between the life 
prospects of those who are subsequently born into such a system. In 
a social system defined by these rules and principles, the inequalities 
rather than diminishing (or even remaining static) over the generations 
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tend to increase and become magnified so that gross disparities of 
wealth appear. The principle and rules provide no real check on the 
natural and inevitable drift or tendency for economic power and advan-
tage to accumulate in the hands of some to the detriment of others. 
It is clear that Hume's principles and rules do no more than fix 
property, facilitiate the operation of a market society, and establish 
the sanctity of contracts. They do not check the great disparities 
in the distribution of economic benefits. There will be some men, 
then, for whom the system of property defined by these rules and 
principles would be disadvantageous. It would be more in their 
interests to have a more constrained system, one which offers more 
~rotection and one which checks the accumulation of wealth in such a 
I 
'way that their children do not start life at a grave disadvantage. 
It seems then that there would be some people whose adherence to these 
rules and principles would not be based upon "interested recognition". 
Adherence to contracts, and impartial judges might appear quite 
irrelevant to people who are disadvantaged by the basic social 
system. "Conservative" principle.s of justice, Miller says, "are 
concerned with ensuring that men's expectations of one another are 
not disappointed,,72 But the kind of stability of expectation that 
arises out of peace, security and order in society is of little 
interest to those whose stable expectation is one of constant dis-
advantage. 
One could, of course, argue that if, as Hume says, men's actions are 
largely unreflective and based upon custom and habit, they could 
-adhere to rules and principles that were against their personal and 
family interests. One would thus be able to explain how some men who 
are disadvantaged by the basic social system, nevertheless, come to 
abide by its rules and practices. But this is, clearly, not Hume's 
theory. Hume believes that custom and habit do cohere with interest. 
Further he sees no problem in explaining the adherence of all men to 
the rules and principles he outlines because he believes they ~re in 
11 th t mb f . 73a the interests of a - even e poores - me ers 0 soc1ety All 
men abide by them and encourage their children to do so too because 
they are in the interests of all men. 
In Section 4.1 we have examined Hume's rules and -principles to establish 
whether they would command the "interested recognition" of all 
llO 
concerned. We found that it was implausible to argue that they 
would command such "interested recognition". In the case of the 
imaginary (or historical) people choosing rules to fix property, it 
was argued that the rules that are supposed to appeal to the imagin-
ations of all would, in fact, conflict with the interests of some and 
would not, therefore, command their "interested recognition". In 
the case of contemporary people, it was argued that adherence to the 
rules and principles by those who are disadvantaged by them is more 
likely to be motivated by custom and habit than by interest. 
In Section 4.2, I shall try to show just how conservative are Hume's 
~Rules and Principles of Property and Just Social Organisation by com-
l 
paring his theory with that of Filmer, and contrasting both theories 
with the theories of Locke, Reid and Hutcheson. In 4.2.1, I shall 
discuss the question of the legitimate size or extent of individuals' 
property holdings, and in 4.2.2, the question of positive in rem 
rights to aid. 
4.2.1 The Size of Property Holdings 
Hume clearly intends that his rule of first possession or occupation 
should cover ownership by labour for he gives as examples the indi-
vidual who has a property right in the hare he has hunted and the 
individual who has a property right in the meadow on which he grazes 
his cattle. But it is also clear that, for Hume, ownership by 
occupation can arise even if no labour is expended. Now where 
occupation does not arise from labour, two major problems arise - the 
first concerns the size or extent of that which-is"occupied and the 
second concerns the use of the resources in question. The skills 
and efforts of individuals vary to some degree, and if occupation by 
labour is the criterion there will be some variation in the amount of 
property held, but this, as Locke points out, will not be very great. 
The case appears to be very different if property rights may be granted 
by occupation without labour. Simply by marking out boundaries, one 
could occupy a vast area, leaving others with insufficient for their 
needs. Moreover, if land (or any other natural resource) comes to 
be occupied in this way it may not be used productively. Now Hume 
admits that there may be disputes concerning the extent of property 
and he further admits that "the mere view of something" (a mountain 
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range, for example) is "seldom considered sufficient" to give title, 
but he never suggests that what a person takes should be limited to 
what he can make use of, or should be limited in such a way that he 
does not deprive others of what they need or could fruitfully use. 
It seems sufficient, for Hume, that "the first discoverer or possessor 
73b 
has the intention of rendering himself the proprietor" 
It is, therefore, clear that Hume's theory of property acquisition 
differs markedly from, and is less adequate than, Locke's. In Hume's 
theory, there is no proviso to "leave enough and as good in common" 
for others, and no proviso not to waste. I shall now show briefly 
rhat Hume's theory is also very different from, and less adequate 
than, the theory of property acquisition advanced by his liberal (and 
natural law) friend, Francis Hutcheson. 
Hutcheson writes: 
Each one has a natural right to the use of such things as 
are in their nature fitted for the common use of all; and 
has a like right, by any innocent means, to acquire prop-
erty in such goods as are fit for occupa·tion and property, 
and have not been occupied by others. The natural desires 
of mankind, both of the selfish and social kind, shew this 
right. And t' is plainly cruel and unjust to hinder any 
innocent acquisition of another. 74 
But acquisition by some persons of such natural goods cannot be so 
extensive as to (1) oppress other persons or (2) frustrate the diligence 
of mankind. 
and 
But as property is constituted to encourage and reward 
industry, it can never be so extended as to prevent or 
frustrate the diligence of mankind. No person or society, 
therefore, can by mere occupation acquire such a right in 
a vast tract of land quite beyond their power to cultivate, 
as shall exclude others who may want to work, or sustenance 
for their numerous hands, from a share proportioned to the 
colonies they can fend. 75 
Mankind must not for ages be excluded from the earth God 
intended they should enjoy, to gratify the vain ambition 
of a few who would retain what they cannot use, while 
others are in inconvenient straits. 76 
Hutcheson further argues that "things once in property may return again 
to a state of community if the proprietor designedly neglects them: and 
then the next occupier may acquire them,,77 In this way, natural 
resources are not wasted. They become the property of those who need 
them, and desire to use them. 
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In Hutcheson's theory, limits are placed on the size of individuals '. 
property .holdings. "Agrarian laws" may be made and used to "put a 
. d . ., ,,78 Th' stop to the ~mmo erate acquisitions of. pr~vate c~ t~zens ~s 
may be done to safeguard the rights and interests of other private 
. t . 79 t . 80 N t c~ ~zens or 0 safeguard the interests of the whole soc~ety .. 0 
only primary but also secondary acquisition (acquisition by inheri-
tance, gift etc) must be limited by civil laws. "This right there-
." 
fore of devising by will seems manifestly founded in the law of 
nature, tho' civil laws may limit the exercise of it in common with 
81 
all other rights respecting property" . The institution of private 
property has its drawbacks or "inconveniences" Hutcheson says, and 
~thus it requires some modification. This modification is accomplished 
i 
"'by a censorial power (the power of government to tax) and proper laws 
. 82 
about acqu~sition, testaments and success~on" 
It is clear that Hume's theory of property acquisition (primary and 
secondary) differs greatly from Hutcheson's (and Locke's). His 
theory has much more in common with Robert Filmer's. Filmer, it will 
be recalled, claims that God first gave Adam .complete sovereignty over 
the Earth, and that, therefore all property is eternally subject to 
the power of Adam's heirs. Adam historically acquired all the land, 
and, therefore, its future is determined by that acquisition - other 
people can legitimately come to hold property only if they received 
it as a free gift from Adam's heirs. Once we have stripped off from 
this theory the theological and Natural Law pre-suppositions, it is 
essentially similar to Hume's theory. After an individual, B, 
justly acquires some property, someone else can come to hold that 
property only if it is legitimately transferred-to" them by B. Under 
both theories land is never "returned" to the community, nor are the 
needs of the community,. no matter how urgent, relevant to the con-
tinued holding of that property by B. In both theories, (1) 
ultimate control over all property rests in the hands of the individual 
owner who alone is at liberty to dispose of that property in whatever 
manner he pleases, and (2) ultimate control over property is so com-
plete and absolute that the needs of others, however desparate, are 
never considered a relevant factor in the determination of just 
entitlement. 
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4.2.2 Positive in rem Rights to Aid 
Hume admits that a wealthy man has a duty to help those in great need. 
"A rich man", he says, "lies under a moral obligation to commqIlicate 
to those in necessity a share of his superfluities,,83 But, as in 
Filmer's account, this moral obligation is one of charity (in the 
t f · t . 84 Th . t . modern sense of the word), and no one 0 JUs 1ce e commun1ca 10n 
of a share of one's superfluities to the poor and needy is not one of 
the rules or principles of just social organisation. We have seen 
that Hume's rules and principles omit all reference to men's needs. 
In Hume's account a man has no right or title to a share ill a wealthy 
man's superfluities; he cannot insist upon being given such a share. 
';If the wealthy man chooses not to discharge his moral obligation, there 
lis nothing the poor man can do, _ for it is a voluntary contribution on 
the part of the wealthy man. 
It is clear, then, that Hume's theory embodies no positive ~n rem_ 
rights, for a right or title (against the community) toone's subsistence 
is just such a right. All the in rem rights in Hume's theory are 
negative. A man has a right (against the community) to be left alone 
to enjoy his property. He has a right that others do not interfere 
wi th him; he has a right to their "restraint and forbearance". One 
important distinction must be made. We have said that Hume's theory 
embodies no positive in rem rights. It would not be true to say that 
his theory embodies no positive rights at all, for his theory clearly 
embodies positive in personam rights. Positive in personam rights 
are rights to be given things, not by society as such, but by partic-
ular individuals. Positive in personam rights are an important 
-feature of market societies and of all societies that are based upon 
a division of labour. If A pays B money in advance for "five hogs-
head of wine", B has a right to the wine in question. We can say 
that B has a positive in personam right. He has a right (against B) 
to be given the goods in question. Positive in personam rights are 
rights against specified individuals and they arise out of contracts 
and promises. 
In the last chapter, we saw that Locke argues against Filmer that, 
without such positive in rem rights, without a right or title to that 
which is needed for subsistence, the very survival of the poor and 
needy is contingent upon the consent of the .wealthy. Such an absolute 
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property as Filmer allows "gives a man power over the life of another"; 
it allows him "arbitrary authority" over that other man; it allows 
him "to make use of his necessity to force him to become a vassal and 
to master him to obedience". In short, the absolute right to 
property brings with it absolute powel and authority. 
The same criticisms that Locke raises against Filmer's theory are 
raised by Thomas Reid against Hume's theory. Further Reid's solution 
is the same as Locke's. Justice requires that there be some positive 
in rem rights. The needy have a right or title to a share in the 
"surplusage" of the weal thy man's goods. Like Locke, Reid distin-
guishes between two kinds of property (1) that which "must presently 
be consumed to sustain life" and (2) that "which is more permanent" 
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and which "may be laid up and stored for the supply of future wants" . 
Like Locke, he argues that it is from this second category of 
"surplusage" or "permanent" property that the rights of the poor and 
needy are to be met. 
What has been said above, of the natural right every man 
has to acquire permanent property, and to dispose of it, 
must be understood with this condition, that no man may 
be thereby deprived of the necessary means of life. The 
right of an innocent man to the necessaries of life, is, 
in its nature, superior to that which the rich man has to 
his riches, even though these be honestly acquired. The 
use of riches or permanent property is to supply fun.ure 
and casual wants which ought to yield to present and 
certain necessity. 
As in a family, justice requires that the children who are 
unable to labour, and those who by sickness are disabled, 
should have their necessities supplied out of the common 
stock, so, in the great family of God, of which all mankind 
are the Children, justice, I think, as well as charity, 
requires that the necessities of those who, by the provi-
dence of God, are disabled from supplying themselves, should 
be supplied from what might otherwise be stored for future 
wants. 
From this it appears that the right of acquiring and that of 
disposing of property, may be subject to limitations and 
restrictions, even in the State of Nature, and even more in 
the state of Civil Society, in which the public has ... 
what writers in jurisprudence call an 'eminent dominion' 
over the property, as well as the lives of the subjects, as 
far as the public good requires. 86 
It might be thought that Reid's vac illation between "justice and 
charity" in the above passage stems from some profound uncertainty on 
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his part as to which virtue is really involved. But such a charge 
would be unfounded. He may use the two words rather freely (in the 
Natural Law tradition), but his ideas are clear enough. It is a 
right to the necessities of life, ann it is a right which is superior 
to that which the rich man has to all his riches. The inferior 
right, that of the rich man to keep all his riches, must yield to the 
superior right. For Reid, as for Locke, the rights of ownership must 
yield to the claims of necessity. Such a limitation on the right of 
ownership is not merely ad hoc, as we have already seen. Rather it 
is motivated by the same considerations that give rise to the general 
rule. Reid and Locke both derive the right of appropriation from the 
right to life or preservation. "A right to life implies a right to 
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the necessary means of life", Reid says But a person cannot 
effectively preserve himself if his very survival is contingent upon 
the consent of another person. There must be positive in rem rights 
- rights to be given what one needs for one's preservations by others. 
Like Locke and Pufendorf, Reid argues that the positive in rem right 
that is applicable in the State of Nature is not abandoned when men 
enter Civil Society. Men's right of "acquiring and disposing" of 
their property is always subject to "1 imitations and restrictions", 
but these limitations and restrictions are even greater in Civil 
Society than in the State of Nature. Like Locke, Reid argues that 
the Civil Society regulates property in accordance with the "public 
good" which is the good of all men, and that when men enter Civil 
Society they give to the government the "executive powers" they 
88 formerly possessed 
In the last chapter, we noted that theories of justice or just social 
organisation could be classified into two kinds - (1) Conservative 
justice and (2) Ideal or Prosthetic justice. We saw that conservative 
justice aims to '~reserve an existing order of rights and possessions 
or to restore it when any breaches are made", and that it is 
"concerned with the continuity of a social order over time, and with 
ensuring that men's expectations of one another are not disappointed". 
In contrast, as we saw, ideal or prosthetic justice aims at "modifying 
the status quo in accordance with some ideal standard; that it takes 
into account such factors as "persons qualities and circumstances" in" 
contrast with conservative justice which takes into account only such 
factors as "established practices and past transactions", and that 
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central to ideal or prosthetic justice are the notions of desert or 
89 
need . 
Hume's theory, like Filmer's is clearly one of conservative justice. 
Reid's, like Locke's, while largely conservative, has an obvious 
prosthetic element embodied in it. The status quo is slightly 
modified by the admission of the positive in rem right to be given 
what one needs for one's preservation. Urgent need is considered to 
be a just basis of distribution. If there is a conflict between 
urgent need and "permanent property" rights, the former, not the 
latter, must be acknowledged. 
It is clear from the above discussion that some prosthetic element, 
some positive in rem rights must be acknowledged in a society if the 
lives of some men are not to be contingent upon the consent of other 
men. An absolute right to property brings with it an absolute power 
and authority over the lives of other men, as Locke and Reid clearly 
saw. It is clearly implausible to hold: 
(1) that a man whose life is contingent in this way will be 
"indifferent" to the question of "what possessions are 
assigned to particular persons" 
and 
(2) that it is the case that all rules of property distribution 
are equally in all men's interests. 
4.3 Hume's Anti-Redistributionist Arguments 
It is clear that Hume's theory of property and just social organisation 
neglects all considerations of need aad positive in rem rights to 
welfare. That he should take this strong line against redistribution 
may seem all the more strange in view of various statements he makes 
about gross inequalities. 
and 
It must be confessed that, whenever we depart from this 
equality (of goods), we rob the poor of more satisfaction 
than we add to the rich, and that the slightest gratifi-
cation of a frivolous vanity in one individual, frequently 90 
costs more than bread to many families, and even provinces. 
Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy the fruits of his 
labour, in a full possession of all the necessaries, and 
many of the conveniences of life. No one can doubt that 
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such an equality is most suitable to human nature and 
diminishes much less from the happiness of the rich, 
than it adds to the satisfaction of the poor. 91 
.He adds that "a too great disproportion among the citizens weakens 
the state". Thus, on the grounds of utility, gross inequalities can-
'J.ot be justified92 Despite this, Hume believes that attempts to 
!essen inequalities through redistribution must always have disastrous 
~onsequences .. He argues that redistribution (1) undermines the 
~tabi1ity of society and (2) results in coercive interference in 
people's lives and a loss of liberty. The argument from the stability 
I)f soc iety (a typically conservative argument) appears in the Treatise,: 
Mnd the argument from liberty (a typically liberal argument) is found 
. 
~n the Enquiry. I shall examine each in turn. 
'J'he Argument from the Stability of Society 
,rAil1er suggests that, for Hume, "the social fabric has a rather delicate 
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f;haracter" The habit of observing the principles and rules of 
pociety must be "built up gradually, and so stability is a cardinal 
v lrtue of soc iet ies" . Hume issues a "dreadful warning of what may 
tI~ppen if the rules of property are not strictly respected". 
It is impossible for men to consult their interests in 
so effectual a manner, as by an universal, and inflexible 
observance of the rules of justice (i.e. property and 
just social organisation) by which alone they can preserve 
society, and keep themselves from falling into that 
wretched and savage condition which is commonly represented 
as the State of Nature. 94 
The principles and rules of property are designed to settle those dis-
putes about property that are likely to disrupt society, and, Hume 
Ill'gues, they will fail to achieve this objective'" if they o..re not 
95 \llli versal1y and inflexibly observed . 
I t could be argued tha t it would be more "just" to settle property dis-
Illites on the basis of the suitability of the property to the contending 
It could be argued that the poor widow in Hume's melodrama 
~1\ou1d be allowed to retain the family homestead even though the mort-
~"ge is overdue because to the bank her payment may represent only a 
r¢w pounds in an already sizeable fortune, while to her it may mean the 
v¢ry existence of herself and her fami1y96 But this view, Hume 
"rgues, is short-sighted. To vary the rules to accommodate the par-
t: lcu1ar case would create confusion and contention. Under such 
\' \rcumstances, property would not, in any real sense, be stable or 
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secure at all. A man's property would be his own only so long as the 
magistrate thought it suitable to him. And when property is not 
stable, there can be no society. The principles and rules must be 
consistently observed. Thus Hume is: 
Convinced that any attempt to assign possessions to 
individuals on the grounds of merit or suitability 
would quickly call into question the whole system of 9 
property, and hence threaten the stability of society. 7 
Hume is correct to argue that there is a need for strict impartiality 
in the application of rules. There can be no special cases. To 
vary the rules to accommodate the particular or special case would 
create confusion and contention. Thus a magistrate cannot judge 
against someone who, according to the rules, has a rightful title to 
some property, because he judges him to be a "seditious bigot". If 
this were so, a man's property would be his only so long as the mag-
istrate thought it suitable to him. To say that there should be no 
special cases is to say that the rules must be universally applied, 
applied without exceptions. The rules must be "rigid" and "inflexible" 
in that they cannot be "bent" arbitrarily to favour or disfavour par-
ticular individuals. There can be no exceptions to a rule. 
However, a distinction can be drawn between an exception and an 
exceptive. A rule that is universal cannot allow exceptions, but it 
can allow exceptives which are qualifications or conditions built into 
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the rule . An exceptive makes a rule more specific, but it still 
remains universal. It can be applied impartially and without 
exception. We can contrast: 
(1) To each all the product of his honest industry 
(2) To each all the product of his honest industry except to 
John Doe and to Richard Roe who are seditious bigots 
(3) To each all the product of his honest industry except 
where others are in urgent necessity 
Rule (2) has an exception built into it; rule (3) has an exceptive 
buil t in to it. Rules (1) and (3) are both universal rules, but 
rule (3) is more specific than rule (1). Hume says that it is nec-
essary to have a "universal and inflexible observance of the rules". 
Such a universal and inflexible observance is as possible in the case 
of rule (3) as it is in the case of rule (1). It may be necessary to 
spell out the criteria of "urgent necessity" because interpretations 
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may vary, but if this is done, the rule may be universally observed. 
Theories like Locke's and Reid's incorporate such exceptives into the 
rules, and it is these exceptives tha.t constitute the "prosthetic" 
element. Locke's and Reid's rules could be summarised as: 
To each all the fruits of his honest industry except where 
others are in great necessity and poverty 
To each all the product of his rightful inheritance except 
where others are in great necessity and poverty. 
It is thus clear that a rule may be "universally and inflexibly observed" 
even though it has an exceptive built into it. One could thus argue 
that positive in rem rights could be admitted, and the stability of 
society would not be undermined. 
I think that Hume would reject this argument for positive in rem rights 
for the following reason. He would argue that a strict observance of 
the rules is a necessary condition of stability in society, but that 
such observance, by itself, is insufficient to produce that stability. 
It is requisite, in addition, t.hat the owner be placed in absolute and 
full control of what he owns, subject to no conditions and qualifi-
cations, so that he alone can decide how to use or dispose of that 
property. Any prosthetic element, or exceptive built into a rule has 
th ff t f It ' .. t' tl 99 B' t d d e e ec 0 a er1ng eX1st1ng 1 es s urgen nee an poverty 
can create a title in the wealth of another. In this way the absolute 
control of the owner is removed. It is subject to "limitations and 
restrictions"lOO. For Hume, the security of society is only possible 
where property is firmly "fixed" to persons. It is clear that Hume 
regards redistribution (in any form and at any level) as being anti-
thetical to his principles of property or "Laws of Nature" as he 
sometimes calls them. By calling Stability of Possession, and Trans-
ference by Consent "natural laws", he implies that there ought to be 
an absolute prohibition to redistribution of wealth - for when he calls 
something a "natural law" he means that it is "inseparable from the 
. ,,101 
spec1es the species cannot exist without it. Thus he is saying 
that witnout such fixing of property to persons, and without this 
absolute and complete control of owners over their property, the very 
existence of the human species will be threatened. 
position justified? 
Miller writes that in Hume's view: 
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Is this extreme 
Once the not±on that the present distribution of property 
is not sacrosanct is abroad, it will be impossible to 
restrain the natural impulses of greed. We must remember 
that: 
'This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions 
for ourselves, and our nearest friends is insatiable, 
perpetual, universal and directly destructive of society. ,102 
All prosthetic principles seek to alter existing titles. This, of 
-, 
course, means that the present distribution of property is not sacro-
sanct. Once this idea is abroad, Hume believes, the natural impulses 
of greed will surface and the stability of society will be undermined. 
However, we have seen how disadvantageous are Hume's rules and 
principles to many members of society. If people are as avid and 
L 
greedy as Hume states, the disadvantaged would have every reason to 
band together into hoardes and steal their wants. Thus, if men are 
as avid and greedy as Hume fears, failure to modify existing titles 
would also undermine society. If we assume, on the other hand, that 
men grow accustomed to the rules and practices of their society and 
are motivated by habit and custom, there is no problem. If men can 
become accustomed to a set of rules and principles according to which 
even their most basic necessities are unmet, they could surely become 
accustomed to a set of rules and principles which ensure them at least 
a minimum level of well-being! 
We can, therefore, question Hume's belief that, on the whole, redistri-
bution has unfortunate consequences. An absolute prohibition against 
redistribution on the grounds that the consequences are inevitably 
unfortunate seems unjustified. 
One could argue that whether the consequences are or are not unfor-
tunate depends to a large extent upon the circumstances and manner of re-
distribution. If the redistribution takes the form of an arbitrary 
expropriation and confiscation of the land or income from the more 
well-to-do ,to the less well-off, ownership is certainly unstable, and 
the stability of society will probably be at risk. If the redistri-
bution is effected by taxation, this is not very likely. It is 
possible, though, that if tax laws, and any other rules of redistri-
bution are constantly rewritten, there could be a kind of psychological 
"instability" or uncertainty and people's expectations could be frus-
trated or disappointed. This is unlikely to undermine the stability 
of society, but it might have other undesirable consequences. But it 
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is not likely that conflict and contention will always attend all 
attempts at redistribution. If redistribution policies are relatively 
stable and well known, redistribution can take place in a way.which 
makes it possible for people to assess its results for them, and to 
make appropriate adjustments. In this way, they may retain a major 
part of their property and wealth without radically altering the 
structure of o~ership in a short time, and without undermining the 
") 
stability of society. 
Not only may it be possible to redistribute without undermining the 
stability of society, but redistribution may actually have the effect 
of increasing social co-operation and mutual trust. There can be 
! 
'little reason for gene:v.al goodwill and co-operation in a society whose 
basic social structure allows many of its members to live a wretched 
life or to perish altogether. In such a situation the social fabric 
is bound to have a delicate character, as Adam Smith clearly saw: 
The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of 
the poor, who are often both driven by want, and prompted 
by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only under 
the shelter of the civil magistrate that· the owner of 
that valuable property can sleep a single night in sec-
urity. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, 
whom, though he never provoked, he can never appease, and 
from whose injustice he can be protected only by the 
powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually hel~ up 
to chastise it. l03 
Pure conservative principles of the type Hume outlines lay the foun-
dations for a basic social structure which fosters "the anti-social 
. " " . d mb . t .. . ,,104 d'" d' t' passlons of avarlce an a 1 lon ln the rlch an ln 19na 10n 
and envy in the poor". Redistribution may provide each member of 
society with a comfortable existence and it is plausible to argue that 
those anti-social passions whiCh Smith catalogues may be greatly 
diminished. In this way redistribution has the effect of ensuring 
the stability of society rather than Undermining it. 
The Liberty Argument 
In the Enquiry, Hume gives consideration to the idea that property 
should be assigned in accordance with a principle of strict or perfect 
equality, that each person should have an equal share of such external 
goods as are provided by nature, or produced by human labour. He 
recognises the adequacy of the material wealth within more advanced 
civil societies to sustain arrangements.~ equal distribution. 
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It must indeed be confessed that nature is so liberal to 
mankind that, were all her presents equally divided among 
the species, and improved by art and industry, every indi-
vidual would enjoy all the necessities, and even most of. 
the comforts of life, nor would ever be liable to any ills 
but such as might accidentallr arise from the sickly frame 
and constitution of his body. 05 
Not only is equal distribution possible, but it would appear to be 
advantageous to precisely those individuals who are disadvantaged by 
laissez-faire principles. 
. 
It must also be confessed that whenever we depart from 
this equality, we rob the poor of more satisfactions than 
we add to the rich, and that the slight gratification of 
a frivolous vanity in one individual frequently costs more 
than bread to many families and even provinces. l06 
~ut these advantages are more apparent than real. 
Egalitarian principles of justice are not in the long-term interests 
of the poor, or of anyone. Such principles are "extremely pernicious 
to human soc ie ty" . 
Render possessions ever so equal, men's different degrees 
of art, care and industry will immediat~ly break that 
equality ... The most vigorous inquisit.ion is requisite 
to watch every inequality on its first appearance, and the 
most severe Jurisdiction to punish and redress it. But 
besides that, so much authority must soon degenerate into 
tyranny and be exerted with great partialities. l07 
Hume's argument is that a distribution in accord with the favoured 
pattern of strict equality will soon be overturned if individuals follow 
their natural abilities, talents, purposes and ambitions. The distri-
bution of perfect equality, Dl, will be changed into a new inegalitarian 
distribution, D2. To maintain the favoured di~tributional pattern, Dl, 
"vigorous inquisition" and "severe" and "tyrannical jurisdiction" will 
be needed. The maintenance of the egalitarian pattern will require 
that the state interfere coercively and continually in people's lives 
to prevent their doing as they choose. Perfect equality is thus 
inimical to liberty. In terms of the dominance criterion we used 
earlier, we could say that, for Hume, egalitarian principles of justice, 
P2, are dominated by free market principles, PI, in that each and every 
person (poor and rich alike) is better off under PI than under P2. 
Under P2, they are denied their liberty and suffer coercive interfer-
ence while under PI they retain their liberty and do not suffer 
coercive interference. 
123 
Now Hume, of course, applies his argument to principles of justice 
designed to ~reate and maintain perfect equality. It is not at all 
clear whether he would want to say that there would be a loss ·of 
liberty and coercive interference in people's lives in cases where the 
amount of redistribution falls well short of equality, where, for 
example, principles of justice are instituted which secure a minimum 
level of materi.al welfare to all persons un,able to provide this for 
themselves. Certainly, he describes "stability of possession" as a 
"law of nature", that is, one that is "inseparable from the species" 
and he appears to believe that free market principles exhaust the con-: 
cept of justice, so it might well be that he would also argue that even 
very mild forms of redistribution result in coercive interference and 
I. 
a loss of liberty. I have suggested that principles of justice that 
incorporate some positive provision of welfare dominate Hume' s free 
market principles on two grounds. First, where such principles 
operate, all persons can be assured of the material means of life; 
secondly such principles enhance the stability of society. But if 
it were found to be the case that principles of justice that incorpor-
ate such positive welfare provision always lead to coercive interfer-
ence and a loss of liberty, it could reasonably be objected that such 
principles do not dominate Hume's free market principles. I shall 
try to show that such principles need not result in any coercive 
interference or loss of liberty to any person. 
In Hume's account, the "moral obligation upon the rich to communicate 
to those in need a share of their superfluities" is an imperfect duty 
(a duty of charity). 
(a duty of justice). 
Suppose instead that it were a perfect duty 
'. 
Must its enforcement lead to a loss of liberty 
in Hume's sense? Must it, in other words, lead to coercive inter-
ference in people's lives and a tyrannous and severe jurisdiction? 
Moreover, must it be applied with great partiality? It would seem 
that this would depend, in large part, upon the method used to estimate 
and collect this surplus. If some official, for example, the magis-
trate, were empowered to enter the. homes of the wealthy and remove 
particular possessions he deemed superfluous to their owner, the 
criticism would be well-founded - for this surely does amount to 
"tyrannous jurisdiction" and does admit of "great partiality". But 
there seems to be no reason why such a method should be used. The 
method of raising the requisite revenue by taxation from declarations 
of income made to government may be used instead. It is a method 
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not unknown in the eighteenth century, for Kant, as we shall see in 
Chapter 4, proposes it as the appropriate method of financing welfare 
for the needy. Such a method avoids not.only "tyrannous jur:i,sdiction" 
but partiality as well for by using the method of "lawful assessment" 
people pay in proportion to the property they hold or the profits they 
make. 
, 
It could be argued that while the worst excesses of interference and 
loss of liberty may be avoided by this method, there is still some 
interference and loss of liberty (and privacy) because a person must 
disclose to some official of government the amount of income, its 
~ource, and possibly his expenses, and this is a matter that concerns 
i 
the property-owner himself and no other person. Now this argument 
does not convincingly defeat the case for raising revenue for welfare, 
for clearly it applies just as strongly to raising revenue for other 
government expenses too. The problem (if indeed it is one) is a 
general one concerning raising revenue per se and is not a special one 
concerning raising revenue for welfare for the needy. Any state -
even one of minrilmal scope and activity - requires some funds with which 
to operate, and if it is to be able to raise the requisite revenue and 
make calculations, it must have some details of people's wealth. Mdre-
over, as Hutcheson points out, it is only by having details of every-
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one's wealth (and expenses) that justice can be done - that people 
pay proportionately to their wealth and expenses and that partiality 
be avoided. "This proportion can never be observed", he writes, 
"wi.thout a census or an estimation made of all the wealth of private 
families at frequently recurring periods, once in five, six or seven 
years ... By a census all would be burdened propo~tionately to their 
wealth; and thus the publick expences oppressive to none beyond his 
neighbours,,109 A person's expenses should also be taken into 
account - for example, "the unmarried should pay higher taxes as they· 
llO 
are not in the charge of rearing new subjects to the state" . Where 
welfare provision is included in the.public expenses, the same method 
of\assessing and collecting revenue may still be employed. ThUS, the 
addition of welfare provision to the list of public expenses need not 
lead to a greater loss of liberty and coercive interference than that 
which would exist were there no such provision. 
Of key importance in liberal theory is what Hutcheson calls "natural 
liberty" (i.e. the natural right to liberty). "Each one has a natural 
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right to exert his powers, according to his own judgment and 
inclination in all such industry, labour or amusements as are not 
111 hurtful to others persons or goods" Moreover, each one has "a 
natural right to enter into an intercourse of innocent offices or 
commerce with all who incline to deal with him". Now some kinds of 
socio-economic systems designed to redistribute or maintain particular 
distributions of property and income do prevent persons employing 
their "active powers" according to their own choice and judgement by 
"putting their actions under the direction of others" - for example 
government officials choose the occupation at which each person will 
!ork, the number of hours of work, the pay each receives, or they make 
\ 
Ii t illegal for one to dispose of one's income in certain ways or to 
"enter into an intercourse of innocent offices or commerce" with other 
persons. Such systems, thus, entail loss of liberty and coercive 
interference. We shall see in the next chapter that J.S. Mill 
criticises St. Simonism on precisely these grounds. It is perhaps 
such a system that. Hume envisages when he writes of "tyrannous juris-
diction" and argues that the natural operation of persons' inclinations, 
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ambitions and skills will be "checked" or limited But the method 
of taxation described above can achieve redistribution and guarantee 
basic material needs are met but without such coercive interference 
and loss of liberty. Persons may still, for example, employ their 
"active powers" in the "industry and labour" of their choice (that is, 
choose their own occupations) in order to acquire the material means 
of life and enjoyment for themselves and their families. Moreover, 
once their property or profits have been taxed, they may use that part 
which remains to them in whatever way they chooae provided they do not 
violate the negative rights of others. They may dispose of that which 
remains to them as they choose, saving it, giving it away, or exchanging 
it for other goods or services. There need be no government officials 
directing one's spending activities by issuing prohibitions on certain 
kinds of spending (for example, "Do not engage a private tutor for the 
education of your children") . The taxation method, therefore, can 
effect redistribution and ensure a social minimum to all persons but 
without "tyrannous jurisdiction" and "vigorous inquisition". 
Now it might be thought that the' social minimum by taxation' method does 
not lead to "tyrannous jurisdiction" in the sense that officials seize 
one's goods or direct one's activities by drafing one into jobs or 
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prohibiting certain kinds of spending, but that it does involve 
"tyrannous jurisdiction" in another sense. There is "tyrannous· 
jurisdiction" in the sense that A is forced (by government officials) 
to contribute to B's welfare. A may be free to choose his own 
employment, to acquire property by any moral means, but he is not 
free to dispose of all that property as he pleases. He is free to 
dispose of only that part which remains after the material needs of 
, 
B have been met. Forcing A to contribute to B's welfare is itself 
a form of tyrannous jurisdiction and coercive interference in A's life. 
Now this is an argument put forward by Robert Nozick and other liber-
tarians and does not appear to be what Hume means by "tyrannous 
~jurisdiction" and. "severe inquisition". I shall, therefore, reserve 
I 
my discussion of the argument until Chapter 4 where I shall attempt to 
show that Nozick's criticism is ill-founded. 
Conclusion 
Hume's merit is to show that entitlements to property grant powers 
and rights and they cannot therefore be disregarded, altered or 
abolished at the whims of others, just because it may be useful to do 
so. "Property rights empower individuals with, and protect them in, 
the capacity to use, dispose of, or otherwise control objects of prop-
erty according to their private purposes, subject to certain limits 
upon infringing the rights of other persons and subject to legitimate 
publ ic purposes". Such rights cannot be infringed or violated and 
the property handed to somebody else just because the magistrate 
believes that that other person would be a more-suitable owner. Hume's 
description of the principles as "laws" that are "natural and insepar-
able from the species" correctly point to the strength and importance 
of the rights involved. But Hume's mistake is to overrate their 
strength and importance. He believes that such rights must never be 
infringed or violated under any circumstances. While it seems correct 
that such rights should not be infringed or curtailed without very 
strong reasons, it does not seem correct that such rights should always 
prevail over all other claims. Hume does not successfully show why 
the right to property should override all other considerations. 
Further, he does not successfully show why, in principle, the advan-
tages of stability of possession and transfer by consent, which are to 
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a certain degree necessary to both individual and societal well-being, 
cannot be sustained while some redistribution secures at least a 
minimum level of well-being for those without the means to do-so for 
themselves. 
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CHAPTER 3 
J.S. MILL'S THEORY OF PROPERTY 
Introduction 
Mill is sometimes represented as the champion of laissez-faire theory, 
liberal entrepreneurship, and the minimal, nightwatchman state l In 
this chapter, I aim to show that this is a misrepresentation of his 
views, that he rejects classic or negative property rights and the 
nightwatchman state in favour of a radically reformed system of private 
property and a positive role for the state. I shall show that Mill's 
views on property rights and distributive justice are shaped by a con-
ception of human autonomy or "individuality", and that his version of 
Utilitarianism, his defence of a more-than-minimal state ,land his 
proposals for reform to the system Qf private property are best under-
stood in the light of this conception. It is, I shall argue, a rich 
and complex conception, and one that avoids the atomistic, asocial 
elements of "Bourgeois individualism" with which it is sometimes con-
fused. Such autonomy or individuality requires a just and free 
society, and is incompatible with the classic or negative right to 
property. 
My plan in this chapter is as follows: In section 1, I shall analyse 
in some detail, Mill's conception of human autonomy or individuality. 
I shall show how this conception is intimately related to his views on 
rights, and the role of government in section 2 and to his account of 
the distribution of property and wealth in section 3. 
1. Mill's Conception of Personal Excellence 
1.1 Autonomy or Individuality: Man as Decision-maker 
Mill's conception of the person may be classed as Aristotelian insofar 
as he considers a person as a being distinct from other kinds of 
2 
entity in the world such as inanimate objects, animals, and plants. 
Different kinds of entities are distinguishable according to the dis-
tinctive powers that members of the class possess. Mill writes that 
the distinctively human kind of power is choosing or decision-making. 
It is an activity that calls into play the totality of human powers. 
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'I'his conception of man as chooser or decision-maker is brought out 
very clearly in Mill's discussion of custom. 
To conform to custom, merely as custom, does not educate 
or develop in him any of the qualities which are the dis-
tinctive endowment of a human being. The human faculties 
of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental 
activity and even moral preference, are exercised only in 
making a choice. 3 
By virtue of be~ng human, all men have the _power to make choices, but 
these powers exist initially only latently, as potential, and they must 
be developed through use. "The mental and the moral, like the mus-
cular powers, are improved only by being used,,4. 
By virtue of being human, all men possess the distinctive ability to 
I 
choose or make a decision. Yet each human being has a unique history 
which implies a complex of special interests, Skills, needs, and 
desires which make him a distinct individual in society, and thereby 
the subject of distinct choices. 
According to Mill, it is just as foolish to believe that all men have 
the same mental characteristics as to believe- that they have the same 
physical characteristics: 
Human beings are not like sheep: and even sheep are not 
indistinguishably alike. A man cannot get a coat or a pair 
of boots to fit him, unless they are either made to his 
measure, or he has a whole warehouseful to choose from: 
and is it easier to fit him with a life than with a coat, 
or are human beings more like one another in their whole 
physical and spiritual conformation than in the shape of 
their feet?5 
Different individuals, Mill argues, will naturally manifest their unique 
powers and abilities in different modes of behaviour. Mill calls this 
choosing a "plan of life". Individuals possess unique natures, and 
they will, therefore, need and desire to live different sorts of lives. 
Such are the differences among human beings in their source 
of pleasure, their susceptibilities of pain, and the oper-
ation on them of different physical and moral agencies, 
that unless there is a corresponding diversity in their 
modes of life, they neither obtain their fair share of 
happiness, nor grow up to the mental, moral and aesthetic 
stature of which their nature is capable. 6 
There is no answer to the question of what kind of life a person should 
lead. Mill sees only a diversity of ends. Depending upon what each 
individual's particular potentialities are, every human being will 
devise his own plan of life to develop his potentialities. As Mill 
states: "There is no reason that all human existence should be con-
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structed on some one or small number of patterns". 
We find Mill constantly condemning attempts to fit people into certain 
moulds: 
If it were only that people have diversities of taste, 
that is reason enough for not attempting to shape them 
all after one model. But different persons require 
different conditions for their spiritual development; 
and can no' more exist healthily in the' same moral, than 
all the variety of plants, can in the same physical, 
atmosphere and climate. The same things that are helps 
to one person towards the cUltivation of his h.igher 
nature are hindrances to another. 7 
This passage shows that Mill recognises the diversity of human powers 
~nd skills, and hence the need for a corresponding diversity of life-
, 
styles or plans of life. Mill believes that individuals cannot choose 
well if their choices are bound to a single pattern - individuals only 
choose in an excellent way if their decisions bear the "impress ... of 
their own judgment (and) their own character". If persons realise 
themselves by choosing in this way, they do not conform to any single 
image of perfection. 
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is 
individual in themselves, but by cultivating and calling 
it forth, within the limits imposed by the rights and 
interests of others, that human beings become a noble 
and beautiful object of contemplation.8 
Thus, a person becomes what Mill calls a "progressive being" by calling 
forth and cultivating what is individual in himself. 
For Mill, choosing a plan of life is an activity that calls into play 
the highest intellectual faculties: 
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose 
his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty 
than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his 
plan of life for himself employs all his faculties. He 
must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to 
foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, dis-
crimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness 
and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision. 9 
For Mill, then, it is not only requisite that a plan of life be 
appropriate to one's natures and powers; it is also requisite that 
that plan should develop and perfect one's nature and powers. According 
to Mill, a person is most fully realising himself, "is most fully living 
a human existence, when he is involved in choosing through manifest 
activity in the world, a plan of life, or a way of living that promotes 
and develops the distinctive powers that have evolved in the course of 
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that person's history". When a person lives by his own life-plan, 
he can be said to be living according to his own character, and to 
live in this way is to realise our common purpose in life. -Gray 
points out that this is the idea that Mill inherits from Von Humbolt 
who writes: 
'The end of man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal 
and immutable dictates of reason ... is the highest and 
most harmonious development of his pOWers to a complete and 
consistent whole. lOa 
Mill adopts Von Humbolt's conception of harmonious development. The 
idea is that each individual develops a harmonious system of life-plans 
whose fulfilment will bring to the individual his "fair share of 
;enjoymen t" . Although no one can realise all his potential, the key 
to fulfilling a schema of life-plans is to pursue goals that are 
compatible and reinforcing of each other. We can infer from Mill's 
discussion of harmonious development that "individuality" is the cul-
tivation of numerous capacities that result in the greatest amount of 
fulfilment throughout life. The motivation to grow, to strive for 
harmonious development, means a pursuit of long-range goals and the 
need to formulate a comprehensive view of one-' s interests. The 
individual, through exercising deliberate choice, adopts goals or a 
sequence of goals, which will be conducive to his development. As 
his knowledge of the world increases, he considers new goals or re-
arranges his goals into a new pattern. Changing circumstances, and 
learning from one's own experiences, as well as from those of others, 
may also result in adjustments in an individual's plan of life. Human 
development is not merely a series of isolated and unrelated acts, but 
a process of experimentation throughout life that is accretive, and it 
... 
is a process, moreover, that uses men's highest intellectual powers 
lOb 
and qualities of character . To be a genuine self, to fulfil the 
goal of achieving true individuality, means to act so as to utilise 
the faculties of the "higher self". This idea of developing and 
perfecting one's nature, of utilising the faculties of the "higher 
self", is closely associated with the theory of the qualities of 
pleasure. Mill believes that some pleasures (those that require the 
"exercise of higher faculties") are superior to others. Thus, for 
Mill, intellectual pleasures are better than physical pleasures. He 
argues that people should help "each other towards increased exercise 
of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their feelings 
and aims towards wise, instead of foolish, elevating instead of 
degrading, objects and contemplations"ll 
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Mill's theory of the quality of pleasures is not only a theory of 
value. It is also a key motivational principle. In Utilitarianism, 
he suggests that men have an inherent tendency to pursue excellence. 
Men are not only born with a capacity to appreciate the "nobler 
feelings", but they will be preferred to the "lower pleasures". "It 
may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible 
to both classes of pleasures ever knowingly and calmly preferred the 
. , 
12 lower" . Mill criticises Bentham for failing to "recognise that man 
is a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfection as an end; of 
desiring for its own sake the conformity of his own character to his 
standard of excellence without hope of good, or fear of evil from 
. ,,13 ~ther sources than his own inward conSClousness 
Mill's conception of individuality has been criticised as elitist 
because, it is argued, only a privileged few can act autonomously, 
choosing their own mode of existence for themselves, experimenting 
with life, and, generally, living a life that is truly "their own". 
But it is clearly not Mill's view that such individuality is possible 
for only a privileged elite. On the contrary, it is the "privilege 
and proper condition of any human being arrived at the maturity of his 
faculties" . Any person who "possesses any tolerable amount of common 
sense and experience" can formulate a comprehensive view of his 
interests, and choose autonomously his own mode of existence. Not 
only is it possible, but Mill even suggests that each person has an 
obligation to himself to seek to cultivate his individuality. 
The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more 
than prudence, means self-respect or development 14 
15 
and "individuality" he adds "is the same with dE!'Velopment" Thus, 
every person can and ought to cultivate his individuality: everyone 
has a duty and, by implication, a right to seek his own development or 
individuality, and this right correlates with a duty of forbearance or 
non-interference on the part of others. The duty to cultivate one's 
individuality is not, of course, absolute. "Ought" implies "can", 
and Mill clearly recognises that it is not possible for all people in 
all social and economic conditions to cultivate their individuality. 
In many societies, as a result of faulty social institutions and 
economic arrangements, large numbers of people are denied the material 
and educational means requisite for the cultivation of individuality. 
We shall see shortly that Mill argues that the unreformed laissez-faire 
capitalism of his day precludes the majority from cultivating their 
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individuality, but that far-reaching reforms may be instituted which 
make it possible for all members of society. 
1.2 Man as Moral and Social 
Mill, then, stresses the value and indeed the naturalness of autonomy 
and individuality. But Mill's conception of individuality should not 
be identified with egoism. In his analysis of the well-springs of 
human behaviour and motivation, he rejects the rigidly egoistic psycho~ 
logical perspective of his predecessors. In his Remarks on Bentham's 
'Philosophy, Mill is sharply critical of the extent to which "Mr. Bentham 
I 
was a believer in the predominance of the selfish principle of human 
16 
nature" . In contrast, Mill argues, "care for others is I in an 
admissible sense, as much an ultimate fact of our nature, as care for 
ourselves ... ,,17. And in Utilitarianism, Mill writes that "the social 
feeling" of mankind is a "powerful natural sentiment", in particular, 
18 
there is a strong desire to be "in unity with our fellow creatures" 
As this sentiment grows in the course of "advancing civilisation", the 
individual develops " ... a stronger personal interest in practically 
consulting the welfare of others; it also leads him to identify his 
feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an even 
greater degree of practical consideration for it. He comes as though 
instinctively to be conscious of himself as a being who, of course, 
19 pays regard to others" 
Mill refuses to call these feelings "innate" because many people do 
not experience them, and many people do not act for the common good. 
Instead, he calls such feelings "natural"; that is, they exist as 
real potentialities, essential to the being of any human, and ripe 
for cultivation. Mill compares this social feeling with the ability 
to speak. 
On the other hand, if, as is my own belief, the moral 
feelings are not innate, but acquired, they are not for 
that reason the less natural It is natural to man 
to speak, to reason, to build cities, to cultivate the 
ground, though these are acquired faculties... Like 
these other acquired capacities ... the moral faculty. if 
not a part of our nature, (i. e. innate) is a natural out-
growth from it; capable like them, in a certain small 
degree, of springing up spontaneously. and susceptible of 20 
being brought by CUltivation to a high degree of development. 
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Such "cultivation" is of prime importance. Mill argues that what 
preserves society and makes possible virtually unlimited social 
advancement is education and moral training. As Graham Duncan has 
pointed out, this, for Mill, includes not merely formal training in 
schools and universities, but the "entire network of social institi-
tutions which mould and form the individual,,21. What he has in mind 
is not simply the elimination of ignorance" but also the inculcation 
of a sense of duty and patriotism, a sense of moral and social 
obligation. There is a close link, he believes, between knowledge, 
virtue, and social cohesion and improvement. Unlike his predeces-
sors such as Hume, he argues that human nature has changed signifi-
;cantlY, that it can be deliberately shaped, and he has great faith in 
22 
the "extra-ordinary power of a well-designed educational system" 
It is interesting to note that Mill's belief (albeit undefended) 
that "men have a natural desire to be in unity with their fellow 
creatures" and that their social feelings may be stimulated by 
education, enables him to escape from a difficult dilemma. He claims, 
quite plausibly, that a person's intellectual- abilities and distinc-
tive character fade when he does not choose for his own reasons and 
in accordance with his own desires. "Progressive beings" judge, 
deciGl:e and choose for themselves, in accordance with their own reasons 
and des ires. Might not somebody decide, however, on the basis of 
reasoning that his desires will only be satisfied if he does not 
conform to certain moral requirements on other-regarding conduct? It 
would seem that an ideal society must either educate its members to 
develop excellence in choosing and run the risk of their not culti-
vating other-regarding virtues, or it must aim to educate its members 
to exhibit other-regarding virtues, and run the risk of preventing 
individuals from choosing for their own reasons, thereby starving and 
"withering" their "human capacities". Mill, as we can see, escapes 
from this dilemma. He argues that persons raised in his ideal society 
will choose, on the basis of their "own" judgment to exhibit the 
other-regarding virtues of progressive beings. They can do so, of 
course, because social feelings are natural; they only require 
stimulation from an education system. In this way he can argue that 
his ideal society can consistently aim to educate persons to develop 
both excellence in choosing and other-regarding virtues because it 
can educate them to choose to exhibit these virtues in accordance 
with their own reasons and desires. 
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It is clear that Mill rejects the psychology of egoism. Not sur-
prisingly, therefore, he also rejects a particular conception of men 
and society that is closely associated with egoism, that is, ~he 
conception of individuals as merely atomic, unrelated entities, and 
societies as artificial impositions constructed for the sake of 
peace and material prosperity. According to this latter view, 
mutual activity and co-operation are solely the result of the pursuit 
of self-interest. 
Mill clearly rejects this "individualistic" society. He states 
that the thought of a society held together by such '~ecuniary 
." . ,,23 dd'" ld t ?nterests is "essentially repulslve and he a s: We Yle 0 no 
I 'not 
one in our wish that 'cash payment' Should~be the universal nexus 
between man and man ,,!:l.4 . "I confess I am not charmed with the ideal 
of life held out by those who think that the normal state of human 
beings is that of trampling, crushing, elbowing and treading on each 
25 
others' heals" . 
For Mill, men are by nature social, and their autonomy is, in part, 
measured by the degree to which they can work co-operatively with 
others. All individuals should be free to act as best suits their 
natures as' long as their behaviour causes no harm to anyone. But his 
ethic is not limited to negative prescription. Mill also believes 
that human beings should act to promote the good of others and that 
when they are involved in acting for the common good, they are acting 
so as to develop their higher faculties. Man's powers include a 
"moral sense" as well as the capacity to make decisions, and, there-
fore, it is the kind of decision-making that includes another person 
as object which is most characteristically human. 
It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine to 
suppose that it is one of selfish indifference, which 
pretends that human beings have no business with each 
other's conduct in life, and that they should not concern 
themselves with the welldoing or wellbeing of one another, 
unless their own interest is involved. Instead of any 
diminution, there is need of great increase of disinterested 
exertion to promote the good of others. 26 
Mill argues that all men have the potential for social concern and 
concern for others, and activity devoted to the common life is an 
essential element of well-being. 
When people who are tolerably fortunate in their outward 
lot do not find in life sufficient enjoyment to make it 
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valuable to them, the cause, generally, is caring for 
nobody but themselves. 27 
Mill thus argues that care for others is a natural expression of human 
life. He suggests that we should act for the good of others not 
merely out of duty, or because society will benefit, but because we 
shall be happier by doing so. The well-being of any person depends 
upon the development of his distinctive human faculties, and, there-
fore, the social sense must be cultivated before we can experience 
complete fulfilment in life. 
and 
Those who leave after them objects of personal affection, 
and especially those who have also cultivated a fellow-
feeling with the collective interests of mankind, retain 
as lively an interest in life on the eve of death, as in 
the vigour of youth and health. 28 
Those only are happy who have their minds fixed on some 
object other than their own happiness; on the happiness 
of others, on the improvement of mank ind ." .. followed not 
as a means, but as an end in itself. 29 
Ryan points out that Mill opposes the egoistic or "market conception 
of society" because he believes that individuals need to participate 
30 in social life if they are to develop properly Thus, he is highly 
critical of the "selfish egoist, devoid of every feeling and care but 
those which centre on his own miserable individuality,,3l Such a man, 
Mill argues, has lost his ability to take an interest in the activities 
of the rest of mankind. Thrown back upon his own "selfish interests", 
he is prone to find life dull and insipid. Duncan similarly points 
o.utthat Mill "had no notion of the free individual standing alone 
without any sense of social obl igation or concern ,,32 Instead, Mill 
viewed the person as "pre-eminently a servant of others" whose self-
development involves cultivation of a distinctive ~ocial sense '~hich 
arises out of common membership in social organisations and wider 
33 human need" . The "individual" in that very pecul iar sense of the term 
used by Mill is one who has developed all those capacities or abilities 
which make for a rational person of goodwill. 
Mill unequivocally rejects the view that human relations are merely 
instrumental; personal happiness requires taking a real interest in 
others' lives and undertaking common endeavours. Thus, while Mill 
advocates the value of "individuality" he has no notion of the 
"rugged individual" who makes his way alone and independently of, or, 
in opposition to, society. Mindless obedience and concern for custom 
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and status imply a dwarfed personality, but so does disdain or indif-
ference towards the community. For Mill, individuality or autonomy 
is not antagonistic to sociality. The concept of individuality does 
not stop at the boundaries of the individual person. An individual 
cannot isolate himself from everyone else without sacrificing his 
indi vidual i ty. Individuality is not a given datum to be protected 
exclusively from society, but is to be developed through participation 
with others. The belief that Mill views the individual as "extra 
social", as in some way standing opposed to society may arise from the 
fact that he uses the word "society" with disdain when referring to a 
form of social organisation in which individuals relate to one another 
cas means rather than as ends. For Mill, a genuine "community" is a 
, 
coalition of "progressive" individuals whose development includes con-
cern for others and which manifests itself in a "spirit of co-operation". 
2. Human Nature and the Good Society 
In the last chapter, we saw how Hume argues that human nature is un-
changing. All men are inherently selfish and greedy and these 
anti-social tendencies manifest themse~ves in an insatiable avidity 
for acquiring external goods. Such qualities of human nature are 
neither occasioned by the institutions of society, nor are they 
removed by them. But suitable institutions can serve to control and 
contain the conflict that would inevitably ensue from the presence of 
such anti-social tendencies and to bring about a state of peace and 
security. The elimination of conflict occasioned by scarce external 
possessions in the presence of limited benevolence~was the major 
problem of justice for Hume. 
Mill's conception of human nature is, as we have just seen, very 
different. He views human nature as a set of capacities or poten-
tialities that can be developed to a greater or lesser extent. The 
other-regarding potentialities, for example, can be developed or left 
largely undeveloped. What specifically aids or thwarts the develop-
ment of men's capacities are societal arrangements and institutions. 
Mill, in contrast to Hume, sees a two-way relationship between men's 
natures and institutions. For Mill, societal institutions and 
arrangements can mould or shape men's natures for better or for worse. 
Gray points out that given Mill's views on human nature, we should 
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expect that he will assess societal institutions and arrangements 
according to whether they enhance or stunt autonomy and personality. 
"We must expect that considerations of liberty and self-develqpment 
will be crucial in Mill's assessment" of the various types of social 
34 
institutions, especially those that relate to property Further, 
we cannot expect Mill to "attach as much weight to considerations of 
security of expectation and of the co-ordination of economic activities 
35 in a world of scarce resources" as Hume does. Mill's assumptions 
about men's natures are quite different from Hume's and this influences 
the way in which he conceives of the problems facing groups of men in 
society. He believes that the major problem for the governors of a 
~society is how to ensure the improvement of all men, how to bring 
'about a state in which all men can be autonomous and "progressive" 
beings. 
2.1 Laissez-Faire, Social Welfare and Autonomy 
Of central importance is the role that Mill expects the government to 
play in "material", moral, and educational matters. It is often held 
that Mill is a supporter of the principle of laissez-faire. I intend 
to show that Mill's version of this principle is very unlike the 
orthodox, classical principle for it allows a much more active and 
positive role for government than mere protection of persons and 
property. I shall first look at his early writings; and then attempt 
to show that these are quite consistent with his later works. 
Throughout the 1830s, he pointedly rejects what he refers to as the 
"laissez-faire" doctrine, the notion best descr;i,be(j in the phrase 
"the government is best which governs least". He clearly envisions 
a much more positive and ambitious role for government than the mere 
protection of persons and property. He expects government to ,assist 
in the shaping of human nature; this he feels is the crucial 
ingredient in any attempt to improve society generally. In a letter 
to d'Eichthal, he argues that government "exists for all purposes 
whatever that are for man's good: and the highest and most important 
of these purposes is the improvement of man as a moral and intelligent 
being,,36 In an article in The Examiner, he specifically rejects 
what he calls the "laissez-faire spirit of the prevailing philosophy" 
which is said "to limit the ends and functions of the social union, 
as strictly as possible, to those of a mere police". The appropriate 
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view, he says is that "political society is a combination among mankind 
for the purposes of helping one another in every way in which help can 
be advantageous" and he laments the fact that this idea "is yet a 
, ,,37 
stranger to the immense majority of understand1ng He looks 
"forward to a time, and no very distant one, in which all the more 
vulgar and subordinate purposes of government will merge in one grand 
purpose of advancing the progress of civilisation,,38 The implication 
here is that the "police" function of government is one of its "more 
vulgar and subordinate purposes". 
In another article in the Examiner, Mill registers his support for 
i"gradually interdicting altogether the employment of children under 
I 
fourteen, and females of any age, in manufactories", and he indicates 
why he thinks public, governmental intervention of this kind is 
appropriate. It is said to be true in many cases that "an individual 
may be presumed a better judge of his own interest than the government" 
but there are cases "in which it would be highly for the advantage of 
everybody if everybody were to act in a certain manner, but in which 
it is not the interest of any individual to adopt the rule for the 
guidance of his own conduct, unless he has some security that all 
39 
others will do so too" . 
This, is, therefore, precisely the kind of case in which the 
government ought to interfere ... The only power which 
can promulgate and guarantee a compact among all the 
labouring people of the community is the government. If 
it is beyond the competency of government ,to do this, it 
is beyond their competency to do anything. 40 
Such a line of argument which challenges the invruolability of a con-
tract between elllployer and employee in favour ot the "general interest" 
or the interest of a large class of people provides a justification 
for a comprehensive government welfare role. It is a clear departure 
from the orthodox principle of laissez-faire according to which gov-
ernment should only interfere if there is a clear case of "force or 
fraud" . Mill's proposal could be criticised on the grounds that it 
places illegitimate restriction on employers and workers who, otherwise, 
would freely consent to the labour contract, and thereby undermines 
the foundation of private enterprise. 
prise is not merely a private matter. 
But, for Mill, private enter-
Decisions that take place 
within and about industry are not limited to the effects that they have 
on the employers and employees, but have effects on the whole society. 
Thus, government has the right to "interfere", 
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In an article in the Jurist, Mill criticises Turgot and other eight-
eenth-century philosophers who purportedly "conceived the perfection 
of political society to be reached, if man could but be compelled to 
abstain from injuring man; not considering that men need help as 
forbearance ... ". These thinkers, he declares, "left each individual 
to fight his own battle against Fate and Necessity, with little aid 
from his fellow men save what he of his own spontaneous seeking, might 
-, 
41 purchase in open market and pay for" Mill's criticism is directed 
primarily at Turgot, but he could well have had Hume in mind too when 
he made these remarks. He similarly takes issue with the negative 
conception of government in his Remarks on Bentham's Philosophy. 
~Having been proccupied with the "protection of persons and property", 
Bentham failed to recognise that this is "but a part of the problem", 
and it "never seems to have occurred to him to rega;rd political 
institutions in a higher light, as a principal means of the social 
42 
education of a people" 
Mill certainly understands his political philosophy to involve a much 
more positive, even utopian, conception of the purpose and scope of 
governmental activity than had earlier philosophers such as Hume and 
Bentham. In his essay on Coleridge, he comes directly to the issue 
of the proper role of government. He speaks of the so-called "let 
alone doctrine, or the theory that governments can do nothing better 
than to do nothing; a doctrine generated by the manifest selfishness 
of modern European governments ... ". As a "general theory", he says, 
"one half of it is true, and the other half false". Government 
"ought not to interdict men from publishine their opinions, pursuing their 
employments, or buying and sell ing their goods, in-- whatever place or 
manner they deem the most advantageous". 
But does it follow from this that go~ernment cannot 
exercise a free agency of its own? - that it cannot 
beneficially employ its powers, its means of information, 
and its pecuniary resources (so far surpassing those of 
any other association, or of any individual) in promoting 
the public welfare by a thousand means ... (No!), a state 
ought to be considered as a great benefit society, or 
mutual insurance company, for helping (under the necessary 
obligations for preventing abuses) that lar§e proportion 
of its members who cannot help themselves. 4 
To regard the state as a "great benefit society", "promot ing the public 
welfare by a thousand means" and using its "pecuniary resources" to 
this end is to envision a far more ambitious and positive role for 
government than classical liberalism had assigned to it, something 
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on the Qrder of the modern liberal welfare state. 
In a letter to Carlyle, Mill looks forward to a time when the-
"laissez-faire system" would "expire". "Peace be with its ashes 
when it does expire", he says, "for I much doubt whether it will 
reach the resurrection,,44. The question to be addressed is whether 
Mill himself is. responsible for resurrecting the principle in later 
years. It is often thought that Mill's brand of freedom is only 
compatible with a "nightwatchman state", and not with "a great benefit 
society" . 
lIn both the Principles and On Liberty, Mill distinguishes between both 
self-regarding and other-regarding conduct. In an ideal society, he 
believes, all adults should have complete freedom in the self-regarding 
sphere. He must have complete liberty "in all that portion of (his) 
life and conduct which affects only himself". 
There is a circle around every human being, which no 
government ... ought to be permitted to overstep '" 
it ought to include all that part which concerns only 
the life, whether inward or outward, of the individual, 
and does not affect the interests of others, or affects 
them only through the moral influence of example. 45 
The main point of On Liberty is to establish that no civilised govern-
ment (or society) shou1d every intervene coercively in men's self-
regarding affairs. Chapter 5 of On Liberty, and Book 5 of the 
Principles argue in addition for a presumption against governmental 
intervention in other-regarding affairs. But it is a presumption only. 
He claims that, unlike self-regarding conduct, this "conduct, in 
principle, comes wi thin the jurisdiction of society',,46 Thus, he 
claims that the presumption against subjecting other-regarding acts 
to legal constraints does not follow from the principle of self-
regarding feeedom. 
The recognition that Mill advances his principle of liberty in the 
self-regarding sphere and his presumption against government inter-
vention in other-regarding affairs as two separate tenets should save 
us from certain misinterpretations of his social philosophy (the 
popular view, for example, that because Mill advocates the principle 
of self-regarding freedom, he is a supporter of the "nightwatchman 
state") . It should aid us to recognise the contrast between his 
unconditional advocacy of self-regarding freedom, and his mere pre-
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sumption against government intervention in other-regarding affairs. 
Civilised societies, he believes, should always grant all normal 
adults complete freedom in the self-regarding sphere. In contrast, 
while he advances reasons to support presumptions against both 
coercive and non-coercive government intervention in other-regarding 
affairs, he claims that these reasons can be overridden. 
Mill gives two main reasons for limiting legal restraints on other-
regarding conduct, and restricting non-coercive government actions. 
First, legal sanctions on other-regarding conduct should be limited 
since this provides freedom for men to cultivate their moral and 
~intellectual powers by making choices47 
t 
Secondly, government action 
should be limited to provide room for the growth of diversity. Mill 
admits that, while these reasons warrant a presumption against such 
government intervention, there may be situations in which men would 
be more likely to cultivate their powers if they were subject to, 
rather than free from, the actions of government. 
uations, "the presumption It should be lifted. 
In these sit-
Mill is, in fact, willing to sanction much more extensive governmental 
action than one might first suppose. It is important to note that 
these grounds admit a large government role in fostering intellectual 
and cultural institutions. In particular, the belief that children 
must be formally educated to develop the moral and intellectual 
powers required for the cultivation of individuality leads him to 
support substantial governmental effort to provide proper childhood 
instruction. This "moral and intellectual education" should be 
_. 
available to "all members of the community". It should be made com-
48 pulsory by law , and the state should be responsible for the quality 
of education by instituting a system of examinations. For families 
unable to pay the expenses of education, the state should provide 
financial dispensations. Financial inability, Mill feels, should not 
h 'ld f . . d t' 49 M prevent c l ren rom recelvlng an e uca lon. oreover, the state 
had a role to play in fostering the diversity in education which is 
required to match and promote diversity in life: 
All that has been said of the importance of individuality 
of character, and diversity in opinions and modes of con-
duct, inVOlves, as of the same unspeakable importance, 
diversity in education. 50 
Such diversity in education can be promoted by the state entering the 
market for education and subsidising educational experiments through 
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the granting of endowments In addition, Mill's belief in the 
worth of intellectual and cultural development leads him to urge in 
the Principles that the government sponsor other types of cultural 
and intellectual institutions when it is the only agency in society 
able and willing to do so. Financial support should be given not 
only to experimental schools, but also to universities, scientific 
expeditions, research institutes, libraries, and the development of 
cultural organisations. It is necessary, Mill announces, to tax 
individuals so that government can provide these educational services. 
J. Fitzjames Stephen, therefore, clearly misreads Mill when he 
alleges that his principles forbid "forcing an unwilling person to 
52 
';Contribute to the support of the British Museum" 
The presumption against governmental intervention may thus be lifted 
to allow the sponsorship of intellectual and cultural institutions. 
It may be lifted to allow other activities.too. The justification 
of non-intervention policies is that they enable people to make the 
kind of choices required for the cultivation of individuality. But 
often these choices cannot be made because of. absence of opportunity. 
Just as poverty may prevent a person from receiving an education, so 
it may prevent him from receiving necessary medical treatment. Mill, 
thus, argues that the state may provide medical facilities such as 
public hospitals. Indeed, it is the role of the state to expand 
individual freedom by providing the individual with all the necessary 
facilities, and, generally, increasing the options available to him. 
Educational, health and certain material conditions are prerequisites 
for the cultivation of individuality, and the g;vernment is justified 
in intervening to provide these conditions where no private agency 
can or will do so. 
In the particular circumstances of a given age or nation, 
there is scarcely anything really important to the general 
interest which it may not be desirable that the government 
should take upon itself, not because private individuals 
cannot effectively perform it, but because they will not. 53 
It is clear, then, that Mill believes that civilised governments should 
ensure their citizens' material well-being as well as ensuring them 
extensive freedom and educational opportunities. In this way, Mill's 
principle of "laissez-faire" is very unlike the classical, orthodox 
principle. Mill does not abandon over the years his idea of the great 
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benefit society. He still believes that a good government "helps" 
and benefits people by providing them with the conditions to become 
"progressive beings". Utilitarianism, Chapters on Socialism,- and 
the Principles recognise that if basic physical needs are not met, 
men cannot achieve any kind of happiness, let alone the true happiness 
of exercising their higher faculties. In Books 4 and 5 of the 
Principles, Mill urges government measures to ensure all individuals 
. -" 
the material pre-requisites for cultivating their powers. He suggests, 
for example, a social minimum to be paid for out of taxation. It is 
this topic of the distribution of wealth and property that we must now. 
consider . 
. .. 
! 
3. The Institution of Private Property 
3.1 Private Property in Principle and Practice 
Poverty is clearly a constraint upon the cultivation of individuality. 
But the problem of poverty remains insoluble only if it is regarded 
as inevitable, as part of "human destiny". Mill does not regard it 
in this light. He begins his discussion of the distrib~tion of 
wealth by making his well-known distinction between the laws of 
production and the laws of distribution. 
The laws and conditions of the production of wealth 
partake of the character of physical truths. There 
is nothing optional or arbitrary in them ... It is 
not so with the distribution of wealth. That is a 
matter of human institutions solely. The things 
once there, mankind, individuallY~ or collectively, 
can do with them as they like. 54 
Past political economists had assumed that both production and distri-
bution were determined by immutable laws. Breaking with this trad-
ition, Mill makes a distinction between production ,and distribution. 
Although he recognises that technological innovations can transform 
the mode of production, markedly increasing production, he accepts it 
as an economic fact that the extent of available natural resources and 
the mode of production in any particular stage of society will always 
limit the productive capacity. But, in the realm of distribution, he 
denies the determining force of physical factors; unlike his pre-
decessors, he emphasises the distinctively malleable qualities of the 
"laws" of distribution. 
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The distribution of wealth, therefore, depends on the laws 
and customs of society. The rules by which it is deter-
mined, are what the opinions and feelings of the ruling 
portion of the community make them, and are very different 
in different ages and countriesb and might be still more different if mankind so chose. 5 
Now, it is, of course, possible that the "ruling portion of the com-
munity" could act in accordance with the interests of all, but Mill 
argues that in practice this has not happened ,. and poverty and penury 
for many has been the result. The free market, sanctioned by the 
ruling portion of the community does not operate to the advantage of 
all. Mill sees the difficulty of reforming entrenched property 
!elations through non-violent means. Nevertheless, he proceeds to 
I lanalyse the distribution of wealth as it derives from social relation-
ships which he characterises as "provisional" in order to argue for 
the necessity of adopting a series of major reforms appropriate to the 
kind of society in which all would have an opportunity to cultivate 
their individuality. 
It seems to be Mill's view that two distinct rights are violated by 
the operation of a free market: 
1. The Right to the Fruits of one's Labour and 
2. The Right to Cultivate one's Individuality. 
I shall treat each separately. 
The Right to the Fruits of one's Labours 
Since the human race has no means of enjoyable existence, 
or of existence at all, but what it derives from its own 
labour and abstinence, there would be no ground for com-
plaint against society, if everyone who wa~willing to 
undergo a fair share of this labour and abstinence could 
attain a fair share of the fruit.56 
Mill argues that some inequality of wealth is justifiable since people 
h ' d f tIt d mot1'vat1'on57 . M th d' ave varY1ng egrees 0 a en an oreover, e 1S-
tinction between capitalists who own capital and labourers who sell 
their labour for a wage, is an acceptable feature of a system of 
private property since thrift and abstinence are practised by some 
individuals and families and not by others. Consequently, the only 
legitimate criticism of a system of social relations based upon private 
property is that the distribution is not proportionate to the labour, 
past and present. 
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This is, in fact, Mill's major criticism of the capitalism of his day. 
According to this standard, the nineteenth-century English system of 
distribution is completely unjustifiable. In the Principlesi Mill 
makes his famous statement that Communism with all its problems would 
be an improvement over the injustices of the present system of private 
58 property In the Chapters on Socialism, his indictment is even 
harsher, and he directs his remarks to those who would try to justify 
the plight of the poor. 
. 
t ( 
The reward, instead of being proportionate to the labour 
and abstinence of the individual is almost in an inverse 
ratio to-it; those who receive the least, labour and 
abstain the most. Even the idle, reckless and ill-conducted 
poor, those who are said with justice to have themselves to 
blame for their condition, often undergo much more and 
severer labour, not only than those who are born to pecuniary 
i~dependence, but than almost any of the more highly remun-
erated of those who earn their subsistence; and even the 
inadequate self-control exercised by the industrious poor 
costs them more sacrifice and more effort than is almost 
ever required from the more favoured members of society.59 
It is clear that Mill makes no attempt to justify the unreformed cap-
italism of his day. The indictment quoted above is significant for it 
reveals great sympathy for the position of poor people who struggle and 
achieve little in a social system they do not control, and it argues 
that they sacrifice even more than those who abstain from pleasure in 
order to acquire capital. In Mill's early writings he makes the 
assumption that capital is acquired through hard work and abstinence. 
Later he rejects this assumption entirely, arguing that the unreformed 
capitalism of his day shows no relation between success and merit, past 
or present. 
The very idea of distributive justice or of~any proportionality 
between success and merit, or between success-and exertion is, 
in the present state of society, so manifestly chimerical as 
to be relegated to the regions of romance. 60 
Mill, of course, was n@t the first to argue that in a just social system, 
rewards should balance merit or effort, and that in the English capit-
alist system such an equitable principle was not met. 
echo Adam Smith's: 
His thoughts 
While it is the division of labour which makes a country 
rich, these riches are not evenly divided ... The division 
of opulence is not according to the work. . .. He who as 
it were bears the burden of society, has the fewest 
01 
advantages. 
Mill writes: 
Private property, in every defence made of it, is supposed 
to mean, the guarantee to individuals of the fruits of their 
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own labour and abstinence. The guarantee to them of the 
labour and abstinence of others transmitted to them without 
any merit or exertion of their own, is not of the essence 
of the institution, but a mere incidental consequence, which 
when it reaches a certain height, does not promote but con-
flicts with~ the ends which render private property 
legitimate. tJ2 
and he notes: 
The instit~tion of property, when limi~ed to its essential 
elements, consists in the recognition, in each person, of 
a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or'she has 
produced by their own exertions ... 63 
Thus, private property is governed. by the "equitable principle": rem- " 
uneration in proportion to exertion. According to this principle, 
each individual is to receive produce (remuneration) in proportion to 
~ 
the amount of work he contributes to the production of an object 
through the use of his own labour (exertion). It is from the equit-
able principle and its implications of full authority over the disposal 
of the product that private property gains its essential meaning: 
that all people are guaranteed not only "the fruits of their own labour 
and abstinence ll but also exclusive disposal of such "fruits" or 
property. Private property, then, has two original essential elements 
which designate its pr~vate nature: each individual is entitled to 
receive whatever he produces himself as a result of his own labour, and 
derived from that entitlement, can do whatever he chooses with that 
product (that is, the individual has the right to dispose of it freely). 
It can be seen that Mill's ideas about property are in line with previous 
liberal thought such as that of Locke, Reid, and Hutcheson. Property 
derives from labour. In Locke's theory, as a result of mixing one's 
labour with an external object, that object becomes one's legitimate 
property: one has a right to it. For Reid too, "justice" requires 
that the "fruits" of everyone's "innocent laboursll or "exertions" be 
secured to him64 . Mill emphasises the concept of desert or merit -
the grounds of the desert or merit being the effort or exertion 
involved in the labour. Thus, labouring on an object makes the object, 
or part thereof, the individual's in proportion to the amount of labour 
exerted. The equitable principle is a principle of proportion, of 
rec iproc i ty . Hutcheson similarly argues that "where the goods or 
labours of other persons have contributed to any increase or improve-
ment, all those who have contributed by their labour or goods have a 
joint property in the compound, or in the fruits and improvements, 
each in proportion to the value of what he contributed,,65. Locke also 
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argues that the fruits of an individual's exertions belong in justice 
to that person. To let someone have the "benefits of another's 
pains" is clearly unjust. Labour is often unpleasant and arduous. 
Thus, those who are willing to make the sacrifice of time and mental 
and physical exertion must reap the concomitant benefits. 
Mill strongly d.isapproves of the situation ,in which labourers work 
for employers who give remuneration which bears no relation to the 
labourer's efforts. So also does Hutcheson. "The labours of any 
person of tolerable strength and sagacity are of much more value than 
his bare maintenance. We see that the generality of healthy people 
", iC an afford a good share of the prof its of their labours for the 
support of a yo.ung family, and even for pleasure and gaiety. If a 
(worker or) servant obliged himself by contract to perpetual labours 
for no other compensation than his bare maintenance, the contract is 
. 66 plainly unequal and unJust" Locke, of course, also condemns as 
unjust employment contracts made under economic duress, where an 
individual is "forced" through "necessity" to accept whatever pittance 
is offered in order to live. Such a contract or "offer", he says, 
67 
amounts to vassalage or slavery 
The equitable principle and the derived right of exclusive disposal 
comprise the pure or "ideal" form of the system. But the institution 
in its "ideal" form "has never yet had a fair trial in any country"; 
at the present time, people are rewarded disproportionately to effort 
and exertion. For Mill, it is from the illicit use of the institution 
of private property that injust,ices arise, not !rom any element:.. 
inherent in the system. Mill, then does not ignore the connection 
between the existence of private property and the existence of injustice 
and inequality, but, generally, and in keeping with liberal tradition, 
he denies that there is a direct connection. Rather, he argues, that 
the institution has been misused and its principles perverted. 
Mill's account of property is, however, not as simple as it may first 
appear. He gives another definition which appears to conflict with 
the one we have just examined. We have seen that he distinguishes 
between what is "essential" and what is "incidental" to the institution. 
It is essential that one be guaranteed the fruits of one's own labour 
and abstinence. It is incidental that one be guaranteed the "fruits 
of the labour and abstinence of others transmitted to one without any 
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merit oY exertion of one's own", (that is, transmitted to one by 
gift or contract). But, in the second, "extended" definition of 
property (part of which we quoted before) Mill writes: 
The institution of property when limited to its essential 
elements, consists in the recognition, in each person, of 
a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have 
produced by their own exertions, or received either by gift 
or by fair agreement, without force or fraud, from those 
who produc·' d it. 68 , 
In this second definition of private property, those. "incidental con-
sequences" of the institution become incorporated into the "essence" 
of the institution. The right of exclusive disposal is essential to 
the institution of property in the case of goods produced by oneself, 
. 
~nd . in the case of goods produced by others (and transferred to one 
without force or fraud) yet these goods produced by others are "not of 
the essence of the institution, but are mere incidental consequences 
of it". In respect of the right of disposal, both essential and 
incidental property have the same status. 
Mill has already admitted that the uneven accumulation of wealth is a 
69 
major cause of injustice and poverty Could it not, therefore, be 
argued that it is the extension of the original principle that is the 
root of the injustice which exists since it permits individuals to 
increase their wealth at the expense of others' economic status (by 
contract) or simply by a specific association with others (by gift). 
Yet Mill defends this extension as implicit in the right of exclusive 
disposal. Mill advocates returning private property to the original 
(labour exertion) principle as a means by which injustice can be 
remedied. But how could this occur if private~roperty consists 
essentially (by definition) in those elements which are responsible 
for the injustice? We shall see (3.3) that Mill escapes or attempts 
to escape from this "injustice dilemma" by distinguishing between the 
right to dispose (of property) and the right to receive (property). 
He claims that while there is an absolute or exclusive right of dis-
posal of property by the owner, there is no correlative right on the 
recipient's part to receive it all. While Al has the right to will 
all his property to A2 , A2 has no right to receive all that property. 
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Jhe Right to Cultivate one's Individuality 
According to Mill, there is no necessary connection between 
"exploitation" and extensive private property. When workers are paid 
less than their contribution or exertion, they are exploited, but this 
exploitation arises from a contingent imbalance between the bargaining 
position of employer and worker, resulting mainly from the oversupply 
of labour.' The worker is not exploited simply because he must sell 
his labour to someone. If B sells his labour to A who pays him 
according to his contribution, B has been treated equitably, and has 
not been exploited. Thus, the right to the fruits of one's labour is 
not necessarily violated by a market in labour. 
is clear, though, that Mill is highly critical of the existence of 
the wage relationship or contract. I think it is Mill's view that 
while the labour contract does not necessarily violate the right of 
the worker to the fruits of his labour, it does necessarily violate the 
right of the worker to cultivate his individuality. Having little 
real choice of occupation or habitation, being. dependent on the will of 
others (especially his employer) he is as unfree as he possibly could 
be "on any system short of actual slavery". Mill makes it clear that 
he sees the worker-employer relationship as essentially one of depen-
dence where the former is subjected to "fixed rules" and is dependent 
on the will of others. He further attributes apathy and lack of 
interest in work, the stunting of initiative and the smothering of 
spontaneity, and the general desuetude of human powers and capacities 
fundamentally to the absence of self-direction in labour. The wage 
relationship or market in producers implies subservience and lack of 
-, 
self-direction. It violates the right of the worker to cultivate his 
individuality. 
In Mill's account, there is a distinction between a market in producers 
and a market in products. This distinction in no way reflects the 
more general distinction between the realm of production and the realm 
of distribution. Both the distribution (ownership) of the means of 
production and the distribution of products are part of the sphere of 
distribution and, as such, they are amenable to control and alteration. 
So, it is possible to institute reforms to eliminate the owner-worker 
relation just as it is possible to eliminate or alter the market as 
the method of distributing commodities. Mill's position is that the 
market in products is generally desirable and efficient and should, 
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therefore, be retained, while the market in producers should be 
eliminated because it violates the right of workers to cultivate 
their individuality. 
We have seen that Mill criticises the Capitalism of his day on two 
accounts: 
1. It violates the right to retain the fruits of one's labour. 
2. It violates the right to cultivate individuality. 
Both these rights are of key importance to Mill and we shall see 
shortly that he incorporates both into his reformed system of private 
property. But before investigating Mill's conception of a just system 
iOf private property, we must look at his account of land which he 
,sees as being of particular importance. 
3.2 Private Property in Land 
The manner in which Mill views the relationship between ownership and 
self-direction is perhaps most clearly exhibited in his discussion of 
the land problem. His discussion is helpful. in enabling us to see 
how important he considers the control of natural resources to be, 
what he considers the conditions of control, and where he places the 
concept, of private property in his hierarchy of values. 
According to Mill, the legitimacy of private accumulation of land can 
be questioned without questioning the right of private property as such. 
In this age, when everything is called into question, and 
when the foundation of private property itself needs to be 
argumentatively maintained against plausible and persuas", 
ive sophisms, one may easily see the danger of mixing up 
what is not really tenable with what is; and the impossi-
bility of maintaining an absolute right in an individual 
to unrestricted control, a jus utendi et abutendi over an 
unlimited quantity of the globe, to which every other person 
could)originally make out as good a natural title as himself. 
Mill derives his conception of property in land from Coleridge. He 
writes that Coleridge's greatest service was to revive the idea of trust 
in land. According to this idea, land is: 
and 
The gift of nature, the source of substance to all, and 
the foundation of everything that influences our physical 
well-being ... it cannot be considered a subject of property 
in the same absolute sense in which men are deemed prop-
rietors of that in which no one has any interest but them-
selves, ... that which they have actuallo called into 
existence by their own bodily exertion. 7 
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We agree fully with Mr. Newman in the doctrine that there 
can be, morally speaking, only a qualified property in-,things 
not produced by labour such as the raw material of the Earth. 
We might go further and say that there is only a qualified 
property in anything not made by the individual's own labour. 7l 
According to Mill, land is for the purpose of the general good, and all 
individuals should be allowed to enjoy it. His contention is that 
ownership of the land (just because the land is not produced by labour) 
should be viewed as conditional and not absolute. No person made the 
land; it represents the common inheritance of the whole species. As 
a result: 
It is some hardship to be born into the world, and to find 
all nature's gifts ~reViOUSlY engrossed, and no place left 
for the newcommer. 7 
'We have seen that, for Mill, the concept of private property in its most 
essential sense applies only wthose items which are produced by labour 
exertion. But the land has not been produced by labour exertion on 
anybody's part. Thus, it would seem, that if there is to be private 
ownership of land in any degree, a, different ethical justification will 
be required. Mill notes that: 
Wherever might has not been accepted as sufficient basis 
of right, the justification of private property in land 
has rested on the theory that most is made of the land for 
the good of the community by giving that full play for the 
stimulus of self-interest which is given by private 
ownership. 73 
When people are excluded from the use of that which is the common 
inheritance of them all, that exclusion can only be justified if it is 
ultimat~ly for their benefit. The production of large quantities of 
food, and other necessary material goods, is clearly to the benefit of 
all and would, therefore, afford a justification.. _ The justification 
for the private ownership of land, Mill explains, is that it is most 
conducive to making land yield "the largest amount of food, and other 
necessary and useful things" needed by the community74 Such'prod-
uction requires labour and labour exertion and is most effectively 
motivated by self-interest. 
Mill clearly states that if the owner of'land.does nothing to improve 
75 it, he should be deprived of the ownership There should be no 
private property in land when the reason for private property in land 
stops. "Where the land is not intended to be cultivated, no good 
reason can in general be given for its being private property at all". 
Whereas the legitimacy of private property in moveables is found in 
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the equitable principle itself (labour exertion) and is, accordingly, 
taken for granted, private property in land requires an external 
justification, that of "positive good or . ,,76 l.mprovement , The sig-
nificance of the "positive good" condition is more readily apparent 
when it is realised that the condition underlying other private property 
is a negative one: exclusive ownership must not result in positive 
evil, although it is quite acceptable if its effects are morally 
77 ' 
neutral By contrast, property in land cannot merely exist in 
private hands; it must exist for a beneficial purpose. While an 
individual may legitimately own goods for the pleasure of ownership 
per se, the owner of land must justify his ownership by making the 
Iland productive. 
Mill, in fact, could be criticised for failing to remain true to his 
"positive good" condition, more specifically for reducing it to a "no 
loss" requirement. He notes that if a landowner does not intend to 
cultivate his land, "he ought to know that he holds it by sufferance 
of the community, and on an implied condition that his ownership, 
since it cannot possibly do them any good, at least shall not deprive 
them of any, which could have been derived from the land if it had 
been unappropriated,,78 In this case, the individual is, in fact, 
holding the land without fulfilling what originally appeared to be a 
necessary condition of private ownership of land. Mill has weakened 
his condition from insisting that private ownership of land must 
result in positive good if it is to be justified or tolerated, to 
allowing it as long as it does not result in loss or harm. 
-Mill is aware that this condition of improvement or benefit in respect 
of land is often not met. "Landed property in England is thus very 
far from completely fulfilling the conditions which render its exis-
tence economically justifiable,,79 And private property in land, 
according to Mill, must be justified economically before it can be 
justified morally. Thus, individual landed property in England far 
from fulfils the conditions which render its existence ethically 
justifiable. 
Mill's discussion is not intended to encourage the nationalisation 
and confiscation of land for redistribution to the poor. He hopes 
that he will not be suspected of recommending a "general resumption 
of landed possessions, or the depriving anyone, without compensation 
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of anything which the law gives him,,80. But he does mean to defend 
the right of the government to place restrictions on land ownership 
for "when the state allows anyone to exercise authority over more 
land than suffices to raise by his own labour his subsistence and 
that of his family, it confers on him power over other human beings 
. 81 
.•. power that affects them in their most vital l.nterests" The 
freedom to own private property should be limited by the state inso-
far as it can be shown that such freedom would result in an abuse of 
the rights of citizens. According to Mill, "no notion of private 
property can bar the right which the state inherently possesses to 
82 
require that the power which it has so given shall not be abused" 
~ 
I 
Mill's attitude towards private property in land is thus based on the 
facts and needs of human life. He, like Locke and Spencer whom we 
quoted in Chapter 1, argues that if some individuals are permitted 
unlimited ownership of land, then other individuals may suffer hard-
ship or even threats to their survival. Mill does not consider all 
forms of private ownership as the cause of poverty, but he does believe 
that land monopolies prevent large numbers of. individuals from gaining 
access to the means of survival and improvement. Mill, therefore, 
argues that the principle of private property cannot always be applied 
to all situations and all persons because there are times when the 
needs of some individuals would be denied if the principle were main-
tained as absolute. 
3.3 Reforms: Distribution and Redistribution of Property, 
Weal th and Inc'ome 
Mill does not render explicit the relationship between private property 
and the rest of human life, but it seems clear he believes that the 
institution of private property is a reflection of, and an influence 
upon, many aspects of human life and human consciousness. In his 
essay, Civilisation, he goes as far as to make "diffusion of property" 
a measure of "civilisation"; a term he uses to specify the higher 
developments of social life83 . 
Mill's ideal is not the abolition of private property, but the dis-
persal of property among as many individuals as possible through 
reform measures. According to Mill, there is good "in retaining the 
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84 institution of private property" , but it is necessary to root out 
all the inequality and injustice in the present system. Mill thus 
affirms the institution of private property in the sense of that 
term which implies wide dispersal of ownership in the community, and 
he rejects the institution insofar as it means the right of any 
individual or group to possess as much and in whatever way they 
please, irrespective of the needs of other members of the community. 
Like Locke and Reid, he thus rejects what may be called the trad-
, 
itional or orthodox conception of private property -.that espoused 
by philosophers such as Filmer and Hume. According to that con-
ception, private property is an inviolable and absolute right of 
.individuals and groups, and the government has no right to regulate 
!property at all even when the needs of some members of the society 
are left unmet. Mill, in contrast, argues that the 
Society is fully entitled to abrogate or alter any par-
ticular right of property which in sufficient consideration 
it judges to stand in the way of the public good. 85 
Absolute and inviolable property rights give some men excessive power 
over others, thereby damaging "their most vital interests" in the 
sense that they are prevented from gaining access to ,_ the means which 
are in part requisite to cultivate their individuality. Mill, as 
we have seen, argues for a "great benefit society" and rejects the 
principle of laissez-faire and the "nightwatchman state". 
As Mill's ideal is the wide diffusion of property in society, he does 
not recommend the overall transformation of property relations, or 
the general confiscation of property as do some of his more radical 
contemporaries. Mill recommends reform measures varying in affinity 
with non-Marxist forms of Socialism, but all quite compatible with 
private property in a more modified or restrained form. These reforms 
include limits on inheritance, land reform, the introduction and 
extension of co-operatives. The reforms share the facility of being 
part of a system of private property or are, at least, able to exist 
in conjunction with it. • 
Bequest and Inheritance 
Mill criticises the contemporary rules of distribution for failing to 
make a distinction between bequest and inheritance. According to 
Mill, only bequest is an essential aspect of a principle of private 
property because: 
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The ownership of a thing cannot be looked upon as 
complete without the power of bestowing it, at death or 
during life, at the owner's pleasure ... 86 
In contrast, inheritance is a non-essential aspect which evolved as 
a common practice of a particular social system which no longer 
exists; severed from its historical roots, inheritance loses its 
rationale87 Mill, as we have seen, writes that ownership implies 
the right of dLsposal of that which is owne~, that full authority 
over the disposal of the goods is essential to the meaning of "owner-
ship". But we have also seen that he makes no claim that a right of 
recipience always correlates with the right of disposal . 
. 
IBy separating bequest and inheritance, Mill intends to underscore the 
fact that the principle of private property should not be used to 
legitimise the accumulation through inheritance of large individual 
fortunes of land and/or capital. The right to unlimited inherited. 
wealth creates too much of an advantage for the few against the many: 
If it may be said, as it may with truth, that those who 
have inherited the savings of others have an advantage 
which they may have in no way deserved, over the indus-
trious whose predecessors have not left ·them anything; 
I not only admit, but strenuously contend, that this 
unearned advantage should be curtailed as much as is 
consistent with justice to those who thought fit to 
dispose of their savings by giving them to their 
de~endents .88 
Mill, therefore, advocates adopting a limitation on inherited wealth. 
He argues that "no person should be permitted to acquire by inheritance, 
more than the amount of a moderate independence,,89 
The consequences of this position are far-reach~ng~ In arguing for 
the establishment of an absolute limit on allowable inherited wealth, 
Mill is going far beyond his early attack on primogeniture, for he is 
calling for a fundamental restructuring of property relationships. 
Moreover his reform applies to the accumulation of capital as well 
as land. In his early writings, he takes it for granted that the 
present-day capitalist was probably aided by inheritance laws. He 
justifies this headstart by labelling it past labour or past abstin-
ence. Since capital, according to the theory, is the result of 
labour plus abstinence, the prospering capitalist is a person who 
abstains and who probably comes from a family of abstainers. Later, 
Mill changes his mind. He argues that many commercial fortunes have 
been built up, even if only partially, "by practices which in a 
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better society would have been impossible' (such as jobbing or making 
use of public position), "or perhaps only by the manifold advantages 
which imperfect institutions gave to those who are already rich, over 
their poorer fellow-citizens, in the general struggles of life"~O 
Mill thus challenges the legitimacy of capital fortunes as well as 
those based on land. He writes that if his principles become the 
adopted practice of society, the capitalist would be deprived of his 
, 
"unearned advantage" over the labourer. As a result, everyone would 
start the economic race on an equal footing. Indeed, Mill believes 
that, if established as law, his notions about bequest and inheritance, 
I 1 f ' ,91 "would pu 1 down al large ortunes in two generatl.ons' 
. 
1 
,It should be noted that Mill's solution to the "injustice dilemma" 
seems odd and unsatisfactory. He wants to maintain that while there 
is an exclusive or full power or right of disposal of property (i.e. 
property gained both by gift and one's own exertion) there is no 
correlative right on the recipient's part to receive it all. While 
Al has the right to will all his property to A2 , A2 has no right to 
inherit all that property. It would appear to be better to deny 
AI'S absolute power of disposal over what he has "at death or during 
life" - and maintain instead that he has a qualified or limited right 
of disposal correlating with a similarly qualified.or limited right 
on the part of A2 to receive or inherit from him. 
Landed Property Reform 
While Mill does not consider all forms of private ownership as the 
cause of poverty, he does believe that land monopoly in particular 
prevents large numbers of individuals from gaining"access to the means 
of survival and benefit. Such a situation is clearly unjust, for 
Mill, as we have seen, adopts a neo-natural law position, the key 
idea of which is that the land is given by nature to all human beings 
for their survival and benefit. The chief beneficiaries of the 
present distribution, Mill argues, are the landed proprietors; those 
who fare worst under it are the labouring classes. Mill thus asserts 
that the major consideration in land reform should be the maximisation 
of benefits for the labouring classes. The reforms he proposes or 
h ' d' ,92 supports have t l.S en l.n Vl.ew 
Mill, as a member of the Land Tenure Reform Association, supports the 
Ten-point Programme which includes many controversial policies. Its 
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fourth clause calls for the taxation of the "future unearned increase 
93 
of the rent of land" . Points five and six outline the role of the 
state in purchasing land which comes on to the market, in order to 
let it to "small cultivators" and spontaneous co-operative experiments. 
The last four points deal with land owned by public bodies, waste 
lands, and with areas of natural beauty, historical and/or scientific 
significance. In all these areas the state is given the right to 
intervene, either by halting the further creation of private property 
, 
or by purchasing from the owner the land, as in the case of natural 
resources. After preventing any future enclosures and sale of 
endowments, the state can utilise the land, either by letting it for 
Icultivation or for improved working class dwellings94 
Many of the pOints are controversial but they are compatible with 
Mill's theoretical formulations. The special tax on the landlord is 
justified by the argument that the landowner who does not improve the 
land should not benefit from the increased value which accrues as a 
result of increased population. The idea that there should be pro-
hibi tion on further appropriation of current .common lands is, of 
course, justified by the neo-natural law assumption that land is for 
the benefit of' all, and not for the few. It is time to end the use 
of the land for the "proprietor class" - the few - and to establish 
it in the interests of the great number who have never benefited from it. 
Land should be utilised by and for the benefit of the whole community. 
But land acquired by the state should not be nationalised for govern-
ment control would not be the same as control by the community95 In 
a letter to Campbel196 , he pOints out that nationaiisation programmes 
are useless if the individuals controlling them are unfit and would 
use their positions to further their own ends. Instead he advocates 
small proprietorships with long leases. By such "peasant" or small 
proprietorships, the ownership of land can be distributed through a 
more diffused group of people. Mill is anxious to raise a "class of 
small proprietors" similar to the peasantry in France who impressed 
him greatly by their prudence, foresight, cautious efficiency and by 
the manner in which they subordinated all their efforts and took all 
the necessary means to look after their property. The cares and 
responsibilities of private proprietorship, he says, develop qualities 
of character and "train the intelligence" and "stimulate mental 
. . t ,,98 
act1v1 y Whereas the day labourer has "anxieties" which have a 
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d.estructive, not an "invigorating effect on the mind", 
The position of the peasant proprietor in Europe is 
the reverse. His anxieties are the ordinary vicissitudes 
of more or less; his cares are that he takes his fair 
share of the business of life, that he is a free human 
being, and not perpetually a child, which seems to be the 
approved condition of the labouring classes according to 
the prevailing philanthropy. He is no longer a being of 
a different order from the middle classes; he has pursuits 
and objects like those which occupy th~m ... If there is 
a first principle of intellectual education, it is this -
that the discipline which does good to the mind' is that in 
which the mind is active, not that in which it is passive. 
The secret for developing the faculties is to give them 
much to do, and much inducement to do it. 
,By such a system of small proprietorships, land is given to people who 
/need it, and, further, it enables such people to take control of their 
lives and develop those qualities of intellect and character that are 
essential to individuality. Also the peasant proprietor system is a 
just one for it enables workers to reap the benefits of their labours. 
Reward is proportional to effort and exertion. Peasant proprietor-
ships, like their industrial corollaries, partnerships and co-
operatives (see below) make possible the satisfaction of two important 
rights: (1) the right to cultivate individuality and (2) the right to 
the fruits of one's labours. 
Taxation and the Provision of a Social Minimum 
Mill rejects a policy of confiscation and nationalisation of land as 
a means to remedy injustice. In fact, he vigorously attacks "all 
schemes for the confiscation of private property in any shape or 
under any pretext,,99, whether this private property be in the form of 
land or capital. This does not mean, however,-that he also rejects 
a system of taxation. We have seen that he proposes and supports an 
inheritance tax of a scope that leaves individuals with only a 
"moderate independence" and also a tax on the increase of land value. 
But Mill's ideas on taxation do not stop here. In various articles, 
he sets forth his ideas as to how a tax system could work to better 
the condition of the ill·oor. He favours a revision of the English tax 
system in order to increase the taxes of the richlOO In this 
regard, he suggests that it would be better to tax "the incomes which 
persons in business derive from their stock in trade, at a lower per-
centage than those of the landowner, the fundholder, and other persons 
101 
who can live in idleness, and whose income is not liable to vary" 
He then outlines what he believes to be the most desirable tax system: 
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Our plan ... would be, to relieve the smaller incomes 
from direct taxation entirely, up to the income which 
might be deemed fully sufficient to satisfy those physical 
wants of a human being which are independent of habit and 
convention: to keep off hunger and cold, and to provide 
for old age, and for the ordinary chances of sickness, or 
other inability to work. Having fixed this minimum for 
entire exemption, we would tax all permanent incomes ex-
ceeding this, in exact proportion to the excess This 
kind of graduated property tax appears to us to be just, 
and no oth'er. 102 -, 
Mill believes that a reformed tax system can be used to alleviate 
poverty in two ways. First, the poverty of the low-paid can be eased 
,by exempting them entirely from income tax. Secondly, the poverty 
lof the unemployed or those physically unable to work can be eased by 
the provision of a social minimum paid for out of some of the income-
tax taken from the wealthier members of society. The poor, he argues~ 
are taxed disproportionately, but if the tax system were reformed 
along the lines suggested above, this inequality would be removed. 
"Income required to maintain life, health, and absence of bodily pain 
103 
ought not to be taxed" Mill's suggestion of tax exemption on 
incomes below £100-150 p.a. would have exempted half the working class 
104 from payment of income tax . 
The second way in which taxation can be used to alleviate poverty is 
to use the revenue from taxation to help those who are unemployed or 
physically unable to work. Losman points out that Mill "acknowledges 
the duty of the state to provide aid to those citizens who find them-
selves destitute,,105 However, it should be pointed out that this 
statement is rather deceptive for the public ai~ Mill endorses is the 
106 dreaded Poor Law . Thus, while it is true that he supports the 
idea his stance towards poor relief is rather harsh, and moreover, 
totally out of character with his conception of the cultivation of 
individuality and the "great benefit society". His harsh attitude 
towards welfare and poor relief may, I think, be explained by his 
unquestioning adherence to Malthus' theory which holds that population 
tends to increase faster than the means of subsistence can be increased, 
so that poverty is inevitable. He argues that the key to prosperity 
lies in controlling the population but that such restraint is not 
usually forthcoming. He rejects the idea of a social minimum on 
easy terms because he believes that in the long-term this will only 
serve to impoverish more members of society. It is for this reason 
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that he believes in giving relief on relatively harsh termsl07 In 
the Claims of Labour, for example, he writes that "the higher and 
middle classes ought to be willing to submit to a very consid~rable 
sacrifice of their own means, for improving the conditions of the 
existing generation of labourers". It is, however, hardly reasonable 
to expect such sacrifice if it results in greater poverty "in the 
108 generation to come" . 
Mill's views on the provision of a social minimum are clearly not: in 
keeping with his views on human nature and his conception of a good 
society. If Mill had not subscribed to Malthus's doctrine of over-
jPOPulation and resulting poverty, it is most likely that he would have 
had very different views on the subject. He does, in fact, provide 
some fairly clear indications of what his position might have been, 
and they are, as we might expect, much more in keeping with his con-
ception of man as a "progressive being", and with his conception of 
the good society. In an article: in the Examiner, for example, Mill 
generally supports the principle that society ought to provide for 
those who cannot provide for themselves. "T.he principle of securing 
by a legal provision the actual necessaries of life and health to all 
who cannot otherwise obtain them, we consider as now placed out of 
109 
the reach of dispute by an unprejudiced person" Also, he makes 
no criticism at all of the Fourierist provision of a social minimum 
(see next section), and he further argues that human beings ought to 
help one another. "The claim to help, therefore, created by desti-
tution, is one of the strongest that can exist; and there is prima 
facie the amplest reason for making the relief of so extreme an 
-exigency as certain to those who require it as by any arrangements 
of society can be made" 110 
Mill's view, then, is that, in principle, it is the duty of society 
to ensure that the needs of all its members are met. Such a view, 
he argues, is "beyond dispute". And, clearly, it is a view that is 
in keeping with his overall position. However, his acceptance of 
certain theories (which, incidentally, he does not defend) leads him 
to adopt harsh solutions to the problem of poverty which do not fit 
well with his conception of the good life for all men. 
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Partnerships and Cooperatives 
The partnerships and cooperatives Mill envisages may be considered 
not so much as an alternative to the institution of private property, 
but as a reform within the institution, designed to make it more 
equi table and just. They are the industrial corollary to peasant 
proprietorships. Initially, such organisations exist alongside 
traditional capitalist enterprises. Mill explains that: 
, 
The relation of masters and workpeople will be gradually 
superseded by partnerships in one of two forms: in some 
cases, association of the labourers with the capitalists; 
in others and perhaps finally in all, association of 
labourers among themselves. III 
.,Mill, as Gray observes, believes in the "mutability of all forms of 
!social life". He believes that "at some distant date", the chief 
means for improving the relations between employer and employee will 
be that of "raising the labourer from a receiver of hire - a mere 
bought instrument in the work of production, having no residuary 
interest~.in the work itself - to the position of being some sort 
of partner in it". In partnerships, Mill sees: 
the only or the most practicable means of humanizing the 
'rights of industry' and those of property; of making 
the employers the real chiefs of the people, leading and 
guiding them in a work in which they also are interested 
- a work of cooperation, not of mere hiring and service -
and justifying by the superior capacity in which they con-
tribute to the work, the higher remuneration which they 
receive for their share in it.112 
The role of the industrial partnership is merely transitional and will 
give rise to a state of industry in which "workpeople as a body will 
either themselves own the capital, or hire it f~m_the owners". These 
partnership ventures may become cooperatives after the "chief" either 
retires or dies. 
Thus, partnerships, Mill hopes, will evolve into a higher form of 
association, the cooperative, which gains his greatest praise, and 
which would, he asserts, bring "blessings to human society,,113 Mill 
favours cooperatives because they are based on assumptions of equality: 
The form of association, however, which if mankind continue 
to improve, must be expected in the end'to predominate is 
not that which can exist between capitalist as chief and 
workpeople without a voice in the management, but the ass-
ociation of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, 
collectively owning capital with which they carryon their 
operations, and working under managers elected and removable 
by themselves. 114 
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Mill has high hopes for the salutary effects of the cooperative 
movement, believing it to be the foremost means of establishing 
better conditions for the workers, and greater harmony between 
employers and employees. The only thing, he writes, which can 
entirely remove the antagonism between labourers and employers is 
, 115 cooperat~on 
Eventually, Mill hypothesises, the cooperative movement will assume 
the predominant position in the economic system of production and 
distribution. 
When, however, cooperative societies shall have suff-
iCiently multiplied, it is not probable that any but the 
least valuable workpeople will any longer consent to work 
all their lives for wages merely; both private capitalists 
and associations will gradually find it necessary to make 
the entire body of labourers participate in the profits. 116 
The demise of the role of the individual capitalist would be an 
evolutionary process. Mill optimistically assumes that, as 
associations absorbed nearly all the workers, capitalists would find 
it advantageous to lend their capital at a diminishing rate of_ interest, 
with the consequence that finally, "the existing accumulation of 
capital might honestly and by a kind of spontaneous process, become, 
in the end, the just property of all who participate in their produc-
tive employment", This "transformation" would "be the nearest approach 
to social justice, and the most beneficial ordering of industrial 
affairs for the universal good, which it is possible at present to 
117 foresee" 
Thus, for Mill, "cooperative associationism", a form of socioeconomic 
organisation according to which the workers or producers are also 
owners who collectively share in the fruits of their work is the con-
crete manifestation of the true ideal of human society. He calls the 
1 h ' 118 cooperative idea is utop~a·- Specifically, he distinguishes the 
"material" and the "spiritual" benefits of cooperatives. 
The chief material benefits are (i) greater diffusion of wealth and 
(ii) greater productivity. Cooperatives may be seen as an important 
part of a socially just society for the wealth, instead of being 
concentrated in the hands of the few, is widely diffused. Further, 
in the cooperatives, people are paid according to labour exertion, 
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that is, according to the equitable principle of desert. Mill also 
argues that productivity would greatly increase thereby increasing 
119 
the total wealth of the nation His argument is that, because 
workers share in the profits, the connection between labour exertion 
and reward is stronger in a cooperative system than in a traditional 
capitalist enterprise or, indeed, under communism, neither of which 
achieve such re.ciprocity. Thus, the workers, instead of giving "the 
" 120 least work for their remuneration" would "do their utmost" . Co-
operatives are, then, not only more socially just in that they achieve 
a greater diffusion of property and adhere closely to the principle 
of desert; they also have a utilitarian value in that they provide 
la much needed incentive. 
, 
The material benefits, Mill argues, are nothing compared with the 
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"moral revolution" that would result from their implementation. 
Although Mill does not analyse explicitly the relation between prop-
erty, the organisation of work and other aspects of social life, his 
discussions (and his discussions of cooperatives, in particular) imply 
that he believes property and labour relations to be both a reflection 
and an influence upon other aspects of human life, human consciousness 
and human nature. It is possible to_identify at least three aspects 
of the "moral revolution" that relate directly to the development of 
human consciousness and human nature. 
First, there are the advantages to be gained from democracy in the 
workplace. In the form of cooperatives that Mill recommends and 
foresees, ownership and control is also a function of the association 
" 
or collective of workers. The labourers qua owners decide what to 
produce, the conditions of work and they share the profits of their 
work. Being able to participate in industrial decisions, Mill 
argues, would convert "each human being's daily occupation into a 
h 1 f . 1 th' d l' 11' ,122 sc 00 0 soc~a sympa ~es an practica ~nte 1gence' For 
Mill, cooperative associationism is the ultimate ideal form of social 
organisation because it enables all individuals to realise themselves 
as persons through a process involving the use and development of 
mental as well as physical faculties in the activity of decision-
making and choice. It facilitates the cultivation of individuality. 
Secondly, Mill believes that an economy constituted by cooperatives 
would promote "social solidarity" by the "healing of the standing feud 
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between capital and labour; the transformation of human life from a 
conflict of classes struggling for opposite interests to a friendly 
rivalry in the pursuit of a common good to all,,123 The reason the 
feud would be healed, of course, is that the class of capitalists 
would disappear as worker cooperatives came to dominate the economy. 
Thus, Mill strongly endorses a society without marked class divisionl 24. 
Class divisions, he argues, hinder the growth of fellow-feeling; a 
more equal society (one without clearly defined strata) would encourage 
the development of men's social natures. 
Thirdly, Mill argues that worker cooperatives would sow the seeds for 
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The security r new sense of security in the labouring classes 
would, one would guess, stem from the difference in priorities of a 
worker-managed enterprise. They would aim, for example, to avoid 
frequent layoffs and to make financial payments (provide a social 
minimum) in cases where layoffs were unavoidable. 
Mill, therefore, advocates the collective ownership of property while 
at the same time defending private property. It should be clear now 
that the two defences are only apparently contradictory. The col-
lective ownership of property that Mill advocates is cooperative 
associationism and this is not necessarily, at least not in Mill's 
thought, contrary to the concept of private property. It merely 
offers an alternative to traditional capitalism. Mill writes of the 
"fall of profits ... extinguishing the class of small dealers and 
small producers .,. throwing business of all kinds more and more into 
the hands of large capitalists ... whether these be rich individuals 
or joint stock companies formed by the aggregation of many small 
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capitals" In other words, Mill observes that the trends of 
modern industry indicate "combinations" of property owners growing 
in power, and consequently as obstacles to the survival of large 
numbers of small independent owners. It is, therefore, in the name 
of private property that he defends cooperative associationism; he 
sees it as a method of restoring possession to people of the necessary 
means of survival and improvement. We have already noted that, for 
Mill, "diffusion of property" is a mark of "civilisation", a term that 
1 . t 127 he uses to indicate the higher developments of socia eX1S ence . 
Mill believes that it is only when property is truly "diffused" that 
men can exercise choice and gain control over their lives. And it 
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is only when men exercise choice and gain control over their lives 
that they can cultivate their individuality. He is critical of various 
forms of Socialism, offered as alternatives to Capitalism that, in 
reality, deny men such choice and control. 
He is critical, first, of "State Socialism". In State Socialism, 
the state is the potential representative of the people or the 
~ 
"community". Under Capitalism, the State Socialists argue, such 
representation does not take place. Instead, the government serves 
the interests of the owning class. But the government can lead the 
reform to a Socialist society. Under State Socialism, planning would 
re carried out by administrators and managers for the social good and 
according to human needs, rather than for "profit". Basic resources 
and industries would be nationalised as would social services. 
Collective ownership would be implemented through the vehicle of the 
state. 
Mill points out, first, that big bureaucratic organisations are not 
necessarily efficient. He writes that people who have a vested 
interest in a project (that is, those who will directly benefit from 
the goods and services produced) will usually be the ones best suited 
to control it. Bureaucrats, however, have no necessary interest in 
the quality of their administration except as it serves them to gain 
power, wealth and prestige. But, more importantly, even if the system 
were efficient, it would still be harmful·if it prevented people from 
directing their own lives and controlling the resources that they need. 
It is desirable that it (the control and execution) should 
be done by them ... as a means to their ow~ mental education, 
a mode of strengthening their active faculties, exercising 
their judgment, and giving them a familiarlkgowledge of the 
subjects with which they are left to deal. 2 
State Socialism, Mill argues, should not be the system that replaces 
orthodox Capitalism because it shares with it some major deficiencies; 
129 it gives some men "coercive power" over other men, and by precluding 
most people from taking active control over their lives and property, 
it thwarts the cultivation of individuality. It, thus, 
strips them of freedom, chOice, and control of their lives. 
Not all forms of Cooperative "Socialism" meet with Mill's approval 
either, for there are some forms which violate the principle of 
individual control. 
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Mill distinguishes "St Simonism" from "Fourierism". St.Simonism 
Mill says 
... does not contemplate an equal, but an unequal division 
of the produce; it does not propose that all should be 
occupied alike, but differently, according to their voc-
ation or capacity; the function of each being assigned, 
like grade in regiment, by the choice of the directing 
authority, and the remuneration being by salary, propor-
tional to the importance, in the eyes of the authority, 
of the function itself, and the merits of the person who 
fulfils it .130 
Mill does not object that individuals are rewarded differently accor-
ding to labour exertion or skill, for, as we have noted, he believes 
in the justice and the utility of this principle. His objection con-
. 
Icerns the direction of labour. "It supposes an absolute despotism 
in the heads of the association; which would probably not be much 
improved if the depositaries of the despotism ... were varied from 
131 
time to time according to popular canvas" Such a system, Mill 
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suggests, is only suited to savages ; for men even of relatively 
modest development, Mill says elsewhere, despotism is stifling to 
133 further growth Mill adds that the sort of despotism envisaged 
by St Simonism, that "in which a handful of nien weigh_everyone in the 
balance, and give more to one and less to another", would never be 
tolerated. 
"Much more attractive", Mill argues, is Fourierism. "This system 
does not contemplate the abolition of private property, nor even of 
inheritance,,134 For the Fourierists, a community forms a single 
enterprise, the capital of which is distributed in shares that may be 
owned unequally; each shareholder receives dividends for use of his 
capital. In addition, all membe~s of the community receive a social 
minimum, irrespective of whether they are capable of labour or not. 
Within each community, the members spontaneously divide themsel~es 
into groups, each of which performs a different function. Each 
member is quite free to participate in more than one group, thus 
allowing for different kinds of experience and achievements. After 
deducting subsistence, the rest of the production is distributed 
proportionately to each group, according to the difficulty of the 
task. If too many people choose one type of task, then the remuner-
ation would decrease, or, in the undesirable cases, remuneration 
would increase. Within each group, the distribution of produce would 
be according to the contribution of capital, labour and talent; the 
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percentage of the latter would be determined by a vote of the entire 
group. 
Fourierism, then, would keep the tie between effort and reward while 
honouring freedom of occupation. The Fourierists do not allocate 
the leadership role of their communities to a non-elected authority 
who then decide the role and remuneration of each member. Instead, 
the leaders are elected, and within each occupation group, major 
distribution decisions are arrived at by the democratic process. 
Also, the great advantage of the Fourierist system, Mill argues, is 
that the members decide for themselves the type of task they will 
IPerform, thus allowing for a greater amount of freedom of choice than 
'is provided for in the authoritarian St Simonian system. Such a 
system thus allows individuals choice and control over their lives. 
Individuals take the major decisions that affect their lives, and 
this has the benefits that we have already outlined. 
4. Conclusion: 
The Nature and Status of Property Rights in Mill's Theory 
Mill writes that "private property, in every defence made of it, is 
supposed to mean, the guarantee to individuals of the fruits of their 
labour and abstinence". In the system of peasant proprietorships 
and co-operatives he proposes (and also in the more advanced 
Fourierist cooperative system which he regards as the true ideal for 
human society) individuals are rewarded accordiug to their labour 
exertion, that is, according to the principle of desert, and there is 
also remuneration according to "thrift" or "abstinence". If one 
refrains from spending and puts one's savings into a co-operative 
enterprise, one gets a return on the investment. For Mill, the 
"guarantee to (persons) of the labour and abstinence of others trans-
mitted to them without any merit or exertion of their own is not of 
the essence of property". Indeed, when it "reaches a certain height" 
it "conflicts with the ends which make private property legitimate". 
Thus, in the reforms Mill proposes, there are strict limits on 
inheritance; individuals may acquire by such means only a "moderate 
independence". 
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But it may be asked how secure this property gained through labour, 
abstinence and limited inheritance is; for Mill writes: 
Society is fully entitled to abrogate or alter any 
particular right of property which> in sufficient con-
sideration, it judges to stand in the way of the public 
good. 
This statement may create the impression that Mill believes that just 
any sort of public or social expediency can override property rights. 
It will be recalled that, at the end of the last chapter, it was 
argued that Hume's merit was to show that entitlements to property 
grant powers and rights and they cannot, therefore, be disregarded, 
altered or abolished merely because it may be useful to do so. His 
-mistake was to overrate their importance, to believe they must never 
,lbelimi ted or c,urtailed under any circumstances. Now is Mill the 
opposite of Hume, according no strength to property rights, prepared 
to waive them when it is expedient to do so? If this were Mill's 
view of the status of property rights, it would be very odd for he 
makes clear that property gives individuals "security" and that this 
is a justification for it. "Good social arrangements", he says, must 
not "impair the security of property which is the product and reward 
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.of personal exertl.on" And he notes that reasonable expectations 
about property should not be disappointed. 
It is clear from Mill's analysis of a right that it is not the kind 
of moral phenomenon that may be cast aside lightly. For Mill, to 
have a right is to have a valid claim upon society136 Society is 
the protector of the right and the referent of the claim. "When we 
call anything a person's right" we mean by that "a valid claim upon 
society" to "protect the holder in the possession of it". Society 
(or, more precisely, the state acting for it) is a duty-bearer; it 
incurs a duty of protection towards the rightholder. Mill speaks of 
a claim to be "protected"; a claim to have something "guaranteed"; 
he speaks of "securing something" and of "not allowing hindrance to 
an activity,,137 It is clear that if society has a duty to protect, 
guarantee or secure the rightholder's right, it cannot satisfy or 
fulfil that obligation by altering or abrogating that right on the 
grounds of expediency or on minor considerations. Moreover, Mill 
makes it clear that the validity or sufficiency of the claim (like 
the worthiness of its protection) is determined by the principle of 
utility - that is, upon "the permanent interests of man as a 
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· ,,138 h progressive belng , the "development of w at is best" in all 
139 persons A valid claim is thus a moral claim. As such, it is 
a moral force, a demand for action, in and of itself, and for .this 
reason also it cannot be cast aside lightly. Rights protect 
individuals in the process of development and progressive expansion. 
They defend personality from unjustified encroachments of other people, 
and they serve as the basis for positive assertions for room in which 
to realise personal capacities which might otherwise remain "cramped 
and warped", "pinched and hidebound". 
Rights, for Mill, are a particularly suitable moral (and legal) means 
-:for protecting persons' "vital interests" - that is, their self-
I 
development and pursuit of individuality - and the justification for 
recognising and enforcing them lies in this function. Rights are 
especially suitable because the claims they contain have a peremptory 
quality not possessed by other appeals to the assistance of society 
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or other individuals. In Mill's words, they are "more absolute" 
and "of more paramount obligation,,141 Rights have a hierarchical 
precedence not possessed by other claims or considerations. For 
example, Mill argues that a government "in benefiting particular 
persons" must be sure "that it is not violating the rights '" of 
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anyone else" 
It is clearly Mill's view, then, that rights (the right to property 
included) cannot be cast aside for simple expediency. They have a 
peremptory quality and are more absolute than other claims or con-
siderations. However, it is not Mill's view that all rights are 
absolute or that they are of the same importance. 
conflict, they cannot both be guaranteed in full. 
If two rights 
Nor can they 
both be ignored if the system of rights is to be preserved. The 
conflict must be resolved and, for Mill, the principle of utility 
(the permanent interests of man as a progressive being) is the final 
arbiter. This role for the principle is a continuing theme in 
Mill's writings. In his Essay on Bentham he writes: "when two or 
more secondary principles conflict, then a direct appeal to some 
143 first principle becomes necessary" Thirty years later he 
writes: "If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations, 
utility may be invoked when their demands are incompatible,,144 
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Mill gives an example of conflict resolution in his chapter on 
justice. In certain circumstances, to save someone's life, it 
may be necessary (even a duty, he says) to steal the required food 
or medicine "or to kidnap or compel to officiate, the only medical 
practitioner,,145 Here property rights (and also rights to freedom 
of action) come into conflict with a right to life and are over-
ridden by it because utility (or the permanent interests of man as 
a progressive being) requires that the right to life be put before 
the right to property or freedom of action. It seems that such a 
conclusion could be reached without appealing directly to the prin~_ 
ciple of utility - by simply recognising that the right to life is a 
-more fundamental right. Mill seems to leave open this possibility 
lin what he says about appeal to the principle of utility: for he 
says that in cases of conflict the principle may be invoked. 
It is clearly Mill's view that very extensive property rights such 
as those associated with the free market conflict with the right to 
cultivate individuality and that the latter right is more fundamental. 
The right to. cultivate individuality can only be satisfied (for all 
persons in society) where great accumulations of wealth are broken 
down and property widely diffused throughout society in the form of 
peasant proprietorships and cooperatives. Mill sees no conflict 
between the right to cultivate individuality and the right to 
property which arises through one's labour, abstinence and through 
limited inheritance. However, it is clear that the right to 
property gained in this way can conflict with the right to life and 
that the latter right is more fundamental. Thus, the medical 
-practitioner may be justly compelled to part with his medicine to 
preserve someone's life. There is no reason to believe that Mill's 
argument would be different if the medical practitioner had invented 
the medicine himself and laboured long and hard to find a particular 
cure. The idea that the right to the material means of life (food, 
shelter, medical care etc.) is more fundamental than the right to the 
fruits of one's labours is, of course, also seen in the Fourierist 
system which Mill advocates. 
For Mill, it would be unjust to override the right of one person to 
protection or to conditions under which individual well-being may be 
achieved unless doing so is required by a more fundamental protection 
or a more fundamental condition of well-being. To override an 
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individual's right (for example his right to property or freedom of 
action) it is necessary to appeal to "social utilities which are 
vastly more important, and, therefore, more absolute or imperative, 
146 
than any others are as a class" . But these social utilities are 
more important because they too involve the vital interests of human 
beings, and .. are not the promotion of mere pleasure and convenience. 
They involve ri.ghts and are not simply matt,ers which are at the 
periphery of a person's existence. Central to Mill's utilitar-
ianism is the idea that only by showing that greater rights are at 
stake is it possible to infringe the personal rights of an individual. 
Moreover, where these greater or more fundamental rights are at stake, 
Mill (like Locke) believes that the weight of the law must be 
! 
invoked to ensure that they are satisfied. Mill writes: 
The principle of securing by a legal provision the actual 
necessaries of life and health to all who cannot otherwise 
obtain them, we consider as now placed out of the reach of 
dispute by an unprejudiced person. 147 (My italics) 
Locke writes: 
Only common charity (i.e. justice see Ch.l) teaches that 
those should be most taken care of by the law who are least 
capable of taking care for themselves. I48 (My italics) 
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FOOTNOTES - J.S. MILL'S THEORY OF PROPERTY 
1. Chief among those who take this view are C.B. Macpherson, 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
R.P. Wolff, and John Hospers - Macpherson viewing Mill as a 
proponent of liberal entrepreneurship, and the laissez-faire 
market economy, and Wolff and Hospers viewing him as a proponent 
of the minimal, nightwatchman state. 
In Democratic Theory, Macpherson argues that two conceptions of 
man are to. be found in liberal theory~ (a) the conception of man 
as "maximiser of utilities" and (b) the conception of man as 
"maximiser of powers". The first is associated with the early 
utilitarians such as Bentham and James Mill while the second was 
only incorporated into liberal thought by J.S. Mill. Macpherson 
sees Mill's view as the more correct; we should accept "the con-· 
cept of man as exerter and developer of his own powers" (p. 21) . 
To Macpherson, then, J.S. Mill has the right conception of man, but 
it appears to be his view that Mill chooses the wrong socio-
economic system to achieve this - i.e. Mill believes in liberal 
entrepreneurship and the market system and these are "incompatible" 
or "inconsistent" with the conception of man as developer of his 
uniquely human attributes (pp.34-35). They are compatible or 
consistent only with man as a "maximiser of uti~ities", as a 
"bundle of appetites demanding satisfaction" (p .41) . In section 
3, I shall take up this point and show how Mill proposes to modify 
the market system in order to make it compatible and consistent 
with his conception of man. 
In Reading Nozick, Wolff attempts to link Mill (and Locke) with 
Nozick. Nozick, he argues, advocates the "Mill-Locke theory of 
public and private" (p .85) . It will be shown that the libertarian 
or classical liberal realm of the private is much wider than it is 
for Mill (or, indeed, for Locke). Disposal of one's property is 
not, for Mill, a purely private affair as it is for Nozick (see 
especially sections on taxation and inheritance). Also, for Mill, 
employment is not purely a matter of contract between employer and 
employee, as it is for libertarians. Employment does not come 
only into the realm of the private. Some state regulation is 
permitted in this and other areas too (see section 2). Both Mill 
and Nozick, of course, have a realm of the public and private in 
their theories, but the boundaries are dif~erently drawn. 
In Libertarianism, Hospers invokes Mill's name in respect of 
"the scope of law" i.e. "What laws should be about and why" 
(pp.20-21). It will be shown that, for Mill, the legitimate 
sphere of law and state activity are much wider than for liber-
tarians such as Hospers - for example, welfare must be secured by 
the law. 
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CHAPTER 4 
NOZICK'S THEORY OF PROPERTY 
In troduc tion 
In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick revives a version of minimal state 
liberalism that became especially popular in the nineteenth century. 
The position. eschews compulsory welfare and sees it as a violation of 
the rights of propertyowners. Consistent with this view, Nozick 
argues that welfare state liberalism is unjustified. Welfare states 
.. 
~ave emerged by violating individual rights. The idea that it is 
morally illegitimate for the state to have more than a severely cir-
cumscribed protective role has thus receivedr,a powerful new impetus, 
and, more generally, Nozick challenges many of the hitherto unquestioned 
assumptions underlying much of contemporary liberal political and social 
philosophy. 
My primary concern in this chapter is Nozick's theory of property 
rights and distributive justice. But these topics are best analysed 
and criticised in terms of his full theory of rights, for they employ 
or embody the kind of principles that his theory of individual moral 
rights requires. Thus, the chapter is, in fact, an examination of 
Nozick's theory of rights with an emphasis on his theory of property. 
In the course of the chapter, I aim to show, in particular, the extent 
to which Nozick' s theory of property rights and distributive justice 
differs from the theories of those whom he clai~s are his philosophical 
ancestors such·'.as Locke and Kant as well as from other liberals such as 
Price. I aim also to challenge Nozick's position, to show that it is 
fundamentally inconsistent, and must, therefore, be rejected. 
1. Nozick's Theory of Individuals' Rights 
1.1 The Nature of Individuals' Rights 
Nozick opens Anarchy, State and Utopia dramatically: "Individuals have 
rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them (without 
violating their rights)"l. These rights are natural in the sense that 
they are not acquired; in Hart's words, they are rights "not created 
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· ,2 
or conferred by men's voluntary act10ns' Nozick claims that he has 
adopted Locke's natural rights. Quoting Locke, he initially suggests 
that among the individual moral rights which persons have are.the 
primary, or first order, rights to life, health, liberty, and property, 
and the secondary, or second order, rights to self-defence, and the 
punishment of others who violate anyone's primary moral rights 3 He 
also sugges.ts that, in addition, individuals have the following "Lockean 
." 
moral rights": rights against violence, theft and fraud, and the right 
to have contracts enforced. 
Nozick's first words quoted above are important ~ there are things no 
rne may do to you'
4 
omit to do for you 
He does not say that there are things no one may 
Prohibitions are by their nature negative in the 
sense that they are coneerned with what is impermissible. But the i'may 
not" of a prohibition can range over a positive or a negative, "may not 
do" or "may not not-do". In Nozick's theory of rights, it is the 
prohibition of a positive ("may not do") that is of primary, though 
not of exclusive, importance. He suggests that we can think of these 
rights as determining a "line (or hypothetica;L plane) that circumscribes 
an area in moral space around an individual,,5. Other things being 
equal, others may not intrude upon, or invade this moral space without 
the individual's voluntary consent. The rights are, thus, negative 
or "non-interference" rights. 
This idea of not invading an individual's moral space without his 
voluntary consent plays a key role in Nozick's theory. It will be 
examined further in Section 4. At this moment, we must note its 
importance in his discussion of welfare or aid. Nozick writes that 
his conception of rights holds "that your being forced to contribute 
to another's welfare violates your rights, whereas someone else's not 
providing you with things you need greatly, including things essential 
to the protection of your rights does not itself violate your rights6 " 
Thus, moral rights are rights to be free from a certain kind of inter-
ference from others. They are not rights to have others do or provide 
certain goods for one, however great the need for these goods may be. 
ThUS, for example, the right to life is merely the right to be free 
from the interference of others in striving for the things one needs 
for life. Nozick denies that there are any rights to aid or welfare, 
that is, rights to have things or to be in a certain material condition. 
There are, he writes, only "particular rights over particular things 
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7 held by particular persons" And he argues that "a right to life is 
not a right to whatever one needs to live; other people may have 
rights over these things ... at most, a right to life would be a right 
to have or strive for whatever one needs to live, provided that having 
it does not violate anyone else's rights,,8 Thus, if Doe lacks the 
means of life (food, shelter, medical care etc.), he does not have any 
right to these ~hings - even if he is incaR~citated and is not in a 
position to strive to meet his own needs. His dying because of failure 
to have the means of Ilife does not violate his right to life. Roe's 
killing him would, of course, do so. 
trt is commonplace in the literature on rights to distinguish between 
~ 
those sorts of rights that are correlative to certain obligations on 
the part of others, and those that are not. Hart notes: 
There is certainly one sense of "a right" ... such that it 
does not follow from X's having a right that X or anyone 
else has any duty. Jurists have isolated rights in this 
sense and have referred to them as 'liberties' just to dis-
tinguish them from rights in the centrally important sense 
of right which has duty as a correlative. 9 
These liberty rights or permissive rights merely affirm the possibility 
of a course of action relative to some system of rules or principles. 
Two persons may be at liberty (and in this sense have a right) to do 
the same thing which only one of them will be able to do. Hart gives 
an example: "Two persons walking along both see a ten dollar bill in 
the road and there is no clue as to the owner. Neither of the two is 
under a duty to allow the other to pick it up, and each has a right in 
the 1 iberty sense to pick it up"lO Wollheim notes with regard to 
such cases that "to the jurist, when A has a rig,ht .. to do a certain action, 
in the sense of having a liberty or privilege to do it, not only has no 
one else any specific duty correlative to this right, but nothing anyone 
else might do would count as an infringement of the right"ll 
On Nozick's view, Lockean rights to choose or act are much more powerful 
than these permissive or liberty rights. They mark off an area within 
which an individual's choices and actions are morally protected and may 
not be interfered with by others. If A has such a right to a partic-
ular piece of land, then, (as Wollheim points out) he has "the right 
that another man should stay off his land, and the liberty or privilege 
. 12 
to go on it h1mself" Unlike permissive rights, these exclusive or 
exclusoDY rights impose correlative duties of forebearance on the part 
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of others; others have a moral duty not to act without the right-
holder's consent in ways which would constitute interference with the 
freedom which the right protects. Feinberg notes that in the case of 
these strongexclusory rights which correlate with duties of forebearance 
on the part of othe~s, having such a right gives one a kind of moral 
authority to prohibit or grant permission to others to act in certain 
13 
ways 
The value of having moral rights of the kind Nozick describes seems 
considerable. When recognised, such rights grant their possessors 
the ability to tie down the future and develop stable expectations 
~bout how others will act towards them. These rights provide the 
lindividual with a sphere of freedom within which he can develop stable 
expectations about what alternatives are available and what the con-
sequences of dOing certain things will be. In those areas protected 
by one's rights, one may make choices without fear that others will 
interfere to frustrate one's plans without one's consent. 
A striking feature of Nozick's theory of moral rights is that the right 
may'not be compromised (at least, not without the right-holder's vol-
untary consent). On Nozick's view, 'there are moral "side constraints" 
on what persons may do which imply that an individual's moral rights 
may not be violated or overidden in order to produce a greater good, or 
even to prevent a more serious violation of the rights of others. He 
even implies that no one's moral rights may ever be overridden for any 
reason, but at one point he hesitates over this conclusion saying that 
he wishes to avoid dealing with the issue of whether rights may be 
14 
"violated in order to avoid catastrophic moral ttorror" 
Nozick is clearly at pains to argue that there is no ultimate (or 
superior) teleological moral principle which makes it permissible to 
violate individuals' rights in order to produce some greater good. 
Individuals' moral rights do not hold a "derivative status" in relation 
to some other good 1 ike happiness or well-being which is to be maximised. 
He adds that even the maximisation of the non-violation of rights is 
not a goal which can justify overriding someone's moral rights. Such 
a theory which Nozick calls a "ut ili tarianism of rights" theory would 
allow an individual's moral rights to be violated if that would 
"minimise the total (weighted) amount of the violation of rights in 
th . 15 e soc l.ety" For Nozick, all teleological theories entail a false 
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view of individuals' moral rights. The correct view of such rights, 
he says, entails that there is a fundamental moral side-constraint 
which prevents others from doing anything that could violate ~hese 
16 
rights in the pursuit of their goals This side constraints view 
of rights, he says, "expresses the inviolability of other persons" for 
individuals may not be forced to bear some burden or sacrifice in order 
17 
to produce a greater good, or avoid a greater harm . 
We have noted that one of the primary (or first order) rights in 
Nozick's theory is the right to property. The "side-constraints" 
principle operates in the case of this right too. The side con-
-straints view of the right to property implies the moral impermissi-
~ility of infringing a person's property right even though this were 
done in order to save another individual's life. The right to 
property may not be compromised in the interests of the welfare of 
others; a person may not be compelled to part with any of the property 
or wealth he legitimately owns to provide others with the means of 
life. Taxation or any other means of confiscation for this end is 
morally impermissible; it is a violation of rights18 
For Nozick, then, as for many libertarians, justice is constituted by 
a set of rights of a purely negative character. Justice consists in 
doing no harm to others and implies no positive or special obligations 
to them (unless these have been agreed to) . A person may choose for 
himself to feed the hungry, clothe the naked, shelter the homeless, 
care for the sick, protect the defenceless, assist the weak and en-
lighten the ignorant, but he cannot be compelled to use any of his 
personal resources - his property and wealth, time'or effort - to such 
ends. Each individual must be his own judge as to whether or not he 
will use his resources in these ways. If a person does so, he does 
so from his own personally-chosen ethical posture towards others. But 
no other person, however great his needs, has a right to any of the 
resources of another individual. 
1.2 Welfare Rights and the Role of Government: 
Locke and Nozick Compared 
Nozick claims as we have noted, that he is "following the respectable 
tradition of Locke,,19. He claims that he is incorporating the freedom 
and rights that Locke assumes in the State of Nature into his own 
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theory. But enough has now been said about Nozick's rights to cast 
doubts upon the correctness of this claim. In the chapter on Locke, 
we noted, contra Macpherson, that Locke takes a strong moral stand 
against great accumulations of wealth, that he calls those who aim to 
accumulate such riches "greedy" and "avaricious", and he argues that 
individuals can only become wealthy to such a degree at the expense of 
their fellow men for the resources of the world are not limitless. 
His approach, we noted, is to allow the government ~n civil society a 
role in the economy, and this includes some redistribution of wealth. 
His idea is that the system of property rights must not greatly dis-
advantage those without property, or they have a right to support in 
Isome kind of redistributive scheme. Exactly how much redistribution 
,there should be is not made clear by Locke, but it is clear that there 
should be at least some sort of minimum welfare guarantee relative to 
contemporary standards and available resources. Like Reid,- he makes 
it clear that individuals have a right to aid or welfare in accordance 
with their natural right to preservation, and such a right is, of 
course, incompatible with an absolute right to property. For Locke, 
it is the case that an individual has a right to what he needs, a 
right to be in a certain material condition, and that th~ property 
rights of other individuals can, to some extent, be overridden in 
order that these welfare rights be satisfied. He tells us that the 
"needy" individual has a "Right to the Surplusage (of the wealthy 
man's) goods", a "Title to so much out of another's Plenty as will keep 
20 him from extream want", and that this "cannot justly be deneyed him" . 
He notes, in addition, that "those should be most taken care of by the 
21 law who are least capable of taking care for themselves" For Locke, 
then, welfare is a public as well as a private responsibility; it 
falls within the domain of justice and not of charity alone. It is 
the job of government to raise the revenue necessary for aid or 
welfare. 
Reid also, it will be recalled, suggests that care of those in need 
should not merely be a matter for private charity alone, :and he, like 
Locke, grants the government a role in raising revenue for the pro-
vision of welfare. He says that "justice, as well as charity, 
requires that the necessities of those who are disabled from supplying 
themselves" should be supplied from the "common stock", and that "the 
rights of acquiring and disposing of property may be subject to 
limitations and restrictions, even in the state of nature, and much 
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more in the state of civil society, in which the public (governmental 
institutions) has 'eminent dominion' over the property of its subjects 
as far as the public good requires,,22 Thus, in the theories -of Locke 
and Reid, there is a right to welfare, a right to the necessities of 
life, and it is a right which is "superior to that which the rich man 
has to all his riches". The inferior right must yield to the superior 
right; the rights of ownership must yield to the claims of welfare. 
The prohibition in respect of welfare is negative: there are things no 
one (or no government) may omit to do for you ("may not not-do" for 
you) without violating your rights. This welfare right is incompatible 
with the absolute right to property and with the moral side constraints 
fiew of property rights. 
The contrast with Nozick is clear enough. While Locke asserts welfare 
rights, Nozick denies them. Failure to provide an individual with 
things he needs greatly does not necessarily violate his rights for 
other individuals may have rights over just those goods he needs. As 
we have seen, Doe's dying because of failure to be given the means of 
life (by Roe) does not violate his right to life even if he is incap-
acitated and is not in a position to strive to meet his own needs. 
This is true both in the State of Nature and in Civil Society. In 
Nozick's view, Doe is not entitled to so much out of Roe's plenty as 
will keep him from want, he has no right to the "surplusage" of any 
other individual's goods. For No~ick, the injustice lies not in 
denying Doe his essential needs, but in depriving Roe of his justly 
held goods and wealth - and this would be the case even if Roe were very 
prosperous and could provide for Doe at small cost to himself. Further, 
for Nozick, it is not the case that a morally good-- government must take 
care of those who are least able to take care of themselves. On the 
contrary, the government which engages in redistributive measures for 
ends such as welfare provision is infringing the property rights of 
those who hold the resources necessary to finance them. To remove any 
part of individuals' resources through taxation or by other means 
without consent is, according to Nozick, morally illegitimate. 
Property rights may:.not be violated to provide welfare, nor may they 
be violated to prevent large accumulations of wealth. 
It is clear that Nozick's rights are significantly different from 
Locke's, and it seems that a key difference lies in their conceptions 
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of the right to life, and their "ranking" of the rights to life and 
property. In Locke's theory, the fundamental Law of Nature to 
preserve mankind gives rise to the fundamental right to life or pres-
ervation. The right to property, in contrast, is not a fundamental 
right, but a derivative right that exists to satisfy the .fundamental 
right. In Locke's theory, the right to l.ife implies a right to that 
which is necessary to sustain one's life. He tells us that "Men being 
~ 
once born, have a right to their preservation, and consequently to 
~ 
Meat and Drink and other such things as Nature affords for their Sub-
. ,,23 Sl.stence . That is, every man has the "right too to the means of 
preserving" his life, and Reid similarly states that "a right to life 
24 
.implies a right to the necessary means of life" The same right, 
Ithe fundamental right, which gives rise to the right to property (as 
means to an end) can also curtail the right to property when the end 
(life or preservation) will be thwarted by it. If there is a conflict 
between the right to life (of one individual) and the right to property 
(of another individual), the right to life, being the fundamental right, 
must always take precedence even where the property was justly acquired 
or inherited. Justice requires that "surplus" property be removed 
from the .wealthy owner and given to the person in need. Such curtail-
ment of property in favour of the needy implies a positive in rem right 
to property; it implies also a "lexical ordering" of the rights to 
life and property. 
In Nozick's theory, the position is very different. There is no such 
"lexical ordering" of the rights to life and property. The r.ight to 
life is not superior to the right to property. Both are on a par as 
"first order rights". Nozick explicitly denies that a right to life 
implies a right to be given whatever is necessary to the exercise of 
that right. If a person needs food, shelter, and clothing to exercise 
his right to life, he has no positive in rem right to be given these 
goods merely because he needs them. Other individuals may already have 
rights over these goods, and to deprive them of their goods is to 
violate their rights and to treat them unjustly. The right.to property 
cannot, he claims, be derived from the right to life. On the contrary, 
"one first needs a theory of. property rights before one can apply any 
supposed right to life (as amended above)", (that is, a right to strive 
for what one needs for life). "The right to life", he says, "cannot 
provide the foundation for a theory of property rights25 
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For many people, including Locke, it see~s intuitively clear that the 
right to life should always take precedence over the right to acquire 
and maintain large quantities of external goods. When the two rights 
clash, there is an intuitive presumption in favour of the former. But 
this is not so in Nozick's theory for his property rights are, as we 
have noted, very strong. In Section 5, we shall examine the validity 
of these strong property rights. 
2. The Entitlement Theory or Theory of Justice in Holdings 
!In the last section, we noted the importance of the right to property 
in Nozick's theory. We also noted that it is a negative in rem right, 
imposing duties of forebearance on the part of others not to interfere 
with the rightholder's enjoym~nt of his property. This negative right 
is universal (and equal) in that all may own property, and all may have 
the right that others do not invade that property. But this is not to 
say that (physical) property is equally divided or held by all, or that 
there is a universal right to some (physical). property. This would 
imply a positive in rem right to property and it is just such a right 
that Nozick denies. We noted that he says that there are only 
"particular (property) rights", held by "particular people" over 
"particular things". Only the negative right is, therefore, universal 
and equal. The positive right to own property is not universal, but 
specific or special (pertaining to specific individuals) . . In this 
section, we shall look at Nozick's entitlement theory or the theory of 
justice in holdings in which he outlines how "particular persons" can 
come to own or hold legitimately "particular things". 
According to Nozick's entitlement theory, a person has a right to what-
ever he has acquired in a manner consistent with anyone of three 
general principles - principles which prescribe the conditions for 
justly appropriating unowned entities, transferring possessions, and 
rectifying past injustices26 The idea is that any individual B justly 
owns property P if and only if he (1) makes an initial just acquisition 
of P (which was previously unheld), or (2) acquires P by legitimate 
transfer from some agent A who justly holds P (either through just 
acquisition or transfer), or (3) receives P as a rectific~tion for past 
injustices. If B comes to hold P in any other fashion, his holding of 
P is unjust. 
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However, merely to know that B can justly come to hold P only if he 
satisfies these criteria does not tell us much about justice in 
holdings. For almost any theory of distributive justice can.be stated 
in terms of Nozick's three formal principles of justice. (For example, 
our principle of transfer might require that only transfers that would 
27 
satisfy, say, Rawls's difference principle or Locke's welfare 
principle are legitimate). So to distinguish Nozick's theory from 
competing theories, we must set out in some detail his theory of justice 
in acquisition, transfer and rectification . 
• 2.1 The Principle of Justice in Acquisition 
I 
.The principle of justice in acquisition specifies "how unheld things 
may come to be held, the process or processes by which unheld things 
may come to be held by these processes, the extent of what comes to be 
h Id b t · 1 and so on,,21 N' k' th f . t' e y a par 1CU ar process OZlC s eory 0 JUs 1ce 
in acquisition emerges in his discussion of Locke's theory of 
appropriation. Locke's answer to the question of how unheld goods 
may come to be held, it will be recalled, is ~hat one may appropriate 
objects by mixing one's labour with them, provided there is "enough 
and as good left in common for others", and there is no waste. Central 
to Locke's theory of acquisition are the ideas of (i) entitlement 
through labour and (ii) a limitation or proviso on acquisition. 
Nozick is not blind to the problems arising out of entitlement through 
labour, nor to the problems arising out of value-added schemes. Indeed, 
29 he candidly points out numerous difficulties for any such accounts 
-But it seems to be his view that the most potent objections to such 
accounts can be circumvented with the addition of a proviso. In respect 
of acquisition, he concludes that an individual has a moral private 
property right to (a) whatever previously unowned object he legitimately 
appropriates by (i) mixing his labour with it or (ii) discovering it 
or (iii) some function of these, and (b) whatever he makes with what he 
already owns (i) alone or (ii) in voluntary cooperation with others. 
A "proviso", Nozick argues, is crucial to any "adequate theory of 
justice in acquisition ,,30 The idea behind the Lockean proviso (at 
least as Nozick interprets it) is that individuals should not be made 
"worse off" by another's appropriation. "A process normally giving 
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rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned 
thing", he says, "will not do so if the position of others no longer at 
liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened", However, someone may 
be made worse off by another's appropriation in two ways: "first by 
losing the opportunity to improve his situation by a particular 
appropriation, or anyone; and second by no longer being able to use 
31 freely (without' appropriation) what he previously could" The first 
version requires that there always be unheld land or" resources for new 
people to appropriate; the second requires only that there remain some 
goods which can be used, though not necessarily appropriated (because 
~hey may already have been appropriated by someone else). Nozick opts 
! 
!for the second, the "weaker" version of the proviso - the version 
which, of course, is compatible with the kind of laissez-faire cap-
italism that Nozick seeks to justify. SUCh a laissez-faire market 
economy, he suggests, will rarely, if ever, violate this version of 
th . 32 e prov1So 
2.1.1 The Proviso and Needs 
We have already noted that Nozick does not regard need as a principle 
of justice. Yet, when we attempt to apply his version of the proviso, 
we find some surprising results. Consider the following case. 
Suppose that there are two men, John Doe and Richard Roe. Doe is a 
crippled dwarf and Roe is robust and agile. There are two orchards 
full of equally good and productive nut trees; -in"" the one, the trees 
are all short enough so that Doe can reach the nuts; in the other, the 
trees are so tall that Roe must climb them to get the nuts, and they 
are out of Doe's reach. Let us suppose further that both Doe and Roe 
intend to earn their livings by picking nuts and selling them, and that 
this is the only work available in the area. May Roe appropriate the 
orchard of short trees? May Doe? If Roe does so, he worsens Doe's 
situation in that Doe is no longer at liberty to pick the nuts from the 
short trees, and though he is, in some sense, at liberty to pick the 
others from the tall trees, he is in fact unable to do so. Thus, it 
would seem that Roe's appropriation violates the proviso. What if Doe 
appropriates the short trees? It seems that he too had worsened Roe's 
situation for Roe is no longer at liberty to pick the nuts from those 
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trees, and in order to pick the others from the tall trees, he will 
have to exert more effort and take more time. 
One response might be that if Doe appropriates the short trees, he 
must compensate Roe in some way for the extra effort of climbing the 
tall trees. Similarly, if Roe appropriates the short trees, he too 
must compensate Doe - but the compensation would be greater in this 
case since Doe cannot get more nuts simply by climbing the tall trees. 
While this is a possible response to the situation, it seems that it 
would not be Nozick's. It appears that Nozick would have to allow 
roe to appropriate the small trees without compensating Roe for the 
extra effort he must undertake. 
By having the only way he can earn a living forbidden to 
him, he is disadvantaged as compared to the normal sit-
uation, whereas someone is not disadvantaged as compared 
to the normal situation by having his most profitable 
alternative forbidden to him. A disadvantage as compared 
to the normal situation differs from being made worse off 
than one would otherwise be. (ASU, p.82) 
Compensation is only due to the person who is· disadvantaged - who 
suffers loss or injury to his interests. If a person is forbidden his 
only means of support, he is disadvantaged in this way. If he loses 
out on his most profitable means of support, he is not so disadvantaged. 
If Doe appropriates the orchard of small nut trees, he takes away from 
Roe his most profitable means of support for it will take Roe more 
hours and more energy to pick any given quantity of nuts from the tall 
trees than it would from the small trees. But, according to Nozick, 
Doe need not compensate Roe for this disadvantage. However, it is 
clear that if Roe appropriates the ordhard of smali nut trees, he has 
taken away from Doe his only means of support (we have assumed that no 
other work is available) and he must, therefore, compensate him. It 
would not be worth his while to appropriate the orchard of small trees. 
Of course, if Doe were an able-bodied individual like himself, Roe 
could appropriate the small trees and leave the less profitable alter-
native to Doe. It seems that simply because Doe is crippled, Roe must 
undertake this extra effort and hours of labour. But this would 
appear to be a clear case of allocation of resources on the basis of 
need, and of one individual having to make extra effort (or undertake 
extra labour) or even make a smaller profit, because of the incapacities 
of another. It is quite in keeping with the spirit of Locke's 
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principles of justice that Roe should make the extra effort that his 
"needy brother" is incapable of making. Need is, as we have seen, an 
important principle of justice for Locke. It is also quite in keeping 
with Reid's principles too for he specifically says that justice 
requires that the able-bodied should undertake extra labour to support 
those who through no fault of their own cannot work or who can work less 
than others. ~ut the case is different f~r Nozick who holds that it 
is unjust that an individual should bear some burden or make a sacrifice 
on the grounds of the needs of others. It seems inconsistent with the 
spirit of Nozick's principles that Roe should make this extra effort or 
undertake extra labour . 
. 
1 
Now suppose that there had been no short trees, only two orchards each 
with equally tall and productive trees. It would clearly be in order 
for Roe to appropriate one orchard. But now it appears that, on 
Nozickian principles, Roe does not have to make any provision for Doe's 
needs; he does not have to make any extra effort on account of Doe's 
incapacities, simply because his appropriation of one of the orchards 
of tall trees has not made Doe worse off. Doe may now be left with no 
way of earning a living - indeed, he may be left without ,any food for 
himself - but no extra effort or labour may be demanded from Roe 
because Doe's plight does not result from Roe's appropriation, from 
Roe's "forbidding? him his only means of support. While there is no 
inconsistency here, it does seem that if we may require an extra amount 
of labour from Roe under one set of conditions, on the grounds that 
Doe's capacities are limited, it would not be unreasonable to require a 
similar amount from him under other, not dissimilar conditions. 
-Nozick's principles are especially hard upon those who cannot support 
themselves - orphans, the handicapped, the old etc. No other person 
owes them as much as a meal. Locke and Reid, I am sure, would insist 
that it is reasonable to require extra labour from Roe in both cases. 
While Roe would have a right to appropriate one of the orchards, he 
would at least have to help Doe obtain sufficient nuts to feed himself. 
If Doe, unable to get sufficient nuts, develops protein deficiency, and 
ultimately dies, Roe has violated the fundamental Law of Nature to 
preserve mankind. Doe's right to life has been violated. According 
to Locke's theory (and Reid's) additional labour would be required of 
Roe in both cases. 
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In civil society, it would surely not be unreasonable to require 
that the earnings of the able-bodied like Roe be taxed to provide for 
the needy in society like Doe. It is, of course, Nozick's s~ated 
position that extra labour cannot be required of some people on the 
grounds of other people's needs. He is committed to the view that 
taxation is unacceptable on the grounds that it is tantamount to 
"forced labour"; it violates property rights, and it uses some persons 
as "means" to the ends of others. Jeffrey Paul states that Nozick is 
the "successor to the great classical liberals of the seventeenth 
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century" such as "Locke and Pufendorf" . But Nozick's position on 
the question of aid is very different from that of the natural law 
rhilosoPhers. Their ideas point in the direction of the welfare 
state, not the minimal state, and in their views, the right to life 
cannot be subordinated to the right to property. Thus, Locke argues 
that in civil society the law should take care of those who cannot 
take care of themselves. Pufendorf claims that care of those in need 
which in the state of nature is an imperfect right may legitimately be 
made into a perfect right in civil society, and Reid claims that care 
of those in need is a concern of justice as well as charity. 
2.1.2 Property Rights and the Right to Life 
In Nozick's view, the right to property cannot be derived from the right 
to life. Rather the order must be reversed: 
A right to life is not a right to whatever one needs to 
live; other people may have rights over these things. 
At most, a right to life would be a right to have or strive 
for whatever one needs to live provided that having it does 
not violate anyone else's rights. With regard to material 
things, the question is whether having it <ices violate any 
right of others '" since special considerations (such as 
the Lockean proviso) may enter with regard to material 
property, one first needs a theory of property rights before 
one can apply any supposed right to life ... therefore, the 
right to life cannot provide the foundation for a theory of 
property rights. (ASU, p.179 footnote) 
The importance for Nozick of the position described in the above passage 
is borne out by his treatment of certain cases. We shall discuss two 
of these: 
Case 1 
A person may not appropriate the only water hole in the 
desert and charge what he will. Nor may he charge what 
he will if he possesses one and, unfortunately, it happens 
that all the water holes in the desert dry up, except for 
his. This unfortunate circumstance, admittedly no fault 
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of his, brings into operation the Lockean proviso and 
limits his property rights. (ASU, p.180) 
Case 2 
The fact that someone owns the total supply of something 
necessary for others to stay alive does not entail that 
his (or anyone's appropriation) of anything left some 
people (immediately or later) in a situation worse than 
the baseline one. A medical researcher who synthesises 
a new substance that effectively treats a certain disease 
and who refuses to sell except on his -own terms does not 
worsen the situation of others by depriving them of what-
ever he has appropriated. (ASU, p.18l) 
In order to make case 2 more like case 1, we can amend case 2 as follows: 
Case 2' , 
1 All the water holes in the desert dry up but A builds a desalination plant by the sea and pipes the water to where 
he (and others) are living. On Nozick's principles, A may 
sell water from his plant on his own terms and he still does 
not worsen their position in the relevant sense - even if 
they die from thirst because they cannot pay his price. 
As Nozick says, in his theory it is not the case that property rights 
must always be limited to spare others death. They may be so limited 
in case 1 but not in case 2 and 2'. We need. to know if others are 
"worse off" and the relevant baseline situation for case 1 is before 
the appropriation took place and before the synthesis/invention took 
place for cases 2 and 2'. The relevant question for case 1 is, there-
fore, "Where would I be without A's appropriation?" and for cases 2 and 
2', "Where would I be without A's synthesis/invention?" If the 
appropriation of the only water hole had not occurred, I would still 
have adequate water to drink, but if the synthesis/invention had not 
taken place, I would be dead. It is clear that the degree of labour, 
effort, knowledge or skill is not relevant to the entitlement even 
though cases 2 and 2' might suggest it. If only one water hole 
remained useful because its owner had taken the precaution of covering 
it to prevent its drying up, the owner would still have the right to 
charge what he wished - for if he had not taken this precaution, there 
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would be no water anyway If the medical researcher refuses to sell 
his medicine except on his exorbitant terms, then in so doing,. his act 
does not make worse the situation of others. They all remain as they 
are if he refuses to make the drug available, just as they would if he 
had never discovered it at all. Similarly, if the person who covers 
the water hole refuses to sell water from it, except on very unreason-
able terms, he does not worsen their situation for they will remain as 
they are, just as they would if he had not preserved the water hole. 
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Thus, in Nozick's theory, property rights are not always limited by 
the right to life of other persons. In some cases they are so limited. 
In other cases, to limit the owner's property rights to spare.others' 
lives is to treat the owner as a resource for the benefit of others -
it would violate the "root idea, namely that there are different indi-
viduals with separate lives". 
Justice or Charity? 
It could be argued that the inventor/medical researcher would be 
morally wrong to charge what he pleased (especially if this was a very. 
high price beyond many people's reach) because he would have a duty of' 
renevolence in such cases. If Nozick agreed, it might seem that an 
odd situation would result for his theory - it would be possible to 
have a right to do something which was morally wrong. But this is 
not necessarily so because it might be Nozick's view that the state 
should not be the enforcer of all morality, that it should enforce 
principles of justice, and not all principles of right. 
the claim that person A has a right to X entails: 
For Nozick 
(i) That person A does no wrong in doing, ac'quiring, or retaining 
K; and 
(ii) That all other moral agents capable of preventing person A from 
doing, acquiring or retaining X have an obligation not. to try so 
to prevent A. 
But person A may decide to waive his right. Even though he may justly 
do X, and even though no other person(s) may prevent his doing X, he 
may voluntarily decide not to do X. 
instead. 
He may choose to be benevolent 
Apart from the issue of enforcement, there seem to be important moral 
differences between acts of charity or benevolence and acts of justice. 
One of these differences is explained very clearly by Reid in his 
Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind. When a person acts 
justly towards another, he does "no more than he was bound to do,,35. 
But when a person acts benevolently or charitably, he is "promoting the 
36 
good and happiness of others" . He is conferring "a benefit or 
favour" and, thus, is doing more than he was bound to do. The 
appropriate "response" to a favour or benefit is that of "gratitude". 
"We must (therefore) distinguish good offices to which we have a right 
from those to which we have no right and which thus require a return 
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of gratitude,,37 On this reasoning, if the medical researcher dropped 
his very high price to a reasonable one, having been moved by every-
one's pleas, this would be an act of kindness or charity on his part, 
and the buyers would be in his debt. He is doing more than he is 
bound to do; he is conferring a benefit. The buyers would seem to 
owe him a debt of gratitude or be under a moral obligation to return 
the kindness. 
It is interesting to speculate upon how Locke might have viewed the 
medical researcher case. Suppose someone had found a cure for plague 
lin 1665 and argued, on Nozickian principles, that he had, in justice, 
'a right to charge the plague-stricken Londoners for it what he wished. 
How might Locke have answered him? 
We know that Locke was contemptuous of self-interested profit and gain, 
and that he argued that it is immoral, unjust, to profit out of the 
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necessity of others . The fundamental Law of Nature is the preser-
vation of mankind, and one always has a duty .to act according to this 
law, provided one's own preservation is not at stake. To put one's 
own profit before the preservation of others is, thus, to commit an 
immorality of the grossest kind, and such an act, because it violates 
Natural Law, is compatible with a "state of licence" rather than a 
"state of liberty". 
Suppose now that the inventor of the cure argued that he might have an 
imperfect duty (one of benevolence or charity) to sell it at a reason-
able price, but not a perfect duty (one of justice) to do so - for he 
could justly charge whatever he wished. 
this challenge? 
How might Locke have answered 
We have already noted that in natural law philosophy (and this includes 
the theories of Pufendorf and Reid as well as Locke), need is viewed 
as a principle of justice and not of charity. Natural law philosophers 
do not draw the line between justice and charity in the same place as 
modern libertarians such as Nozick. Many acts that would be seen by 
Nozick as benevolent are, for natural law philosophers, acts of justice. 
That Locke would have considered the duty in the above case to be one 
of justice and not of purely voluntary charity seems clear from a dis-
cussion of the 'just price' in Venditi039 . He considers the case of 
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a vendor holding wheat in a town pressed with famine. 
Yet if he (the vendor) carries it away unless they will give 
him more than they are able or extorts so much from their 
present necessity as not to leave them the means of subsis-
tence afterwards, he offends against the common rule of 
charity as a man, and if they perish any of them by reason 
of extortion, is no doubt guilty of murder. For though all 
the selling merchants gain arises only from the advantage he 
makes of the Buyer's want, whether it be a want of necessity 
or fancy t.' is all one, yet he must not, make use of his 
necessity to his destruction, and enrich himself so as to 
make another perish. He is so far from being permitted to 
gain to that degree, that he is bound to be at some loss, 
and impart of his own to save another from perishing. 
(My italics) 
It is true that Locke writes of 'charity' not of 'justice', but we 
-~lready know that in many cases, 'charity' implies a Right or Title40 
This particular passage occurs in his discussion of the 'just price' 
so it would appear to be a matter of justice (rather than voluntary 
charity in the modern sense) that Locke has in mind when he writes that 
the vendor is ''bound to be at some loss and impart of his own" to 
preserve others. In other wordS, if the vendor is "at some loss" 
through the sale, this is required by justice and not by mere kindness. 
If the vendor is not willing to be at some loss, to mak.e some financial 
sacrifice, and anyone should perish because of his stand, he has not 
acted in an unkind way; he has committed murder. This passage in 
Venditio is quite consistent with TT 1:41-42 in which Locke argues that 
the poor man has a right or title to as much out of another's plenty 
as will keep him from want and the wealthy may not enrich himself by 
exploiting the poor man's necessity. 
There seems to be nothing in Locke's princ ip1es_to .. suggest that his 
view would be different if the vendor alone had wheat because he had 
invented a pesticide which preserved his crop while the crops of every-
one else died. Indeed, he makes it clear that claims to the benefits 
of one's labours - one's honest industry - are limited by the fundamental 
1 f t t k · d41 aw 0 na ure 0 preserve man ~n . 
It is interesting to note that the idea that inventions associated 
with preservation should be sold on reasonable terms as a matter of 
justice is expressed very clearly by another natural law philosopher, 
Francis Hutcheson. 
A like right we may justly assert to mankind as a system, 
and to every society of men, even before civil government, 
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to compel any person who has fallen upon any fortunate 
invention, of great necessity or use for the preservation 
of life, or for a great increase of human happiness, to 
divulge it upon reasonable terms. The inventor ... is 
justly entitled to a compensation in:'proportion to the good 
it brings society, or to the labour which the invention may 
have cost him or to the profit he could have made by it. 
But if a man is exorbitant in his demands, or so inhuman as 
not to employ his discoveries where they are wanted, or will 
always retain the secret to himself, so it must perish with 
him, if the matter appears to be of great importance to man-
kind, a society has the right to compel him to arbitration 
about the proper compensation to be made for the discovery; 
and to force him, upon just terms, to make it. (SMP, Ch.16, p.l09) 
~ow Hutcheson applies his argument to inventions which increase human 
happiness or well-being as well as those concerned with the preservation 
of human 1 ife . What would Locke's position have been in the case of 
an invention which tends to enhance the well-being of all or the pros-
perity of the society, but is not concerned with preservation - in 
other words, that its sale at an exorbitant price would not lead to 
any person's death? Would Locke agree with Nozick that in such a case 
the inventor could sell the invention on his own terms, or with 
Hutcheson? Clearly if preservation is not at issue, there is no 
violation of this natural right, that is, the inventor in selling on 
his own terms is not acting unjustly by violating the natural right of 
others to their preservation. But it is far from clear that Locke 
would agree that simply because preservation is not at stake that the 
inventor had Nozickian type property and liberty rights in his 
invent ion. Locke writes that the magistrate 
shall be accountable for his laws and administration as a 
magistrate, according as they are intended_to the good, 
preservation, and quiet of all his subjects in this world 
as much as possible. (Tol, 1:179) 
In civil society, the individual submits both his person and property 
to the regulation and jurisdiction of the government; 
He is to part with as much of his natural liberty in 
providing for himself, as the good, prosperity and safety 
of the society shall require. (TT 2:130) 
In both the Treatises and Essay on Toleration, the welfare of the public 
is given as the standard for defining what the magistrate mayor may not 
do with property rights. By the welfare of the public, Locke clearly 
does not mean simply the preservation of all - although this must be 
the first consideration of any government. He means, in addition, the 
"good of all subjects" and the "good and prosperity and safety of the 
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society" . I think it is most unlikely that Locke would believe that 
an inventor has the right to sell his invention on very exorbitant 
terms (i.e. that he has such strong and extensive property rights) if 
this invention serves to enhance the good or prosperity of the society, 
or any part of it. It seems Locke would probably agree with Hutcheson, 
not Nozick, for surely the civil society in compelling the inventor to 
arbitration about the proper compensation to be made for the discovery, 
, 
and in forcing him upon just terms to make it, is simply exercising 
that "regulation", "jurisdiction" and "dominion" over persons and 
their property for the "good of all subjects", the "good and prosperit~ 
of soc iety" . It should be noted also that Locke makes it clear that 
'in civil society each must labour for the public good. "I think 
leveryone, according to whatever way Providence has placed him in, is 
42 bound to labour for the publick good, or else he has no right to eat" . 
Clearly, to fail to divulge one's invention on reasonable terms, to be 
exorbitant in one's demands, is to consider only one's own good. 
2.2 The Principle of Justice in Transfer 
The principle of justice in transfer is the second principle in Nozick's 
entitlement theory. It specifies those means by which individuals' 
entitlements to holdings may legitimately be changed or transferred to 
other persons. The key idea is that any person, D, who justly holds 
property P may give P to any other person whom he wishes to receive it. 
Property may not be taken against the owner's will (unless there has 
been a violation of the weaker form of the proviso). Thus, for 
example, D's property holding is not subject to the needs of other 
individuals no matter how great this need might be: 
bination of individually just transfers be unjust. 
Nor can any com-
In addition to disallowing taxation for welfare, the entitlement theory 
excludes certain other types of transfer: 
Some people steal from others or defraud them, or enslave 
them, seizing their product, and preventing them from 
living as they choose, or forcibly exclude others from 
competing in exchanges. 
modes of transition. 
None of these are permissible 
Like taxation for the purposes of aid, these are impermissible modes 
of transition because they are unfree. The principle of justice in 
transfer is basically a principle upholding voluntary exchange, free 
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from governmental regulation (except as is necessary to prevent fraud 
or coercion). 
Nozick summarises his position as follows: 
(1) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle 
of justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
(2) A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle 
of transfe.r from someone else who is ~p.titled to that holding is 
entitled to that holding. 
(3) No one is entitled to the holding except by (repeated) application 
of (1) and (2). (ASU, p .151) 
It would seem that clause (2) needs amending. Suppose one night, I 
,stealthily pick some of my neighbour's strawberries. (I, of course, am 
~ot entitled to the fruit as theft is an impermissible mode of transfe~. 
I go to another village next day and trade these strawberries for some 
bread and that trade is without coercion or other impermissible prac-
tices. According to (2), I am entitled to the bread because I have 
acquired it "from someone else who is entitled to that (bread)". (We 
are supposing that everyone else's holdings are justly acquired except 
for my strawberries.) But the new holder of the strawberries is not 
entitled to them because I was not entitled to them before our trade, 
so clause (2) is not fulfilled. This is an odd result. If anyone 
lacks entitlement, it is surely me. 
possibly as follows: 
Clause (2) needs to be amended, 
(2') A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the 
principle of justice in transfer, where all parties to the 
transfer are entitled to their holdings, is entitled to 
the holding. 
We noted above that the weaker version of the Lockean proviso applies 
to all transfers too. As Nozick puts it; "Each owner's title to his 
holding includes the historical shadow of the Lockean proviso on 
appropriation" . It is clear, then, that all that was said before in 
respect of acquisition applies also in respect of transfer. The 
medical researcher, A, could bequeath his laboratory, its contents, 
and his secret method for synthesising the drug to his son, A2. A2 
could then sell the drug for any price he wishes. Similarly, if A2, 
B2 and C2 inherit a water-hole each from A, Band C respectively, and 
the water-holes of B2 and C2 dry up, A2 may not charge B2 and C2 "what 
he wills", even though A's bequest of the water-hole to A2 was a just 
one. But A2 may legitimately charge B2 and C2 what he wills if his 
own water-hole did not dry "due to special precautions he" (or even 
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his father, A,) "took to prevent this". Note how, on Nozick's theory, 
a person's material position may be affected for better or for worse 
by the prudence or imprudence, talent or lack of it, of one's.forebears. 
2.3 The Principle of Rectification 
The purpose of the principle of rectification is to specify what pro-
cedures and principles should be used to correct the effects of past 
injustices, that is, cases where the principles of justice in acquis-
ition or transfer were not observed. In an entitlement theory, such 
a principle is more difficult to arrive at than in other theories of 
-distributive justice because the first two principles rely so heavily 
Ion the actual course of events leading up to a distribution. 
For Nozick, a sufficient condition for restoration seems to be this. 
One must determine the holdings that persons would have had if the 
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violation:iliad not occurred Justice is restored if those whose 
rights were violated (as well as those who were made worse off by 
having others' rights violated) are brought up to at least as high an 
indifference curve as they would have been had the injustice not 
occurred. Thus, suppose that there are only two adults Richard and 
John, each with one descendent Richard-son and John-son. John owns 
a fruit tree which Richard takes and transplants without getting 
John's approval. For justice to be restored, John should get the 
tree back with whatever crop he would have had (or something else 
equally valuable to him). But suppose Richard does not restore 
justice by the time he and John die. Richard-son now has the trans-
_. 
planted tree, and John-son has nothing. Can justIce be restored? 
Nozick wants us to determine what would have been the case had the 
injustice not taken place, or had justice been restored. Perhaps 
John would have bequeathed the tree to John-son, or John may have 
neglected the tree which would then have died. Perhaps, instead 
John might have thought John-son a fool, Richard-son quite clever and 
good with trees; hence he might have transplanted the tree for Richard-
son anyway. Justice is restored if everyone is as well off as they 
would have been had the injustice not ,occurred. 
The general outline of such an approach is not implausible. In 
particular, it seems appropriate to seek out the relevant preferences 
in the "subjunctive mood,,44 (for example, what John would have wanted 
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for John-son if either the injustice had not been committed or if it 
had been rectified). But while it seems plausible in simplified 
situations such as that sketched above, in real life one is f~ced with 
the gigantic task of explaining how to restore justice after gener-
ations of injustice. It is most improbable that we can calculate 
such subjunctive determinations for so many inter-dependent individuals 
through many generations, especially as the cast of characters might 
have been different had no injustices occurred. Nozick recognises 
this problem and he suggests that some principle akin to Rawls' differ-
ence principle might be necessary45, given inadequate information to 
satisfy the strict principle of rectification, and the obvious call to 
restore justice as best as we are able. 
3. Nozick's Taxonomy of Principles of Justice 
Historical Principles 
The entitlement theory or theory of justice in holdings, Nozick says, 
is an historical theory of justice. An historical theory grounds 
present entitlements on actual past occurrences. From the perspective 
of such a theory, the justice of a state of affairs can only be ass-
essed in the light of the historical processes from which it emerged. 
The mere possibility that a state of affairs would have come about does 
not suffice to make it just. Thus, "the fact that a thief's victim 
voluntarily would have presented him with gifts does not entitle him to 
his ill-gotten gains,,46 
Nozick notes that the entitlement theory is not alone in giving weight 
to historical facts. Among other theories which do so is one which 
prescribes that holdings are to be proportional to moral merit47. A 
person is deserving (or possesses moral merit) in virtue of his past 
activities. Thus, in assessing present entitlements from the viewpoint 
of this principle, historical facts must be taken into account. 
End State Principles 
There are, however, principles that define qualifying conditions for 
entitlements that disregard historical facts. These principles Nozick 
calls "end state principles". They "hold that the justice of a dis-
tribution is determined by how things are distributed ... as judged by 
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t · . . b t' ,,48 same s ructural prlnciple(s) of just dlstrl u lon A structural 
principle is one which prescribes a distribution without making ref-
erence to any particular facts about individuals. Such a principle 
would define the positions available in a distributional matrix but 
would be indifferent as to which individualS filled the positions. 
"Two distributions are structurally identical", Nozick argues, "if 
they have the same profile, but perhaps have different persons occupying 
49 
the slots" . Thus, in a society of three person, A, B, and C, the 
distributional matrix A-3, B-2, C-l, would be structurally identical 
to A-I, B-2 and C-3 and A-2, B-1, C-3. Utilitarianism and welfare 
economic principles are two examples of end state principles of 
. t' 50 lJUS lce 
, 
Patterned Principles 
Patterned principles of justice prescribe that persons are entitled to' 
a share of the total stock of goods proportional in size to the degree 
to which they manifest some specified attribute or attributes. "Let us 
call a principle of distribution patterned", Nozick writes, "if it 
specifies that a distribution is to vary along with some natural 
dimension, weighted sum of natural dimensions, or lexical ordering of 
natural dimensions,,51. The egalitarian principle is a patt.erned 
principle in that it prescribes that persons are to receive in propor-
tion to their humanity, and, consequently, that all are to receive the 
same. Patterned principles, Nozick writes, might be seen as suggesting 
various sUbstitutes for X in the schema: "To each according to his 
X,,52. Among the distributional principles which Nozick classes as 
patterned are those which prescribe a distribution proportional to 
moral merit, need and IQ. "Almost every suggested principle of dis-
tributive justice", Nozick asserts, "is patterned: to each according 
to his moral merit, or needs, or marginal product, or how hard he tries, 
53 
or the weighted sum of the foregoing, and so on" . 
"The princ iple of entitlement", Nozick claims, "is not patterned". He 
goes on to argue that "the set of holdings that results when some 
people receive their marginal product, others win at gambling, others 
receive returns on investments, others make for themselves much of 
54 
what they have, others find things, and so on, will not be patterned" 
Clearly, the "principle of entitlement" as Nozick calls it is not a 
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principle of the same order as, say, the principle of need or moral 
merit. "Entitlement" is not the ground of a right; entitlement is 
right. To say that a person is entitled is to say that he has a right; 
it is not to suggest the reason why he has the right. The entitlement 
theory, as Nozick expounds it, prescribes that persons are entitled to 
those things that they have acquired justly, that is, acquired in a 
manner consistent with the principles of justice in acquisition and 
transfer. The issue between Nozick and his critics, therefore, is 
whether entitlement should be grounded upon the "free market" principles 
of acquisition and transfer, or upon some other principles such as need 
or effort, or whether the free market principles of acquisition and 
transfer should be modified (rather than replaced) by such alternative 
brinciPles. Welfare liberals usually argue for the latter position. 
They accord some weight to the free market principles of acquisition 
and transfer, but argue against the libertarians such as Nozick 
that such principles do not exhaust the concept of justice. They argue 
for a "lexical ordering" of principles according to which the principle 
of need takes precedence over the principles of acquisition and transfer. 
The free market or "process" principles of acquisition and transfer 
apply only to the "economic surplus", that part of the total wealth 
that remains after each person's basic needs have been met. This is 
the position that is taken by Locke and Reid, but it is possible for 
them to take th'is position because they do not deny the legitimacy of 
positive in rem property rights. In contrast, libertarians such as 
Nozick argue that the the laissez-faire principles of acquisition 
and transfer (exchange) together exhaust the concept of distributive 
justice. It is in this respect that their theories of justice are 
distinctive. Commenting on Nozick's theory, Sc~nron writes: 
Many theories of justice will give some role to consider-
ations of entitlement; that is, they will recognise some 
processes (i.e. process principles such as acquisition and 
transfer) as conferring legitimacy on their outcomes. What 
is special about Nozick's view is that it makes entitlement 
the beginning and end of distributive justice. 55 
In the remainder of this section, I shall briefly outline Nozick's case 
for making these entitlement princ iples "the beginning and end of dis-
tributive justice" for this will make clear why he considers the dis-
tinction between historical and unpatterned principles of justice on 
the one hand, and patterned and end state principles on the other hand, 
to be of such fundamental importance, perhaps as Scanlon suggests, "the 
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central theoretical device of the book". The detailed analysis and 
criticism will follow in Section 5. 
Patterns and Liberties 
The maintenance of an established distribution in conformity with end 
state or patterned principles, Nozick argues, requires that persons be 
restricted in what they can do with the things to which they have 
rights. 
-, 56 
"Liberty", he asserts, "upsets patterns" Begin with any 
particular patterned or end state distribution, and if people are per-
mitted to do whatever they want with their respective shares, there is 
no a priori reason to expect that, when each employs his share in order 
.to realise his own ends, anything like the desired pattern will be 
~aintained. Suppose that Dl were the distribution of goods obtaining 
in a given society and that this distribution were in accord with a 
favoured pattern (for example, strict equality). The distribution, 
Dl, could be changed into another distribution, D2, not in accord with 
this pattern, by anyone of a variety of means: by gifts, by someone 
starting a very successful business in his spare time using only 
resources to which he was entitled under Dl, or, as Nozick suggests, 
by one million people willingly paying Wilt Chamberlain 25 c per head 
57 for the privilege of watching him play basketball 
Attempts to maintain such patterns by a more-than-minimal-state will 
always restrict individual liberty, Nozick argues. Any favoured 
pattern will be transformed into an unfavoured one by people choosing 
to act in various ways - exchanging goods and services with other 
people or giving things to other people. To maintain a pattern, the 
state must constantly interfere to stop people rrom transferring their 
resources as they wish, or to take from some persons resources that 
others have chosen to transfer to them. In order to maintain a par-
ticular pattern such as Dl, limits must be set on transfers, exchanges 
and private production. Unless the authorities take decisive action 
to prevent it, unless, as Nozick puts it, "capitalist acts between 
consenting adults" are prohibited, the emergence of a parallel market 
could lead to a situation in which a person's de facto income is sig-
nificantly at variance with his officially assigned (de jure) income. 
To maintain a patterned or end state distribution, Nozick argues, 
"one must continually interfere to stop people from transferring 
resources they wish to, or continually interfere to take from some 
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persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to 
58 
them" . 
In contrast, where historical entitlement principles obtain, the 
"pattern" of title holdings emerges from a series of free choices; 
choices to appropriate and transfer. Persons are completely free to 
modify the existing distribution (or, rather, their small part of it) 
by engaging in any appropriation or exchange that is consistent with the 
fundamental principles of "procedural justice". There are for pro-
cedural theorists like Nozick and Hume, no a priori limits on the 
direction in which, or the extent to which, persons can. alter an 
existing distribution. "Patterning" and "end state" systems, on the 
. 
pther hand, can permit no such unlimited freedom to modify an existing 
distribution. Persons can have no right to engage in transactions 
that change the favoured distributional ideal. "Patterned distrib-
utional principles", Nozick writes, "do not give people what entitle-
ment principles do, only better distributed. For they do not give the 
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right to choose what to do with what one has" In short, they deny 
people liberty; they deny people their rights. 
Proponents of patterned distribution, Nozick argues, focus on recipient 
justice (on positive in rem rights)T ignoring any right a person might 
have to give something to someone. Discussions are on whether persons 
should have the right to inherit, rather than on whether they have a 
right to bequeath, or whether persons who have a right to hold also 
have a right to choose that others hold in their place. Historical 
entitlement views redistribution of income and holdings as a violation 
of people's rights, unless it involves rectifica;ticm of past inrjustice. 
It t t " f " fIb f d labour6D ~f th sees axa 10n 0 earn1ngs rom a our as orce  e 
proceeds of the taxation are not used for services that benefit those 
who are taxed. Whether through taxation on wages or on profits, 
patterned principles of distribution, Nozick argues, invol ve:- approp-
riating the activities of other persons. Seizing the results of 
someone's labour is equivalent to seizing hours from him and directing 
him to carryon various activities. The person has in this respect 
" 61 lost the liberty to decide what purpose his work 1S to serve 
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4. The Principle of Self-Ownership in Traditional Liberal Theory 
We have seen that much of Nozick's theory of distributive justice 
rests upon claims about the rights of individuals. Nozick does not 
attempt to set out a full moral theory, placing that task beyond the 
scope of his work, but rather suggests a line of argument leading to 
a view of morality as consisting of "side-constraints" on action. He 
distinguishes tJ:1is type of view from "goa1-:?rientated" moralities such 
as utilitarianism whose aim is to maximise some specified good. A 
"side-constraint" view of morality regards certain actions as categor-
ica11y impermissible. Significantly included among such impermissible 
actions is using any part of the property of some persons to aid 
Fthers w.i thout their consent. 
At the heart of Nozick's theory of justice and the set of rights and 
liberties it embodies, is a conception of individuals as separate and 
distinct beings. This distinctness or separateness of persons Nozick 
calls "the root idea,,62. The moral significance of the root idea is 
that these separate individuals are "inviolable", and the "moral side-
constraints (upon action) express the inviolability of individua1s,,63 
Side constraints upon action, Nozick explains, "reflect the underlying 
principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not 
be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their 
consent. Individuals are invio1ab1e,,64 He repeatedly emphasises 
the unacceptabi1ity of a person's being used, sacrificed or treated as 
a means or resource by another. 
65 
except as he chooses" 
"No one should be used for any end, 
The moral side constraints upon what we do, I claim, reflect 
the fact of our separate existences ... There-is no justified 
sacrifice of some of us for others. This root idea, namely 
that there are different individuals with separate lives, and 
so no one may be sacrificed for others, underlies the exis-
tence of moral side constraints ... The stronger the force 
of an end-state maximising view, the more powerful must be the 
root idea capable of resisting it that underlies the existence 
of moral side constraints. Hence the more seriously must be 
taken the existence of distinct individuals who are not a 
resource for others. 66 
Using one person as a resource· or "means"-'ior. others invo.1ves. using some 
of his resources for the sake of others. Items which count as being 
his resources are all those things to which he has a property right. 
They include items ordinarily viewed as property (house, car, shares, 
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bonds) but also skills, talents, brains, arms and legs, so that property 
67 is being employed in its widened, true Lockean sense . Given its 
expanded meaning, however, it is accurate to say that it is on the 
ground that state-enforced welfare policies violate individuals' prop-
erty rights that Nozick contends that taxation for the purpose of 
enhancing the social good illegitimately uses persons as resources for 
others. He makes this point explicitly later when he objects to 
taxation for welfare and other redistributive goals in particular, and 
to "patterning" or end state principles in general because they wrongly 
depart from the notions of "self-ownership" and "inviolability" that 
he attributes to classical liberalism. 
• Whether it is done through taxation on wages or on wages over 
1 a certain amount, or through seizure of profits, or through 
there being a big social pot so that it's not clear what's 
coming from where and what's going where, patterned principles 
of distributive justice involve appropriating the actions of 
other persons. Seizing the results of someone's labour is 
equivalent to seizing hours from him, and directing him to 
carryon various activities. If people force you to do 
certain work, or unrewarded work, for a certain period of time, 
they decide what you are to do, and what purposes your work is 
to serve, apart from your decisions. This process whereby 
they take this decision from you makes them a part-owner of 
you; it gives them a property right in you. Just as having 
such particular control and power of decision, by right, over 
an animal or inanimate object would be to have a property 
right in it. 
End-state and most patterning principles of distributive 
justice institute (partial) ownership by others of people and 
their actions and labour. These principles involve a shift 
from the classical liberals' notion of self-ownership to a 
notion of (partial) property rights in other peop1e. 68 
Taxation for redistribution, then, appropriates_the labour (or some 
other resource) of some for the good of others. Such a measure, accor-
ding to Nozick, can only be justified if it can be demonstrated that 
tax-payers are not "self-owners ", but are owned at least in part by the 
beneficiaries of welfare and other redistributiwe policies. 
Redistributive principles, Nozick argues, "involve a shift from the 
class ica1 liberals' notion of self-ownership". According to Nozick's 
interpretation of the classical liberals' conception of self-ownership, 
an individual's actions, labour and property may, in justice, be fully 
controlled by himself alone. Nozick does not say at this point who 
these "classical liberals" are. We may hazard a guess that he has in 
mind Locke and Kant. In the next section, I shall compare Nozick's and 
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Kant's principles and ideas on property and show that Nozick's principle 
of self-ownership or involability is very un-Kantian. In the remainder 
of this section, I shall briefly look at Locke's recommendations for 
the instruction and welfare of poor children for these show most clear~ 
his rejection of Nozickian-style self-ownership in respect of liberty 
and external property. I shall summarise his ideas, and then show how 
these policies would, according to Nozick, make the poor children "part-
-, 
owners" in those who are compelled to help them. I shall also make 
reference to his views on the role of government, showing, in particular, 
that he is no minimal statist. I shall finally point to some funda-
mentally different assumptions that Locke and Nozick make which account 
.for their respective positions on the question of self-ownership. 
I 
4.1 Lockean Self-ownership: Locke and Nozick Compared 
Locke recommends that "working schools, generally for spinning or 
knitting or some other part of the woollen manufacture, be set up in 
each parish" and "that the teaching in these schools be paid out of the 
69 poor rates" . He sugges.ts that the schools should take all children 
between the ages of three and fourteen whose families are in receipt 
of poor relief. The purpose of taking children at three years old is 
two-fold: first, "the mother will be eased of a great part of her 
trouble in looking after and providing for them at home, and so be at 
more liberty to work", and secondly, "the children will be better pro-
vided for". In amplification of this second reasons, he says, "What 
is necessary for their relief willmore effectively have that use if it 
be distributed at school, than if it be given to their fathers in money; 
For a great number of children giving a poor man a-title to an allowance 
from the parish, this allowance is given once a week, or once a month 
to the father in money, which he, not unseldom, spends on himself at 
the alehouse, whilst his children (for whose sake he had it) are left 
to suffer, or perish under the want of necessaries unless the charity 
of neighbours relieve them". At home, many of them are only 
"scantily" fed; "at school, they will be in no danger of famishing, 
but, on the contrary, will be healthier and stronger than those who 
are bred otherwise". These schools are thus for the welfare of the 
younger children and for the welfare and instruction of older children. 
In cases where "the poor children of any parish" are too numerous to 
be put in one school, some of the boys should be apprenticed until 
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the age of twenty-three to handicraftmen or landowners. Locke 
suggests "that the handicraftmen of the parish be bound to take every 
other of their respective apprentices from amongst the boys i~ the 
school, without any money", and that those who have "land of their own 
to the value of £25, or upwards, must choose out of the school what boy 
each of them pleases, to be his apprentice in husbandry" also without 
any money. Finally, he recommends that all the boys who by fourteen 
~ 
have not become apprenticed already should be apprenticed" to such 
~ 
gentlemen, yeomen or farmers" as have the greatest land, "who shall be 
obliged to take them for their apprentices till the age of 23". 
In cases where it is not possible for these people to take on. appren-
,tices, they may have them apprenticed to a handicraftman, but "at 
Itheir own cost". 
, 
These recommendations are quite consistent with Locke's general 
position. The "preservation of mankind", and "the feeding of the 
70 hungry" are precepts of Natural Law and these precepts are: "absolute"; 
they "cease not in Society", but "stand as an Eternal Rule to all Men, 
71 Legislators as well as others" . "Munic ipal Laws of Countries are 
only so far right, as they are founded on the Law of Nature, by which 
they are to be regulated and interpreted,,72 Care of those in need 
cannot, for Locke, be a matter of voluntary consent; it cannot 
"depend on an unstable and changeable will". "What immorality would 
not be allowable, and even inevitable, if the example of the majority 
73 gave us the law?" he asks. It is clear why Locke argues that "those 
should be most taken care of by the law who are least capable of taking 
74 
care for themselves~ . Some of the "surplus" property of the wealthy 
may legitimately be used for financing the welfare and instruction of 
children in need75 . 
For Nozick, the position is very different. There is no reason why a 
wealthy individual, just because he is wealthy, should pay the poor 
rate for the welfare and instruction of other people's children, or 
should have to bear the cost of having another person's child appren-
ticed to a handicraftman (in cases where he cannot accept him as his 
own apprentice). According to Nozick's theory, the poor rate could 
legitimately be levied only upon those individuals whose appropriation 
of land (or other natural resources) had worsened the situation of the 
children and their families - for example, if a wealthy landowner had 
enclosed a large area of land and thrown the families off it, leaving 
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them no land to use. But in the many cases where the poverty of some 
families does not result from a violation of the proviso, no poor rate 
could legitimately be levied. To levy such a rate upon weal~hy indi-
viduals, just because they are wealthy, would amount to treating them 
as a resource for the poor children. They would not be self-owners, 
but would be owned (in part) by the poor children. 
~ 
It also seems to be the case that Locke's apprenticeship scheme would 
c, 
resul t in a loss of liberty for some persons that Nozick could only 
view as objectionable and a further violation of the principle of 
self-ownership. We noted that Locke recommends "that the handicraftmen 
~e bound to take every other of their respective apprentices from among 
Ithe boys" in the working school in cases where "the poor children" are 
too numerous for them to be put in one school. Now a handicraftman 
who believed in the rightness of the Nozickian principle of self-
ownership might well argue that such a policy constrains his choice of 
apprentices. Why should he not be free to take on only apprentices 
that he wants - none of whom may be from the poor school? Simply 
because the school has an "overflow" problem,. he is legally required to 
"discrimina'b.e positively" in favour of the working school children to 
satisfy the 50% quota rule. There is a similar loss of liberty for 
the farmer, yeoman or landowner. They may all argue that they do not 
wish to take on a "husbandry apprentice" anyway. But Locke's recom-
mendations bind them to take one each. Their only consolation is that 
they shall not "be bound to have two such apprentices at a time". 
It seems that Locke's apprenticeship scheme would violate the Nozickian 
principle of self-ownership. The scheme allows that the liberty of 
an individual - an individual who may be in no way responsible for the 
poverty of others because he has not violated the proviso - may be 
compromised simply because others are in need. It violates the right 
of such individuals to employ or train those of their own choice. It 
"uses them to achieve other ends" (such as the good of others, the 
common good) without their consent. 
In contrast, this loss of liberty is quite consistent with Locke's 
principles of justice. In civil society, both one's "Person and 
Possession" are regulated by the Laws of the Society,,76 That is, 
each one has "a Liberty to dispose and order, as he lists, his Person, 
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Actions, Possessions, and hiS Whole Property" but "within tlie,allowance 
77 
of those Laws under which he is" Just laws regulate property and 
liberty according to the "publick Good" and this ''publick good"-includes 
the preservation and welfare of "every member" of society. It is 
permissible and even necessary for such laws to curtail the liberty 
and property of some to ensure that the needs of others are met. One 
has a right to dispose of one's actions (and property) as one pleases, 
but subject to the needs of others in society. "Self-ownership" for 
Locke, therefore has important limitations. It seems that it is 
Nozick's own principles that involve a shift from the classical 
liberals' notion of self-ownership (if Noz,ick is thinking of Locke). 
~or Locke, the person and his property are not inviolable in the same 
I 
sense as they are for Nozick. "The end of Government", Locke writes, 
"is the good of the Community". Any alterations to the law that a 
government makes "tending to that end, cannot be an incroachment upon 
any body: since nobody in Government can have a Right tending to any 
other end. And those only are incroachments which hinder the public 
78 good" 
* * * * 
Locke makes it plain that the preservation of the needy does not 
exhaust the concept of the "publick good". There are other positive 
ends of government, too, the achievement of which requires the reg-
ulation of property and liberty rights and hence the compromising of 
self-ownership. Locke argues that civil society may regulate property 
and liberty rights to ensure "the good, preservation and quiet of all 
SUbjects,,79, the "good of the community,,80, "the good, prosperity and 
safety of the soc iety ,,81 In order to achieve these ends, it must 
secure conditions favourable to material well-b~ing and this requires 
a role for government in the economy. Locke mentions that it is the 
function of government to maintain conditions favourable to stable 
markets so that trade can abound. Legislation on economic matters 
must enlarge the flow of money "into the current-trade for the improve-
ment of the general stock and wealth of the nation". Sometimes 
legislation on economic matters may be instituted to achieve the pros-
perity of the nation; it may also be required to ensure the "good and 
preservation of all subjects". As we have already seen, Locke 
recommends the state regulation of interest rates to prevent economic 
hardship among the poor and their exploitation by wealthy capitalists. 
The government must also secure the preservation of all and the pros-
perity of the community by securing the "increase of lands and the 
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right employment of them" - the latter being the "great art of 
82 government" - and the good and preservation of all by ensuring that 
jobs are provided for the poor. 
In sum, Locke does not argue for the minimal, nightwatchman state; 
he does not believe, as Nozick does, that "any more extensive state" 
than the minimal one will "violate persons' rights". The "great art 
, 
of government" for Locke is not merely protection against force, theft, 
fraud and enforcement of contracts. On the contrary: 
The ways of attaining these (i.e. the ends of government) 
comprehend all the arts of peace and war; the management 
of trade, the employment of the poor, and all other things 
that belong to the administration of the publick. 83 
Now it is clear that the fundamental Law of Nature justifies the lim-
itation of the property and liberty of some for the preservation of 
others. The limitation of the property and liberty of landowners and 
handicraftmen in Locke's proposals for the relief of children in need 
is clearly justified by the fundamental Law of Nature. But the "good 
of the community", the "good, prosperity and safety of society", the 
"good and quiet of all subjects" cannot be justified on this ground. 
Moreover, it would appear that the good of all and the prosperity of 
the nation may impose more extensive regulation of property by govern~ 
ment than that required for preservation alone, and limit self-ownership 
even further. For example the "right employment of lands If may require 
that property owners are required to use all or part of their lands 
in accordance with the choices of government. Similarly, government 
intervention in economic affairs and trade for the national prosperity 
may result in certain persons making smaller profits than they would 
otherwise make in a free-market, laissez-faire system. How does 
Locke justify this further regulation of property and liberty? 
Locke explains: 
For being now in a new state (i.e. civil society), wherein 
he is to enjoy many conveniences from the labour, assis-
tance, and society of others in the same community, as well 
as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also 
with as much of his natural liberty in providing for him-
self, as the good, prosperity and safety of society shall 
require; which is not only necessary, but just; since the 
other members of society do the like. 84 
In this passage, Locke makes it clear that the individual reaps personal 
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benefits from living in civil society that he would not have were he 
on his own, for example, on a desert island. He "enjoys many con-
veniences from the labour, assistance and society of others in the 
same community, as well as protection from its whole strength". It is 
these goods provided by all in concert that raise him to a new level. 
What a person achieves, especially the wealth he has, is not what he 
would have if everything depended on his own labour and skills. The 
individual for whom all is going well is especially prone to the belief 
that what he enjoys stems entirely from his own labour, effort or 
judgment. But this is a mistake, Locke argues. The individual who 
applauds his own strength and legs that have carried him 
so far in such a scantling of time, and ascribes all to 
his own vigour, little considers how much he owes to their 
pains, who cleared the woods, drained the bogs, built the 
bridges, and made the ways passable without which he might 
have toiled much with little progress. 85 
If this same individual were to be put back in the early stages of the 
state of nature, his achievements would be negligible. It is clearly 
this "societal aspect" of people's achievements and prosperity that 
Nozick's analysis neglects. Nozick never points to the gains a person 
gets from society for which he should make a "return. Thelibertarian 
focus is on the individual, as though he were on a desert island, and 
is, in this respect, very different from the Lockean focus. In 
accordance with the above passage, Locke could argue that Nozick's 
medical researcher might have made a significant breakthrough (for 
which he deserves credit and material reward) but that his achievements 
were not entirely of his own making, but were furthered and made pos-
sible by the accumulated knowledge and expertise of society together 
with many other. physical and material advantagea PFovided by society. 
Regarding knowledge and inventions in particular, Locke adds that "we 
are favourable enough to our own faculties to conclude that of their 
own strength they would have attained those discoveries without foreign 
assistance". But we "profit by others' discoveries". A person's 
discovery is "not properly of his own single industry, nor of his own 
acquisition". These quotations show very clearly that Locke's focus 
is very different from Nozick's. On account of this different pers-
pective, it is very likely that they would use different baselines in 
judging property rights. For Nozick, the baseline is "Where would 
the others be if the medical researcher had not made his invention ?~ 
I think for Locke it would probably be: "Where would the inventor be 
without the benefits of society?" 
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If an individual gains benefits from society, then it does seem 
reasonable that he should be called upon to make some sacrifice to 
maintain it and ensure its prosperity. And this is, of course, 
Locke' s point. It would not be just if all benefit, but only some 
have to make a sacrifice, but it is just if all have to make the same 
sacrifice. Locke states that it is just that one gives up some of 
one's "natural liberty in providing for oneself" for the good, pros-
perity and safety of society because all other persons do the same. 
If the burdens placed on all persons who benefit be "universal and 
equal" this is just and there can be no grounds of complaint. But 
surely, it could be argued, the propertyowner makes a larger sacri-
riCe for the benefits he receives from society than does the very 
poor man, for while both may have to "part with" some liberty, only 
the propertyowner can "part with" some property or have his property 
86 
regulated. Locke makes it clear that it is not only property that 
one holds on entering civil society that is subject to the regulation 
and dominion of society. Any property one "shall acquire" at a later 
date is limited in exactly the same way. Thus, if a poor man becomes 
wealthy, his wealth will also be regulated according to the "publick 
good" . 
Locke opts for a much weaker concept·of self-ownership than Nozick. 
The stronger concept· is, . of course, incompatibl'e with the fundamental 
Law of Nature to p-reservemankind •. , 'In addition, the stronger concept 
seems to lose some of its impact or moral significance in a context of 
reciprocity.- a.context in whicm-itis concedeEl that an individual's 
material prosperity, achievements and discoveries are facilitated and 
even partly constituted by the labour of others~ 
4.2 "Kantian" Inviolability and Self-Ownership: 
Kant and Nozick Compared 
Nozick also invokes the name and prestige of Kant in support of his 
anti-redistributive views. The side constraints or absolute view of 
rights is traced by Nozick to "the underlying Kantian principle that 
individuals are ends, and not merely means; they may not be sacri-
f iced or used for the achievement of other ends without their consent ". 
Individuals are "inviolable,,87 From this fundamental moral principle, 
Nozick suggests, not only the positive functions of the state (pro-
tection against physical force, theft, fraud, breach of contract) but 
also its limitations can be derived. It prohibits "sacrificing one 
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person to benefit another". 
This Kantian principle to which Nozick appeals in support of his 
position against "enforced benevolence" is, of course, the second 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative: "Act in such a way that 
you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any o~her, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
Co 
time as an end,,88. For Kant, the Categorical Imperative is the 
moral foundation for both perfect and imperfect duties. Perfect 
duties are duties of justice, duties which correlate with rights, and .-
which must be enforced by the state, while imperfect duties are duties 
pf virtue which are morally good to perform but whose performance may 
I 89 
not be enforced by the state or anyone else . Because the 
Categorical Imperative or "Kant ian Principle" is the moral foundation 
of duties of justice - duties enforceable by the state - Nozick is 
correct to make the connection between the powers and limitations of 
state activities and this Kantian Principle, that is, to argue that 
the powers of the state must be derived from the Kantian Principle in 
order to be morally legitimate. The key question is whether, for 
Kant, as for Nozick, all forms of "aid" or "benevolence" are imperfect 
duties not enforceable by the state or whether there are some kinds of 
"aid" or "benevolence" that are perfect duties (duties which correlate 
with rights) which the state may enforce. In other wordS, does Kant 
believe that it is morally good to help the poor and needy in society, 
or is it obligatory in the strong sense required to justify governmental 
• 
coercion? 
In the remainder of this sectio:p., I shall conSider""Kant's own appli-
cation of the Kantian Principle to his social philosophy as it appears 
in the Metaphysical Elements of Justice and Theory and Practice. I 
shall show that Kant's own understanding of KP does not justify the 
prohibition of all "benevolent" activities by the state, that Kant, 
unlike Nozick, does not argue "that the state may not use its coercive 
apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid others". 
In MEJ, Kant argues that the government has the "right to levy taxes" 
for welfare. "The government is authorised to require the wealthy to 
provide the means of sustenance to those who are unable to provide the 
most necessary needs of nature for themselves", to require the wealthy 
"to support those members of the society who are not able to support 
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themselves" The wealthy (whom Kant defines as those who "have 
91 
sufficient for their needs and other purposes and then to spare") are 
"bound" to "contribute to the support of their fellow citizens in need,,92 
"The money", he says, "should not be raised through voluntary contri- ;; 
butions, b-ut by compulsory exactions as political burdens", that is, by 
"taxation" or "lawful assessment" made upon weal thy citizens' "property 
d ,,93 Th t t" t b d who has to 11've,,94 an commerce. e s a e canno a an on anyone 
and, to this end, it may use its coercive apparatus to require some 
(wealthy) citizens to aid others (needy citizens) . The duty to aid 
others, to provide those in need with the material means of life, is a 
perfect duty i.e. a duty of justice that is juridically enforceable, It 
-is matched by a correlative right on the part of the needy to be supplied 
lith the material means of life. 
Now, it might be thought that when Kant says that the government is 
authorised to require the wealthy to provide the "means of sustenance" 
to the needy, he has in mind something very minimal like bare food 
rations to prevent starvation or malnutrition. This appears to be 
Murphy's view95 , and is certainly the view taken by Susan Meld Shell 
who says in a footnote: "For Kant, our right to protection by the state 
is a right to bare subsistence but no more than that ,,96. Kant's words, 
"the means of sustenance" seem to suggest this, but his examples in 
Sections 326, 327 and 367 show that he intends much more than this, 
although not a fully-developed modern Welfare State. In particular, 
. 97 
he mentions state provision for "the poor, the invalid and the sick" 
and "abandoned children,,98 such as "homes for the poor and hospitals,,99, 
, ,,100 '" 101 
"foundling hospltals and wldows' homes, hospitals and so on" . 
-The "and so on" does not include state-financed schools for Kant has no 
confidence in state education. If the state authorities "provide 
funds" for education, "the drawing up of the (educational) scheme must 
be deferred to them". But "experience" shows that the financial 
authorities of the state "have not the universal good so much in view, 
as the well-being of the state, whereby they may attain their own 
102 
ends" , Thus, "the support" given "to those members of the society 
unable to support themselves" covers health, welfare and housing, but 
not education. State-financed institutions set up for these purposes 
"are certainly not subject to abolition,,103. 
State-financed "benificent institutions" set up for the needy may co-
exist with private (endowed) institutions set up for the same purpose, 
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but the state must make its own provision for all those whose needs are 
not covered by such private institutions. Kant permits the state 
extensive jurisdiction over these private institutions, including the 
right to adapt them to the needs of the time, to "choose a wiser means 
of support" for their beneficiaries. He suggests that, in most cases, 
it would be bet.ter if the poor and sick were taken out of institutions 
where their "freedom is extremely limited" and instead given "a grant-
in-aid of a certain sum of money (proportionate to the need of the 
times)" so that they could "board wherever they please, with relatives 
. t ,,104 
or acqualn ances 
iIn sum, Kant does not argue, like Nozick, that the state may not use 
I 
its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting some citizens to aid 
others. He does not come out in strong condemnation of social welfare, 
arguing that it is unjust to tax Jones in order to be benevolent to 
Smith, that to tax Jones in this way is to treat him as a means to the 
ends of Smith. On the contrary, provision of the means of health and 
welfare is one of the state's fundamental obligations. "The state 
cannot abandon anyone who has to live,,105; .it cannot "knowingly let 
anyone perish,,106 It cannot neglect people so that they are left to 
b t . 1 . f "d d ,,107 eg, 0 recelve a ms; the recelpt 0 alms, he says, egra es men . 
The needy have perfect rights to the means of health and welfare; the 
wealthy a duty of justice to provide these means. It is interesting 
to note that Kant believes that all forms of property (including com-
108. 
merce and business) should be subject to taxation by lawful assessment 
A libertarian, like Nozick, would argue that to tax wealth arising from 
commerce and industry (as opposed to wealth arising from land, gifts 
and inheritance) is especially wrong; 
labour and energy from the taxpayers; 
their beneficiaries. 
..... 
it amounts to seizing hours of 
it makes taxpayers slaves to 
For Kant, the legitimate sphere of state action follows from the 
essential function of the state itself which is to. preserve freedom in 
the external relations of men. The state must aim to secure, by 
legislation, a stable, enduring, social order that guarantees the right 
of each person to "pursue his happiness in the manner that seems best 
to him" provided, of course, that he does not thereby infringe on any-
one'else's freedom according to universal law. Justice is defined by 
Kant as "the aggregate of those conditions under which the will of one 
person can be conjoined with the will of another in accordance with the 
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universal law of freedom,,109. The coercive power of the state derives 
its legitimacy from the necessity of using force to keep one person from 
110 
using his freedom to limit the freedom of another, . Freedom is "the 
.. f . "Ill cond1t10n 0 every use of coerC10n . 
It is clear that Kant's welfare proposals would enable those with little 
or no property to exercise their right of freedom, that is, to pursue 
their happiness in their own way. Certain kinds of economic disadvan-
tage inhibit the exercise of freedom of those who are disadvantaged. 
Those who have to concentrate (because of lack of such goods as food, 
clothing, shelter and medical care) on mere animal survival are not in 
-a position to pursue their happiness in the manner that seems best to 
ithem (nor are they able to realise any of their uniquely human potentials). 
Thus, such welfare proposals would clearly enhance their freedom. But 
what about the freedom of those from whom the property or wealth was 
taken in order to finance these welfare benefits? A libertarian, like 
Nozick, would argue that such welfare proposals also contract freedom 
i.e. they contract the freedom of propertyholders to do as they wish 
with what they legitimately own. 
For Kant, all morally legitimate laws of property must express the 
collective will of the community. This includes laws regarding 
disposal of property. Thus, for Kant, disposal of one's property is a 
public affair, expressing the collective will of the community, while, 
for Nozick, in contrast, it is a private affair, expressing the private 
(individual) will of the propertyholder. I shall first spell out the 
implications of this difference, and then explain the reason for it. 
Public laws such as those of property and welfare which secure the 
rights of each person, Kant argues, s,hould be based on the "united and 
. 1,,112 
consenting w1ll of al Each person "has the lawful freedom to 
113 
obey no law other than one to which he has given his consent" . In 
TP, he explains "the touchstone of the legitimacy of all public law" as 
follows: 
If the law is so framed that all the people could not possibly 
give it their consent ... the law is unjust; but if it is at 
all possible that a people might agree on it, then the people's 
duty is to look upon the law as just. 114 
Welfare legislation, to be fully justified, must always accord with the 
general will. If such legislation (which inevitably places restric-
tions and "political burdens" on wealthy citizens) did not accord with 
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everyone's will, its enactment would limit some persons' freedom to 
pursue their happiness in a way that is compatible with everyone's 
freedom according to universal law, and would, therefore, be unjust. 
If, on the other hand, such legislation does accord with everyone's 
will - if every citizen could consent to it, its enactment (and 
enforcement by the state) would be just. 
To understand Kant's view of justifiable public legislation, it is 
important to understand what he means when he says that a public law 
is unjust if and only if "all the people could not possibly give it 
their consent". What sense of "possibility" does Kant have in mind? 
-In one passage, Kant implies that the answer is logical possib,ility. 
!"Just as long as it is not self-contradictory to assume that all the 
115 
people consent to a law ... the law is in accord with justice" Yet 
this is clearly not his final judgment on the kind of possibility in-
volved. He gives as an example of a law to which the people could not 
possibly give their consent one "granting the hereditary privilege of 
116 
master-status to a certain class of subjects" Clearly, there is 
nothing self-contradictory about this law. .Moreover, it would not be 
surprising if all the members of a feudal society (brought up to believe 
in the correctness of hereditary privilege) actually assented to such 
a law. Kant makes his meaning clearer in a later passage when he 
writes of the legislator's "true will". He asks whether a community 
"may enact a law to the effect that certain tenets of faith and outward 
religious forms, once adopted, should remain forever,,117. A law 
setting up such an official state religion with a fixed canon of ortho-
doxy must be rejected, he argues - even if it accords with one's own 
-particular religious views - because it prevents one "from making 
further progress in religious understanding and from correcting past 
mistakes". He adds that such a law "would be null and void in itself, 
because it runs counter to the destiny and ends of mankind,,118 These 
"universal ends of mankind" or "essential ends of humanity" are des-
cribed in the Metaphysics of Morals as happiness and perfectionll9 
Viewed from the inter-personal level, a law enacting such a state 
religion must be rejected, because it may run counter to the happiness 
of some persons by trying to force on them values and beliefs in which 
they do not share. On the level of the single individual, viewed 
diachronically, as a critical pursuer of his perfection and happiness 
over time, such a law must also be rejected. To attempt to tailor 
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public laws to one's particular value-conception at a certain time is 
to limit one's potential for developing and implementing future value-
conceptions, and would be irrational. Revision of values and beliefs 
becomes impossible. A very similar justification can be provided for 
welfare provision, and against absolute property rights. On the 
inter-personal level, a law enforcing the absolute right to property 
must be rejected because it would run counter to the well-being or 
happiness of some persons by leaving them without the material means 
of life. On the level of the single individual, such absolute 
property rights must also be rejected. The wealthy individual who 
argues for absolute property rights because he has sufficient, who 
,attempts, in other words, to tailor property laws to suit his present 
,circumstances, is ignoring the fact that these circumstances may change 
over time, and that, without welfare provision, he may be left without 
the material. means of life. 
For Kant, public law is a species of universal law which is freely 
adopted by rational (human) beings in the light of certain essential 
(human) ends - notably happiness and perfection. To know whether a 
particular law is consistent with the general will, we must ask whether 
all the members of the community considered as rational beings with 
these essential ends could consistently assent to that law. The 
sense of "could" is not restricted to logical possibility. Public law 
ensures persons' (external) freedom, but (externally) "free behaviour" 
and the "use of freedom" must "conform" with "the essential ends of 
humanity,,120 For Kant, a person's (external) freedom is not invio-
lable and unlimited; it may be "restrained" and limited sothat the ends 
of humanity are maintained and furthered12l For" Locke, the Law of 
Nature justly limits freedom (or "licence"); for Kant, the Ends of 
Humanity justly do so. 
We have seen that, for Kant, disposal of one's property is not a purely 
private affair as it is for Nozick, but is. subject to the collective 
will of the community. This difference is clearly very significant, 
122 but what is it.s source? 
It is clear that people may legislate collectively about something only 
if they "possess" it collectively, if they all have claims or titles to 
the good in question123 And Kant does, indeed, assume that the natural 
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resources of the world are possessed in common. "We all have an equal 
. h ·d d 124 right" he says, "to the good things whl.ch nature as provl. e " In 
other words, Kant (like Locke, Reid and Mill) assumes "positive 
community" . He hOlds that a person can have "peremptory possession" 
(property rights) in natural resources like land only in the sense that 
he is entitled. to use such resources in certain ways and to be pro-
tected in his use of them by the civil law. Strictly, or in a deeper 
sense, natural resources are "possessed in common" with all the members 
of society. Thus Kant says: 
Right in a thing is a right to the private use of a thing, 
of which I am in possession - originally or derivatively -
in common with all others. 125a 
. 
IKant, therefore, claims that the private possession of property amounts 
'to a private or special right to use a common possession. 
If one person has "peremptory possession" of a particular good, then 
others are under an obligation to abstain from using that good, but 
this obligation to abstain can arise only "from the collective will of 
. l25b 
all united in a relation of common posseSSl.on" But, we have 
already seen that this collective or general will could not assent to 
absolute property rights that leave some persons without ,the means of 
life or the means to pursue their happiness in their own way~ In 
other words, and viewed from the level of the single individual 
(diachronically), it would not be rational to give up one's (state of 
nature) claims to the natural resources of the world, to abstain from 
using goods that one could formerly use, without an assurance that the 
means of life and freedom would still be guaranteed one in civil 
society. If property rights are to command th~ assent of all, then 
all persons must be guaranteed the means of life and freedom by the 
state. It is probably this idea that Kant has in mind when he says: 
The general Will of the people has united itself into a 
society in order to maintain itself continually (i.e. 
according to the laws of . justice) and for this pur-
pose it has subjected itself to the internal authority of 
the state to support those members of the society who are 
not able to support themselves. Therefore, it follows 
from the nature of the state that the government is author-
ised to require the wealthy to provide the means of sus-
tenance to those who are unable to provide the most necessary 
needs of nature for themselves. 126 
For Kant, there is an important element of reciprocity in property rights. 
The state makes some persons secure in their property, but only on con-
dition that they will allow that property to be taxed to ensure the 
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me'ans of life and freedom to others. Wealthy persons, he says, 
receive "protection and care" of their lives and property but in 
return for this, "they have bound themselves to contribute to .the 
support of their fellow-citizens in need and this is the ground for 
. d ,,127 the state's rlght to require them to 0 so 
In Kant's theory, perfect duties (duties of justice) correlate with 
rights. These duties of justice and rights are (morally) enforceable 
by the state. Persons have rights to the means of health and welfare. 
These rights (like all rights) are "inviolable,,128 and must not be 
transgressed. Kant notes: 
He who transgresses the rights of others intends to make 
use of the persons of these others merely as a means, 
without considering that, as rational beings, they must 
always be esteemed at the same time as ends. 129 
In Kant's view, if a needy person has a positive in rem right to the 
means of health and welfare, and if to violate a person's right is to 
treat that person as a means and not to esteem him at the same time as 
an end, then it is the case that to fail to provide a needy person with 
the means of health and welfare to which he is entitled is to treat 
that needy person as a means and not to esteem him at the same time as 
as an end. 
Kant's position is, therefore, fundamentally different from Nozick's. 
For Nozick, of course, we treat the wealthy individual as a means when 
we tax away any of his wealth for the benefit of the poor and needy. 
It is clearly not the case that all redistributive schemes are morally 
impermissible according to the "classical libera-l "" principles 0\ invio-
lability and self-ownership, (if by classical liberal principles, 
Nozick means the principles of Locke and Kant.) Many modern redis-
tributive schemes (notably those designed to enhance welfare or make 
possible the exercise of freedom and autonomy) do not involve a "shift" 
from the "classical" principle. Rather, the shift has been made by 
Nozick himself. 
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4.3 Self-ownership and Paternalism: 
Richard Price and Nozick Compared 
Welfare in modern welfare states is effected through (1) transfer pay-
ments (transferring property from A to B) and also by (2) insurance 
schemes for old age and sickness. We have seen that Nozick, unlike 
Locke, Pufendorf, Reid, Kant and Mill, argues that transfer payments 
are morally unjustifiable because those to whom property is trans-
ferred become "part-owners" of those from whom property is taken. But 
it might be thought that although he rejects (compulsory) transfer 
payments, he could admit the moral legitimacy of the (compulsory) 
insurance principle because this does not give anyone "property rights· 
-in other people"; the insurance principle requires that A spends some 
IOf his money on A's welfare, not that A spends some of his money on 
B's welfare. Nozick, however, makes clear his rejection of the com-
pulsory insurance principle. Only the 
Minimal state, limited to the narrow functions of protection 
against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts is 
justified; any more extensive state will violate persons' 
rights not to be forced to do certain things, and is unjusti-
fied ... Two noteworthy implications are that the state may 
not use its coercive apparatus for the purpose of getting 
some persons to aid others, or in order to irohibit activities 
to people for their ~ good or protection. 30 
Nozick distinguishes between what Feinberg calls the "welfare principle'~ 
and the "paternal princiPle,,131 In many theories, it is held that 
restriction of a person's liberty can be justified to benefit others 
(the welfare principle) and to benefit or prevent harm to the self (the 
paternal principle). Nozick argues against restriction of l.iberty on 
both of these grounds. The minimal state may not use coercion to get 
persons to help others or to get persons to hel~ themselves. The min-
imal state does not "use or threaten force for the benefit of persons 
-in the state,,132. N 't' 1 th t l' . t • ow ~ ~s c ear a compu sory ~nsurance ~s pa -
ernalistic in this sense. It forces a person to do something for his 
own good or protection, for he must put aside part of his income or 
wealth for his old age or ill-health. It violates Nozickain property 
rights and destroys self-ownership. If a person is forced to put 
aside a part of his income or pr.operty even though it be for his own 
later use, he loses the r~ght to dispose of all his own property as he 
chooses. The state instead is controlling his spending of some of his 
own wealth. His liberty and property rights are, thereby, compromised 
by the state, and his self-ownership destroyed or damaged. Such 
1 . . . ,,133 b th . t· . "paterna ~st~c aggress~on y e state is morally unJus ~f~ed. 
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It appears that once again Nozick is out of line with traditional 
liberal thought. In the eighteenth century, the liberal (and natural 
rights) philosopher, Richard Price, argued for compulsory insurance 
for sickness and senescence. He argued that it was the job of the 
state to make provision for payment of benefit in times of sickness 
as well as old age, and that this provision was to be financed by 
compulsory subscription from those who worked. In the scheme he 
proposed, two classes of people were exempt from compulsory sub-
scription: those in possession of landed estate to the value of £10 
p.a., but not worth more than £1,000 exclusive of such property, and 
certain people on low pay such as soldiers. The former were to be 
iexcluded on account of the contributions which they otherwise made to 
'the relief of the poor (by direct aid, that is, transfer payments) and 
the latter on account of the meagreness of their pay which could not 
support an insurance contribution134 . Thus, Price's idea was that 
two kinds of welfare provision should co-exist; direct aid (transfer 
payments) for those who could not work or whose pay was too low to 
enable them to insure for their own welfare, and a compulsory insur-
ance system for old age and sickness for the others. 
Price held the view that the right to property is "inviolable and 
135 
sacred" and that to say that someone has a'property right in some-
thing is to say "that it is fit that he should have the disposal of 
it rather than others, and wrong to deprive him of it,,136, but"despite 
this, the right to property that he acknowledges is much weaker than 
that acknowledged by Nozick. It is akin to that acknowledged by other 
pro-welfare liberal philosophers, and like these others, he is prepared 
-to modify the principle of self-ownership. "We all of us have com-
missions from God ... to reli.eve distress and save that which is lost; 
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and we should consider ourselves as sent from God for this purpose" 
The state or civil society is the instrument we can use to discharge 
this responsibility. Unlike Nozick, Price believed that it is 
morally legitimate for the state to use its coercive apparatus to get 
some persons to aid others and to get persons to help themselves. It 
would therefore seem to be the case that Nozick in his rejection of 
(paternalistic) compulsory insurance is again out of line with 
traditional liberal theory. Modern liberal welfare philosophers who 
argue that it is morally legitimate for the state to make insurance, 
for old age and. sickness compulsory can point to Richard Price as their 
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predecessor and claim that it is Nozick, and not they, who has 
"shifted" from traditional liberal values and principles. 
5. The Liberal Case for Redistribution 
and Positive in rem Rights to Aid 
We have seen that Nozick mistakenly believes that he is following the 
"respectable" liberal tradition of Locke and Kant. But it is, never-
theless, possible that it is his conception of distributive justice 
that is right and that theirs is wrong. That is, while he may be 
~mistaken in his belief that he is following Locke and Kant, he may be , 
quite correct in his belief that justice requires absolute private 
property rights and historical entitlement principles. In this 
final section, I shall try to show that this is not the case, and that 
Nozick is wrong in his belief that justice requires no patterned prin-
ciples and no limitations on private property rights. 
Nozick concedes that ASU "does not present a precise theory of the moral 
. 138 basis of individual r1ghts" ,but he does offer some comments on the 
subject in a section entitled "What are Constraints Based Upon?" In 
that section, he attempts to identify the moral foundations of rights 
by considering the question of which natural human characteristics are 
necessary and/or sufficient for possessing rights. He argues that 
there must be a connection between these characteristics and the moral 
basis of rights. 
In virtue of precisely what characteristics of persons 
are there moral constraints on how they maT treat each 
other or be treated? We also want to understand why these 
characteristics connect with these constraints ... It would 
appear that a person's characteristics, by virtue of which 
others are constrained in their treatment of him, must them-
selves be valuable characteristics. How else are we to 
understand. why something so valuable emerges from them?139 
He considers the traditional proposals for predicates upon which rights 
or side constraints are based such as being sentient, self-conscious, 
rational, possessing free will, having a soul, but he rejects each as 
insufficient. Speculating that it might be unfair to treat each pur-
ported characteristic separately, Nozick asks whether, in conjunction, 
rational.i ty, free will, and moral agency might not "add up to something 
whose significance is clear: a being able to formulate long term plans 
for its life, able to consider and decide upon the basis of abstract 
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principles or considerations it formulates to itself" The focus 
is especially upon the ability to shape one's own life, to suffuse 
one's life with meaning and to do those things on the basis of 
abstract principles. In essence, Nozick believes that this makes 
sense of most, if not all, the traditional proposals. 
A person's shaping his life in accordance with some over-
all plan is his way of giving meaning to his life: only 
a being with a capacity to so shape hrs life can have or 
strive for a meaningful life ... This notion, we should 
note, has the right 'feel' as something that might help 
to bridge an 'is-ought' gap; it appropriately seems to 
straddle the two. 14l 
. 
~ore is said by Nozick on the subject of the moral foundation of 
rights in Philosophical Explanations. In this work, he identifies 
man as a being. who "searches after value" and "guides his behaviour 
" 142 by value consl.derations" . This "value seeking" capacity is the 
"basic moral characteristic,,143, and it is, of course, intimately 
related to the other "members of the traditional list of candidates 
h th b "I" t 1 "t f 11 "" 1 ,,144 d suc as e a l. l. Y to P an over tl.me, 0 0 ow prl.ncl.p es an 
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to "choose freely" Man is, in short, "a: value-seeking, choice-
making and meaning-seeking" being146 "All people share the (capacity 
for) being value-seeking selves,,147 "They aim differently, and give 
different shape and texture to,,;their lives as they express themselves 
as value-seeking and value-weighing selves,,148 The connection 
between the attribute of "life-shaping" mentioned in ASU and the 
attribute of "value-seeking" that features so prominently in PE seems 
to be as follows: people's value-seeking capacities find expression 
in their major goals and purposes, in their "ov~rall plans". People 
shape their lives, make their choices, and guide their behaviour in 
the light of values to which they assent. In ASU, he writes of those 
"abstract principles or considerations" which a person "formulates to 
himself" and, in the light of which, he "formulates long term plans 
for his life" or "overall plans". These "abstract principles and 
considerations" (of ASU) are the "principles of value" or "value con-
siderations" by which a "value seeking" individual "guides his 
behaviour" and lives his life (according to PE). 
In the section entitled "Rights" in PE, Nozick suggests that the "apt 
149 
response" to a value seeking being is to permit him "a domain of 
150 
autonomy" , and this "domain must include a range of important and 
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significant choices (such as religious practice, place of residence, 
choice of mate and life-style, choice of occupation) as well as a.vast 
range of trivial choices which go to make up the daily textur~ of our 
. 151 l1ves" . "Respecting" such a "domain of autonomy" is the "appro-
priate response" to a value seeking being because it enables him to 
exercise that capacity which most defines him. 
-, 
Nozick claims that the capacity for value seeking is valuable. He 
further claims that beings with this characteristic have rights in 
virtue of which there are constraints upon the way other similar 
beings may treat them. What then is the function of these rights? 
~Or, in other words, what is the rationale or reason for these rights? 
I: 
:What is the point in ascribing them? It would seem that their 
rationale or function is to give individuals the moral protections 
and guarantees that make it possible for them to exercise their value 
seeking capacities in the choice of life~plans, goals, life-styles 
and occupations. In short, rights allow their possessors to live the 
lives of value seeking beings, to make the. kind of choices approp-
priate to the natures of such beings. 
The question now arises as to whether the rights that Nozick discusses 
in ASU really give all individuals the moral protections and guarantees 
requisite for such a life. Do his rights, for example, make it 
possible for every individual to choose, among other things, his life-
style and occupation? In particular, we need to know whether his 
absolute private property rights are compatible with such choices for 
all persons. 
It is clear that negative rights such as freedom of speech and infor-
mation, freedom of assembly (for religious, political and other 
pu~oses), and careers open to all are necessary for the kind of value 
seeking life that Nozick has in mind. Moreover, it is clear that his 
theory ensures everyone his share of such distributable goods. But 
such rights do not seem to. provide sufficient guarantees and moral 
protections for such a life. Nozick's theory, we know, does not 
allow transfers of property or wealth without the owner's consent. 
Thus, he has to hold that the individual may (has the right to) choose 
his life-style, occupation, place of residence etc, and, thereby, give 
shape, meaning and texture to his life, and utilise his value seeking 
capacity, even if (a) many jobs and careers are denied him because he, 
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or his parents, could not pay for his education and training, (b) he 
takes the only (low-paid) job he can get, and (c) the pay he 
receives from that job is insufficient to keep him and his family 
sufficiently fed, clad, housed, and in good health. If all persons 
are to be able to make significant choices and shape their lives in 
their own way, it is surely reasonable to argue that they must be 
guaranteed all the necessary material and educational conditions 
that make this possible. 
At the beginning of this chapter, we noted that prohibitions (or 
constraints) while negative in character, in that they are concerned 
.with the impermissble, can range over a positive or negative. Thus, I -
;"may not do" and "may not not-do" are equally prohibitions or con-
straints. In Nozick's theory of rights, as we have seen, it is the 
prohibition of a positive (may not-do) that has the key role - the 
prohibition of a negative (may not not-do) having application in 
respect of in personam contracts. In other words, for Nozick, 
"the domain of autonomy" is filled up largely with prohibitions or 
constraints of a positive character. But, if certain material and 
educational goods are to be guaranteed to people, the "domain of 
autonomy" should also be filled with some constraints or prohibitions 
of a negative kind. There would, in other words, be certain things 
that one could not not-do for other persons. There would still be 
side constraints on action, but these would be of a very different 
character. 
The problem is that one of Nozick's side constraints or absolute rights 
- the absolute right to property - undermines tue ?pportunity of those 
people with little or no property to shape their lives in their own 
way, to live a value seeking life, by giving other people (those with 
very large amounts of property) too great a control over their lives. 
The function of property rights, according to Nozick's theory, is to 
give people those guarantees and moral protections necessary for living 
the life of a value seeking being. But absolute property rights can 
act to undermine their own moral foundation or justification. The 
"natural reason" or function of the right is defeated. It seems that 
if a (supposed) absolute property right acts so as to give some persons 
so great a control over the lives of others that these others are no 
longer in a position to make the significant life-shaping choices that 
are a part of a value seeking life, then there is no such right. 
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Locke, of course, makes a very similar point (in respect of the means 
of welfare) in the Two Treatises. The key justification or moral 
foundation of property, for Locke, is that it enables people to be 
secure in the means of life. If a supposed property right acts so 
as to give some persons so great a control over the lives of others 
that these others are no longer in a position to obtain the means of 
life, 
It would be a good argument to prove that there never 
; 
was such property. (My italics) ... (For) it is more 
, 
reasonable to think that God should rather himself give 
them all a right to make use of the food, raiment and 
other conveniences of life ... than to make them depend 
upon the will of a man for their subsistence who should 
have the power to destroy them when he pleased. 152 
1 
!Rights to property that give some persons so much control over others 
that the "natural reason" for the right is defeated are simply 
"specious,,153 It does not, of course, follow that there are no 
property rights, but only that they must be limited and not absolute. 
If it is true that some amount of property is necessary in order to 
guarantee to individuals those choices that form part of a value 
seeking life, and this value seeking life is considered morally sig-
nificant, then everyone should (morally) have at least that minimum 
amount - even if it must come from someone who presently owns that 
property. Thus, in some circumstances, side constraints would not be 
absolute and one person's (say, a very wealthy individual's) property 
rights might be overridden by another's right to be in a position to 
make those significant life-shaping choices. So the claim, if true, 
undermines a Nozickian laissez-faire account. Exactly the same 
argument holds if we argue that property is necessary to guarantee 
liberty as Nozick argues in ASU. 
The opposite argument serves Nozick's case no better. Suppose one 
holds that entitlements to property are not essential to liberty or 
a value seeking life - that the individual who has absolutely no 
external property, no money, has the right or is free to make signifi-
cant life-shaping choices. Property is, in other words, just one of 
the many goods which might be important but is not essential for libert¥ 
or a value-seeking life. . If property has its significance downgraded in 
this way, it is difficult to see why it should be protected as an un-
limited right. Other goods seem to be as, if not, more important. 
Without food, for example, one cannot live. Hence some right to an 
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adequate diet would seem more important than a right to hold unlimited 
property. The same could be said about a right to education and a 
right to medical care. In other words, if there are numerous com-
peting goods which might be important, if not crucial, for liberty or 
a value seeking life, then there is no reason to assume that property 
must be protected at the cost of these other goods. Surely food to 
stay alive is more important for a value seeking life or for liberty 
-" 
than enough money to buy a fifth Rolls Royce. 
Nozick might attempt to begin with the claim that people have their 
bodies and their freedom and then argue that the actual owning of 
~property (like one's body and one's freedom) is somehow essential to 
, 
:personhood (and autonomy). But such a suggestion also seems 
inadequate to generate Nozickian unlimited property rights. For, if 
holding property (in particular, extensive property) is essential to 
personhood, if it is as essential to it as life and liberty, then 
everyone should have property (as they should have life and liberty) 
to be a full person. Yet his theory does not imply that everyone 
should have property. Rather his theory is compatible with very few 
persons holding (very large amounts of) property. Entitlements to 
property (or money) are not guaranteed by his theory. If they were, 
there would be no absolute side constraints protecting already held 
property. 
Nozick is, in short, _. caught in a dilemma. He tries to show (1) that 
property is so essential to a value seeking life, or to liberty or to 
personhood, that none of it may be taxed away without the owner's 
being used as a resource, his liberty infringed-or-his value seeking 
capacity impaired. At the same time, he tries to show (2) that he who 
is totally without property is still a "complete" and free person, at 
liberty to lead the life of a value seeking being. In other words, it 
seems that property is both necessary and not necessary for liberty or 
a value seeking life. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
1. The Traditional Liberal Case for Negative Property Rights 
We noted in the Introduction that negative in rem rights of non-
interference in respect of property are important for traditional 
welfare liberal philosophers as they are for classical liberals and 
libertarians such as Nozick. Thus, for example, the owner of a 
"cottage and garden" has the right to the peaceful occupancy of his 
1 2 home and garden an individual has a "right to his goods" - goods 
3 for "current consumption" and for "later use" or "permanent property" , 
"a right to such innocent labour as he chooses, and to the fruit of 
that labour,,4, that is, to the "product of his honest industry,,5 He 
has a right to gifts given to him, or to an inheritance left to him6 , 
and a right to "exchange with his fellow men commodities or labour,,7, 
that is, "to enter iIito an intercourse of innocent offices or commerce 
with all who incline to deal with him". 
These negative rights in respect of property and labour correspond 
with duties of non-interference or forebearance on the part of others. 
Individuals must be permitted "to enjoy" the goods and the activities 
8 
that lead to the acquisition of these goods i no other person may 
"justle and molest his neighbour" and seek to deprive him of his own9 . 
The owner himself "not others" must have the power to "dispose of his 
property" and "transfer it ,,10 . Thus, property rights empower indivi-
duals with, and protect them in, the capacity to use, dispose and 
otherwise control objects of property according to their own private 
purposes. Property rights acknowledge the capacity of persons to 
make their own decisions about what is theirs. 
Negative rights, as we have seen, may be divided into active and 
passive rights. Active negative rights are referred to collectively 
as the "r.ight to liberty" and passive negative rights as the "right to 
security". The key active negative rights in respect of property are 
the rights to engage in innocent exertions to acquire goods, to make 
provision for oneself and one's family, to use one's property for the 
benefit of oneself and one's connections, and to dispose of one's 
property and transfer it as one chooses. Traditional welfare liberals 
argue that if such active negative rights in respect of property can be 
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flouted by a government on any pretext or whim, one could hardly claim 
that a right to liberty or property existed. 
The key passive negative right in respect of property is the right to 
11 be left to the peaceful "enjoyment of one's goods" - both goods that 
12 
supply one's "present wants" and those for "future wants" Man is 
a "sagacious animal,,13; he plans and makes provision for his future 
needs and, therefore, holds property for future use. This is nec-
14 
essary for his peace of mind, well-being and personal security If 
people are to enjoy the right to security (as they are to enjoy the 
right to liberty) it is clear that property rights cannot be abrogated 
or flouted on any insignificant pretexts. "Scarce any man can be 
happy", secure or retain his peace of mind, "who sees that all his 
enjoyments are precarious and depending on the will of others of 
whose kind intentions he can have no assurance". 
Welfare liberal philosophers, therefore, recognise a prima facie case 
for enforcing (such negative) property rights. Such rights give 
rise to expectations about what individuals (or groups of individuals) 
can do with, or expect to derive from, the property they own or enjoy. 
To have a right to property is implicitly to have a claim that the 
right be reasonably secure because such a right is necessary to plan 
at least some kind of future actions. And planning future actions 
15 
seems to be a part of one's liberty and a part of one's security 
If property rights are not reasonably secure, it makes little sense to 
talk about persons' having property rights at all. It would not be 
possible to establish a way of life, to make decisions or commitments 
on a long-term basis at all. There would, for example, be no point 
in attempting to provide oneself and one's family with the "comforts" 
and "advantages of 1 ife", in attempting to ensure that "one's own and 
one's family's wants are liberally suPPlied,,16 Property rights have 
close affinities with the rights to life, personal security and 
liberty and they, therefore, need adequate protection. 
Negative property rights acknowledge persons' capacities to make 
decisions about what they own, to plan and make decisions and commit-
ments in respect of their lives. It would, therefore, seem reasonable 
to argue that any curtailment or abrogation of the right to control, 
order, dispose of, and transfer property should not be undertaken 
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lightly or capriciously, or on insufficient grounds. For classical 
liberals or libertarians such as Nozick, it would seem that no grounds 
are sufficient for curtailment or limitation of these rights to control, 
dispose of and transfer one's property (apart from the negative rights 
of others). Classic or negative property rights are so sacred that 
he is forced to wonder whether they may ever be violated even to 
"avert catastrophic 'moral horror". Now philosophers such as Price 
use similar language in respect of property rights, claiming that they 
are "sacred and inviolable,,17, but, by this, they mean only that they 
must not be "perniciously violated", that is, violated on insufficient 
or arbitrary grounds. For welfare liberal philosophers, property 
rights empower individuals with, and protect them in, the capacity to 
use, dispose and otherwise control objects of property according to 
their private purposes but subject to certain limits upon infringing 
upon the positive in rem welfare rights of others, and subject also to 
legitimate public purposes. 
What these philosophers maintain is not that property rights are so 
sacred that no civil laws may ever limit them at all, but, rather, 
that where such laws exist, they must be (a) fair and objective, and 
(b) stable and enduring. The burden of paying for the needs of the 
less fortunate members of society and for other legitimate public 
purposes must be shared equally among those of similar (and sufficient) 
wealth, and laws curtailing property rights must be public and stable, 
and not subject to frequent changes. 
2. Welfare as a Legitimate Limitation on Negative 
Property Rights in Traditional Liberal Philosophy 
For classical liberals and libertarians such as Nozick there can be no 
taxation (or other controls or abridgments upon property rights) to 
secure the welfare of others. There can be no state-enforced welfare, 
no positive in rem rights to aid; aid to the needy must always be a 
matter for private charity alone. Nozick (together with his critics) 
believes that modern liberal philosophers who argue for the welfare 
state with its positive in rem rights to aid have arrived at this 
position by sacrificing or abandoning the values, moral principles 
and conception of distributive justice espoused by their liberal fore-
bears such as Locke and Kant. 
246 
In this thesis, I have tried to show that the commonly-held belief 
that philosophers such as Locke, Pufendorf, Reid, Kant and Mill are 
classical liberals who, like Nozick, reject positive in rem rights to 
aid is without foundation. For these philosophers, welfare is a 
matter of justice, not of charity; some of the property of the pros-
perous may be taken by the state for redistribution to the needy. 
All these philosophers make their positions very clear. 
When modern liberal philosophers claim that provision for the needy 
is a matter of justice and not of charity, they are not, therefore, 
making a new claim. Their claim is thoroughly consistent with the 
foremost liberal philosophical theories that date back to the seven-
teenth century, and continue throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. Rather, it is Nozick's claim that is different; he has 
narrowed the scope of distributive justice to exclude welfare. It 
is he and not his welfare liberal contemporaries who has "shifted" 
away from the moral principles, values and rights of philosophers like 
Locke, Pufendorf, Reid, Kant and Mill. 
3. The Consistency of the Welfare Liberal Philosophical Position 
All the philosophers we have examined offer a justificatory basis or 
foundation for individual rights (including property rights). Rights, 
in other words, exist for a reason; there is some point in ascribing 
them. The justificatory basis or reason the liberals put forward is 
that rights protect and preserve something fundamentally valuable 
about human beings, their lives or capacities. It is held either that 
human beings have value, or that certain directions of human develop-
ment or living are valuable and that rights protect and preserve human 
lives, capacities or modes of living. Rights (the whole panoply of 
liberal rights - freedom of speech, association, liberty and property 
- to name but some of the most important) protect and maintain what is 
of highest value. 
Now among the conditions necessary for the preservation of human life, 
or human life of a certain sort, are material conditions. Material 
goods (or property) are necessary if that which is valued is to retain 
those features by which it is valued. All the liberal philosophers 
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(welfare and classical) as we have just seen in part I of this con-
clusion acknowledge the need for (negative) property rights. Such 
property rights are closely linked to other rights su~h as the rights 
to life, personal security and liberty. 
Benn writes that: 
It would be irrational, other things being equal, to regard 
something as axiotimon (something it is appropriate to value 
or esteem) but not to care whether it exists or not, flour-
ishes or decays. To axiotima, therefore, can be ascribed 
needs - conditions necessary if the object is to remain that 
by virtue of which it is valued; for something valued as a 
racehorse would no longer be valued as a corpse ... Human 
beings no less than pictures, racehorses or trees, are 
axiotima ... The conditions without which they could not 
live or retain the features by virtue of which we rerceive 
them as axioiima, we may call their 'basic needs'. 8 
For welfare liberal philosophers, the satisfaction of.these basic material 
conditions requir~ positive in rem 'rights to welfare or aid in addition 
to negative in rem rightsto property. Positive in rem rights to 
material aid or welfare are seen as essential in order that that which 
is valued retains those features by which it is valued. The sat is-
faction of these basic material conditions does not call for end-state 
equality. None of the welfare liberal philosophers whom we have 
examined are committed to equality of property - not even Mill. But 
the distribution of property cannot be so unequal that that which is 
valued is lost or damaged. I believe that it is possible to show 
that the welfare position is superior in that it is consistent in 
maintaining that material goods (property, money) !!!:.~_~~~~~~_!!,~~~~sary 
for human life itself or for a particular kind of human life which is 
held to be most valuable. 
In Locke's theory, both reason and revelation inform us that human 
beings are of the highest value and must, therefore) be pres-
erved. The preservation of mankind is the fundamental law of nature. 
Property rights exist essentially for the preservation of human lives. 
Individuals have the right and freedom to acquire and hold property 
in order that they and their families have the material means of life. 
This does not, of course, mean that they may acquire only that which is 
required for bare preservation; they have the right and, indeed, the 
duty (where possible) to acquire and retain property for the comforts and 
advantages of life, but this does not change Locke's point that 
property is first and foremost for preservation. Now Locke is clear 
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that some material goods are always necessary for life or preservation. 
Thus property (in land or capital) can never be so extensive that some 
persons' lives are put in jeopardy. If this becomes so, some redis-
tribution is called for. Locke tells us that the needy man has a 
"right" or "title" to a part of the "surplusage" of the wealthy man. 
He has, moreover, a right to be "taken care of" by the civil law. He 
has this welfare right in order that he be preserved. If he is left 
in "extream want", he may either not survive at all, or survive in a 
way that is not recognisably human, and an object of the highest value 
will be lost. Locke's view is that all require some property (goods) 
to be preserved. And in his account, bO_!!! __ E-!,~p_~~.t~~~!_!Kh}s and wel~ar~ 
xJghl.LhI:lY~ _tlle __ S!lIll~ g:rollnd or justiftc_a1;():ryba~i~ - they preserve and 
protect human lives. The case Reid presents is very similar, and, 
for him too, welfare is a matter of justice. 
For Kant also (but for different reasons), human beings have "absolute 
value" or "intrinsic worth". Through their possession of rational 
nature, they are "objective" or "self-existent ends,,19. They are the 
20 
"ultimate end of creation here on Earth" ; the "ultimate end of 
21 
nature" . They are the '~ltimate end of creation here on Earth, 
because they are the only beings upon it that are able to form a con-
ception of ends, and form an aggregate of things purposefully fashioned 
22 
to constitute by the aid of their reason, a system of ends" . Now 
Kant makes it clear how important he considers the exercise of external 
freedom to be for beings endowed with these capacities. External 
freedom is of the "highest" value in that it "gives unlimited usefulness 
to all other faculties"; moreover, it "serves as the foundation of all 
23 
perfections and is their necessary condition" It "enables" a 
24 person "to live as a man" . 
In Kant's theory, it also seems to be the case that the same end - the 
exercise of external freedom - justifies both property and welfare 
rights. The legitimate sphere of state action follows from the 
essential function of the state itself which is to preserve and 
guarantee freedom in the external relations of men. Justice and law 
are limited to the question of whether the exercise of free choice on 
the part of one is consistent with the freedom of another. The 
aim of justice and law is to ensure that each citizen's pursuit of his 
ends, whatever they may be, leaves every other person free to pursue 
I 
his own ends. Now, in the pursuit of his ends, a citizen may acquire 
and hold property; he may acquire and hold property to satisfy his 
material needs and pursue his ends generally in accordance with his 
external freedom (the free use of his will). This property right 
which is an acquired right, Kant tells us, derives immediately from 
the innate right to (external) freedom. However, it is clear that 
the satisfaction of basic material needs is a pre-requisite for 
survival and for the pursuit of one's ends; that is, the satisfaction 
of basic needs is a pre-requisite for the exercise of one's external 
freedom. Now for reasons we have already seen, it cannot be willed 
as a universal law that only some have the material means of life, or 
that only some are able to pursue their ends, and hence that only 
some are able to exercise their innate right to freedom. Thus, '~the 
government is authorised to require the wealthy to provide the means 
of sustenance to those who are unable to provide the most necessary 
needs of nature for themselves". In this way, persons are not at 
risk from dying through want of the necessities of life, or prevented 
through want of such goods from exercising their freedom to pursue 
their ends. Moreover, by such provision, the state treats less for-
tunate persons as "ends in themselves", in accordance with their 
"absolute value" or "intrinsic worth". The exercise of external 
"~~ - ~- .-~ ..... 
Jr ~.~.(I()lll i s .~ hej~~~! ~~~~~.!l!.i.o~~._~ 0 r b~!J. .. ~!::.<?P~l:'~!L!1!1c!.'!.~!.!..!l£El . ..!:i,Kl!ts . 
The raison d'etre of a legitimate state is to guarantee each citizen's 
freedom to pursue his own ends. In order that this is so, it must 
allow citizens to acquire and hold property for the satisfaction of 
needs and other ends, but it must also guarantee citizens' basic 
goods without which neither life nor freedom to pursue any ends is 
possible. In this way, the provision of welfare "follows from the 
nature of the state". 
In the theories of Locke and Kant (but for different reasons), human 
beings are held to be of the highest value. In Mill's theory, it is 
held that certain directions of human development and living have 
special significance or value, and that certain qualities or capacities 
are human excellences. What is special about human beings, for Mill, 
is their ability to layout their own mode of existence, to be indivi-
dualsor choosers. Nearly all persons are capable of choosing or 
laying out their mode of existence, but it is not possible for the 
majority of people in a society where there are great concentrations 
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of wealth. In such cases, some are left without the material means 
of life and it is clear that a person cannot choose or layout his 
mode of existence if he has no property at all - not even sufficient 
to purchase the basic necessities of life. The government may, 
therefore, institute taxation, redistribute property (such as land) 
and provide public services such as hospitals. It may play an active 
role in the promotion of the "great benefit society" in which all are 
able to be individuals or choosers. In taxing the wealthy (redistri-
buting wealth to provide money and services for the less fortunate 
members of society), the government is not making it impossible for 
those from whom some property was taken to layout their mode of 
existence, to be choosers, for Mill makes it clear that great wealth 
is not required for such a life. If all persons are to be able to 
layout their mode of existence, their basic needs must be met and 
additionally they must have some property to control either individually 
(a small piece of land) or in cooperation with others (in partnerships 
and co-operatives). The kind of life and development which Mill 
values most highly clearly requires a control of property by indivi-
duals that exceeds what is needed for the preservation of life, or 
the exercise of external freedom. It is requisite that property be 
widely diffused or distributed. Mill makes it clear that in choosing, 
in being an individual, one may acquire, hold and dispose of property. 
But, as it is not possible to be a chooser or an individual without 
some property, redistribution and aid are justified. Thus, !J!~~xJw§ 
.i~L~:r~~~~~~.~~~~~.!.!~I~E:l .... ~1!!l:~.~ ... the same f oU!l~.~ t ~~n~ . .!>.r~)u~! i~.!.~a.!'~!'xJ? asis . 
Moreover, Mill, like Kant, Locke and Reid consistently argues that all 
persons must have some material goods 0:r I>:r()E.~.!.!;Y if they are to retain 
those features by which we value them. Material goods are always 
necessary for life or for certain modes of living. Principles of 
distributive justice and property rights must be such as to reflect 
this fact. 
For Nozick, too, human beings are axiotima. That which is of special 
or great significance about human beings is their capacity to live 
meaningful lives or to seek value. They can organise or plan their 
lives and make choices according to a set of values to which they 
assent. It is this special feature or characteristic of human beings 
which rights (including property rights) protect and preserve. Thu~, 
this is the ground or justificatory basis of Nozick's strong property 
rights. Why does this valuable human characteristic which justifies 
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words are the "conditions" or "basic needs" of this axiotimon a matter 
of voluntary charity and not of right? Does Nozick lose sight of 
his axiotimon so that property rights acquire a momentum of their own, 
or is he indifferent as to whether his "axiotimon exists or not, 
flourishes or decays"? I think it is clear that Nozick does not lose 
sight of his axiotimon, nor is he indifferent to its existence. 
Rather, he believes that welfare rights themselves serve to destroy 
what is of greatest value. "A value-seeking individual" must be 
permitted "to weight values in free choice" for the "basic moral 
characteristic of being a value seeking individual includes weighting 
values in free choice,,24. If the state 'compels aid', forces a 
wealthy individual to give up even the smallest part of his property 
to those in 'dire' need, it thereby prevents his making free choices 
in respect of all his property for he may no longer decide how he will 
use and dispose of all his property. He will no longer be in full 
control of all his property; the disposal and use of his property 
will not reflect his "weighting of values" but the state's weighting 
of values instead. But a problem remains for Nozick, as we have 
already seen. If this "weighting of values in free choice" must 
extend to property, then there is good reason to argue that all persons 
must have some property in order that all can make these 'free choices' 
which are so important to a value-seeking individual. All must have 
at least some property to control. Equally, if this "weighting of 
values" does not or need not extend to property, there is no reason 
to have such strong property rights as Nozick proposes. Nozick seems 
to be committed to a very odd position; a position that holds that 
property is necessary for a value-seeking life for those that have 
some, but not necessary for a value-seeking life for those that do not 
have some. In short, it seems that it is both necessary and not 
necessary for such a life. Nozick, therefore, gets into a position 
of inconsistency. In contrast, the welfare liberals' position is 
consistent; they maintain that property is always necessary for life, 
or for a life of a certain sort. And because property is necessary 
for life or for a certain sort of life, all persons must have some, 
and redistribution is justified to ensure this. 
Now, the welfare position that property is always needed for life or 
for a life of a certain sort is surely correct. A person cannot 
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preserve his life, exercise his freedom in accordance with the 
essential ends of mankind, or choose his own mode of life if he lacks 
even the material means to purchase food, clothes, shelter and 
medicine. Likewise if an individual is to "regulate and guide his 
life in accordance with some overall conception which he chooses", if 
he is to make those choices characteristic of a value-seeking being, 
it is clear that, at the least, his basic needs must be met, and if 
this is so, there must be redistribution to secure such a minimal 
level of well-being (appropriate to the standards of the society) for 
those without the means to do so for themselves. The degree of 
control of property or material goods requisite for a value-seeking 
life isa matter of debate. There seems good reason to believe 
that a person could best seek value or realise the life of a value-
seeking being in a Mill-type system of co-operatives, partnerships, 
and peasant proprietorships, but, at the very least, it seems that 
his basic needs must be met. Nozick does not show adequately why 
there must be such strong property rights, why there must be no re-
distribution for welfare at even this lowest level. In short, his 
claim that "the state may not use its coercive apparatus for the 
purpose of getting some citizens to aid others" must be rejected. 
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